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ABSTRACT 
 
INTERPRETING THE CULTURE OF UBUNTU: 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF A REPRESENTATIVE INDIGENOUS AFRICAN ETHICS 
TO GLOBAL BIOETHICS 
 
 
By  
Leonard Tumaini Chuwa, A.J., M.A. 
December, 2012 
 
Dissertation Supervised by Professor Gerard Magill, PhD 
Ubuntu is a worldview and a way of life shared by most Africans south of Sahara. 
Basically Ubuntu underlines the often unrecognized role of relatedness and dependence 
of human individuality to other humans and the cosmos. The importance of relatedness to 
humanity is summarized by the two maxims of Ubuntu. The first is: a human being is 
human because of other human beings. The second maxim is an elaboration of the first. It 
goes; a human being is human because of the otherness of other human beings. John 
Mbiti combines those two maxims into, ―I am because we are, and we are because I am.‖ 
Ubuntu worldview can provide insights about relationships with communities and the 
world that contribute to the meaning of Global Bioethics.  
Ubuntu can be described as involving several distinct yet related components that 
can be explored in relation to major strands of discourse in contemporary Bioethics. The 
 v  
first component of Ubuntu deals with the tension between individual and universal rights. 
The second component of Ubuntu deals with concerns about the cosmic and global 
context of life. The third component of Ubuntu deals with the role of solidarity that unites 
individuals and communities. Ubuntu has a lot in common with current discourse in 
bioethics. It can facilitate global bioethics. It can inspire the on-going dialogue about 
human dignity, human rights and the ethics that surround it. It can inspire and be inspired 
by global environmental concerns that threaten the biosphere and human life. Ubuntu can 
critique the formal bioethical principles of autonomy, justice, beneficence and non-
maleficence. Above all, Ubuntu can create a basis for dialogue and mutually enlightening 
discourse between global bioethics and indigenous cultures. Such a dialogue helps make 
advancements in bioethics relevant to local indigenous cultures, thereby facilitating the 
acceptability and praxis of global bioethical principles. 
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 Chapter One
Introduction: The Culture of Ubuntu 
Bioethics is a relatively new formal academic discipline. An increasing sense of 
the significance of Global Bioethics is emerging in which indigenous cultures are 
recognized as making valuable contributions to the general field of bioethics. The culture 
of Ubuntu is a representative example of an indigenous African ethics that can contribute 
to an emerging understanding of Global Bioethics. 
Ubuntu, which has existed for centuries, is a sub-Sahara African culture that 
refers to respectful treatment of all people as sharing, caring, and living in harmony with 
all creation. Felix Munyaradzi articulates that according to Ubuntu culture, an ideal and 
meaningful life is a product of inner peace, which results from harmonious relationships 
among individuals, between individuals and society, and between people and their 
environment. 
This dissertation discusses the three constituent components of the culture of 
Ubuntu: human rights based on human dignity, human cosmic context, and social 
solidarity. In other words, Ubuntu is comprised of values that enable and maintain 
harmony among human beings, between people and their environment, and between 
people and the cosmos.
1
 According to the ideal of Ubuntu ethics, pursuit of this harmony 
and tranquility in creation should occur at individual, societal and cosmic levels. Thus in 
the tradition of Ubuntu, cooperation between individuals, social cultures, and creation is 
of utmost importance.
2
 The first section of this chapter explores the culture of Ubuntu in 
general while the second section explores Ubuntu ethics in particular. 
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1. Exploration of Ubuntu 
The culture of Ubuntu presents a communal mindset for ethical decisions 
whereby individuals, community, and the world are connected together. Of course, the 
ancient culture of Ubuntu cannot articulate positions on contemporary technical 
bioethical issues such as brain death, genetic engineering, or cloning that are found in the 
developed world. Ubuntu can neither be classified as, nor compete with, the modern 
defined and specialized schools of thought in ethics such as modern consequentialism, 
deontology, or pragmatism. However, the culture of Ubuntu can provide insights about 
relationships with communities and the world that enable this indigenous African ethics 
to contribute to Global Bioethics. 
a. Meaning of Ubuntu 
Ubuntu is a Nguni word consisting of the ―augment prefix u-, the abstract noun 
prefix bu-, and the noun stem –ntu, meaning person.‖3 The word is found in most Bantu 
languages and shares the same construction, or same root, or same phonetics, or same 
concept. Most Bantu ethnic groups use a phonological variant of the word but its 
meaning, word-view and application are universal to the indigenous people of Africa 
South of the Sahara. The Swahili people of East Africa, for example, use Utu, Kikuyu of 
Kenya use the word Umundu, Merians of Kenya use Umuntu, The Chagga of Tanzania 
use Undu and the Sukuma people of Tanzania use the word Bumuntu.
4
 
This shared world-view, the culture of Ubuntu, is articulated by Broodryk. He 
describes Ubuntu as ―a comprehensive ancient African worldview based on the core 
values of intense humanness, caring, sharing, respect, compassion and associated values, 
ensuring a happy and qualitative human community life in a spirit of family.‖5 Asante, 
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Miike and Yin describe the Ubuntu worldview as multidimensional, representing ―the 
core values of African world views: respect for any human being, for human dignity and 
for human life, collective shared responsibility, obedience, humility, solidarity, caring, 
hospitality, interdependence, and communalism, to list but a few.‖6 In Louw‘s words, 
Ubuntu ―can be interpreted as both a factual description and a rule of conduct or social 
ethics. It both describes human being as ‗being-with-others‘ and prescribes what ‗being-
with-others‘ should be all about.‖7 
b. Ubuntu is Anthropocentric, Theocentric and Cosmocentric 
African culture has been termed anthropocentric because it rarely addresses God 
directly. God is both transcendent and immanent. Although humans pray to God directly, 
they often go through intermediaries because they are believed to have better access to 
God. Such intermediaries would include ancestors and spirits.
8
 Bujo explains this view 
when he notes that ―One who pays heed to the dignity of the human person also pleases 
God, and the one who acts against the human person offends precisely this God.‖9 
Another important clue into understanding Ubuntu culture is that ―African ethics treats 
the dignity of the human person as including the dignity of the entire creation, so that the 
cosmic dimension is one of its basic components.‖10 Consequently, African ethics can 
only be properly understood from the perspective of being anthropocentric, societal, 
cosmic and theocentric. Its objective is ―fundamentally life itself.‖11 Each member of the 
community and the community as a whole ―must guarantee the promotion and protection 
of life by specifying or ordaining ethics and morality.‖12 Life is the highest principle of 
ethical conduct.
13
 Whatever is against life is unethical; whatever favors life is ethical. 
Although human life is the center of all life on earth, all life is sacred since all life is 
considered interdependent. 
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(i) Interdependence 
Ubuntu observes a network of interdependence and relationships that are divinely 
ordained to promote, sustain and foster life. A human person can neither be defined nor 
survive if separated from the society and the cosmos that enables that person‘s existence. 
It is a matter of justice to care for other humans, other lives and the non-living part of the 
cosmos. Len Holdstock describes this African perspective of reality as holistic. He notes 
that for an African, everything belongs together; humans and the world around them 
belong together. Causing harm to the environment is hurting oneself. Humans are 
perceived as a vital force which is interrelated with, and contingent upon other vital 
forces around them. Existence is inconceivable independent of the beings‘ 
interdependence and interrelationships.
14
 To explain this mindset among the peoples of 
sub-Sahara Africa, Donna Richards writes that ―The traditional African view of the 
universe is as a spiritual whole in which all beings are organically interrelated and 
interdependent…the cosmos is sacred and cannot be objectified. Nature is spirit, not to be 
exploited…All beings exist in reciprocal relationship to one another.‖15 However, 
Richards notes that there is tension in reality which underlines individual self-
determination without negating the ideal of harmony in reality. She also notes the same 
interdependence between spirit and matter. She states that ―The mode of harmony which 
prevails does not preclude the ability to struggle. Spirit is primary, yet manifested in 
material being.‖16 
According to Ubuntu, reality is unity in which God is both imminent and 
transcendent. Ubuntu may be understood by considering the philosophy of Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin. De Chardin transcends the traditional dualistic and dichotomous 
worldview in his powerful perception of reality as essentially one. He construes reality 
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neither as a division of matter and energy, nor spirit and matter but as a single reality in 
the shape of two phenomena. Matter and energy are two aspects or phenomena of a single 
being; there is inseparable interconnectedness and interdependence. Matter can be 
reduced to energy and energy to matter.
17
 Such worldview, which is based on scientific 
discoveries, best describes the perspective of Ubuntu. In Ubuntu the physical and the 
spiritual, the living and the non-living, the human and the non-human are perceived as 
necessary in sustenance of human life. Human life comes from, and is sustained by both 
organic and inorganic cosmos. For the sake of harmony, which is an ethical ideal, 
humans must treat each being fairly according to its moral status and claim. Thaddeus 
Metz argues that compared to holist and individualist conceptions of moral status, this 
African ―underexplored modal-relational perspective does a better job of accounting for 
degrees of moral status.‖18 Interdependence and relationality is the kernel of the argument 
for the moral status of non-human beings. 
In sum, the human person is an organism within a bigger organism, the society. 
Human society is a part of the biosphere and the cosmos. God is both transcendent and 
imminent in the sense that he pervades reality while at the same time remains separate 
from it. Somé observes, ―The close relationship between people and place is symbolized 
by the bond that indigenous people recognize between a person and his or her place of 
birth, and also in the fact that any ritual that is performed is viewed as being tied to the 
geography where it takes place.‖19 Being a comprehensive world view, therefore, Ubuntu 
is a loaded term which is defined in a variety of ways. Whichever way Ubuntu is defined, 
it ―reveals African culture and tradition, beliefs and customs and value systems.‖20 
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Ubuntu is the bond that underlies the cultural diversity and various value systems of most 
African ethnic groups south of Sahara. 
(ii) Need for Otherness 
In Ubuntu ethics the importance of other persons for any human being cannot be 
overstated. A person is both ontologically and socially a product of other persons. Ubuntu 
is based on two maxims. The first is ―a person is a person through other persons.‖21 The 
second maxim is a translation of the same statement that underlines the need for diversity 
and plurality. It states, ―A human being is a human being through the otherness of other 
human beings.‖22 Otherness includes human diversity of languages, histories, values and 
customs, all of which constitute human society.
23
 
Ubuntu recognizes the fact that an individual can only become conscious of 
his/her existence along with its rights as well as obligations towards the self, other 
persons and the universe by the medium of the presence of others. In other words, cut off 
from all others, no individual personal life is possible, let alone personal consciousness.
24
 
Such personal consciousness is based, not only on the living members of the society; it is 
based also on all those who have died, from whom the present members descended. The 
culture of Ubuntu recognizes that present generation is a product of past generations. 
Many past generations have paved the way and made it possible for any current 
generation to be what it is now. Current generations, so to say, stand on the shoulders of 
past generations.
25
 
Because of its ‗other-oriented‘ worldview Ubuntu is communitarian. Mbiti 
express this interconnection between individuals in praxis when he states that in the 
Ubuntu culture whatever happens to the individual happens not just to that individual but 
to the community in which the individual is a member. Likewise, whatever happens to 
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the community impacts each member of the community. When an individual rejoices ―he 
rejoices not alone but with his kinsmen, his neighbors and his relatives whether dead or 
living… The individual can only say, ‗I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore, I 
am.‘‖26 Gyekye notes that most Bantu languages, acknowledge that a person is, 
―inherently a communal being, embedded in a context of social relationships and 
interdependence, and never as an isolated, atomic individual‖27 No individual survival or 
realization is possible independent of the community. 
Since the community enables individuation and its basic rights, duties and 
obligations, the individual owes the community just as the community owes the 
individual. Neither of the two survives without the other. The community is a product of 
its many individuals, just as the individual is a product of many members of the 
community. The interdependent mutuality between the community and its members can 
neither be denied nor overstated. In his African Traditions and Religions basing his 
argument on a research that he made in sub-Sahara Africa Mbiti explores the symbiotic 
relationship between sub-Sahara Africans and their respective ethnic communities. He 
notes that individual existence is only possible within corporate existence. Consequently 
any particular individual is simply ―part of the whole.‖ Separation from the community is 
not only impossible. It is inconceivable. It is an essential duty of the community, 
therefore, to ―make, create, or produce the individual; for the individual depends on the 
corporate group. Physical birth is not enough: the child must go through a rite of 
incorporation so that it becomes fully integrated into the entire society.‖28 The role of the 
corporate community in the constant on-going creation of the individual commands 
reciprocity in form of individual cooperation in the life of the community. 
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Among the Bantu peoples of Africa life is characterized by constant initiation and 
incorporation which is expressed in rich symbolism of new birth. Such initiations are 
stages through which the community creates the individual, enabling him to self-realize. 
They are forms of incorporation into the wider world. According to Mbiti, the initiation 
goes on even after death. The final stage of initiation for the person ―is reached when he 
dies and even then he is ritually incorporated into the wider family of both the dead and 
the living.‖29 
The phrase ―being with others‖ in Ubuntu is of central importance. It is not 
limited to human beings. It includes the biosphere and the cosmos, since human action 
affects both humans and non-human universe. Human beings are not only dependent on 
one another; they are dependent on the biosphere and the cosmos. Human existence is 
rooted in, facilitated by, and constantly related to the biosphere and the cosmos. Just as it 
is impossible to envision human personhood independent of the society, so it is 
impossible to envision human society independent of its context, the cosmos. In the 
words of Somé, ―The natural world is an integral part of an indigenous community. 
Village people envision the community as including the geography and the natural world 
that surrounds and contains the people.‖30 The peoples of sub-Sahara Africa perceive 
society, the biosphere and the cosmos as an extension of the self. Consequently ―being 
with others‖ is necessary for personal happiness, peace, integrity and self-realization. 
Thaddeus Metz posits that relationality is ―at the core of morality.‖31 
The culture of Ubuntu is both theocentric and anthropocentric. Human beings are 
the center of created reality. However, humans‘ centrality does not preclude God‘s 
supreme sovereignty. Ubuntu holds that all reality is under God‘s control. Kasanane notes 
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that traditional Africans believe that God controls the universe, human interactions and 
relationships among themselves as well as with the cosmos by means of a number of 
subsidiaries. The ―Supreme Being is interested in the way people relate to one another. A 
number of taboos, regulations and prohibitions exist in every society to ensure mutual 
coexistence.‖32 
(iii) Ubuntu and Unity 
Due to its steadfast belief in the importance of unity as a fundamental value, 
Ubuntu culture is not interested in separating, defining, and distinguishing. Kasanane 
expresses this worldview in his work, Ethics in African Theology when he says that ―in 
African religions there is no separation between religion and ethics, between one‘s beliefs 
and one‘s actions towards others. Ethics is an integral part of religion.‖33 Mbiti notes that 
religion is part and parcel of the life-style and all activities of traditional Africans. In 
Mbiti‘s words, ―Because traditional religions permeate all the departments of life, there is 
no formal distinction between the sacred and the secular, between the religious and non-
religious, between the spiritual and the material areas of life. Wherever the African is, 
there is his religion.‖34 Whether a traditional African is sowing, harvesting, in a party, in 
a funeral ceremony or at war he/she is religious. Religion cannot be separated from the 
believer. Thus, the daily normal activities of people are at the same time acts of 
worship.
35
 Bujo summarizes sub-Saharan holism when he writes, ―no dichotomy exists in 
Black Africa between body and soul, or between theory and praxis – or in the present 
instance between the body and knowledge.‖36 Reality or existence is a function of unity. 
Human unity is crucial in the comprehension of existence itself. Unity is of 
ontological, societal, ethical and religious importance. Exploring African culture as 
compared to western culture, Steve Biko States: ―We regard our living together not as an 
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unfortunate mishap warranting endless competition among us but as a deliberate act of 
God to make us a community of brothers and sisters jointly involved in the quest for a 
composite answer to the varied problems of life.‖ Biko then evaluates an African action 
as communal as distinguished from individualistic approach to human action. He states, 
―our action is usually joint community oriented action rather than the individualism 
which is the hallmark of the capitalist approach.‖37 
The corporate view of a human person among sub-Sahara Africans is so deep that, 
as Menkiti relates, a person cannot be defined, as is the case in the western world, 
according to his ―physical or psychological characteristic of a lone individual.‖ A person 
transcends such criteria. A definition of a person which excludes the community falls 
short of necessary components that define personhood, the most important of which 
concern his relationality, need for community or society, and unity.
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Personal and societal need for the biosphere and the cosmos can hardly be 
overstated in the Ubuntu perspective. Although no animal has equal moral status to a 
human person, nevertheless, to the degree that humans relate with a particular member of 
the biosphere, such being has a degree of moral status that ought to be recognized and 
respected, especially in relation to human dignity and the need of humans for other 
beings.
39
 Metz argues at length for the validity and plausibility of this African perspective 
as a theory of moral status. Metz contends that ―in light of the African theory‘s ability to 
account for many widely shared intuitions, it warrants no less attention than individualist 
and holist accounts as a promising form of monism.‖40 The unity that Ubuntu advocates 
for is based on human dignity. This dignity demands human rights without excluding the 
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rights of the biosphere, since human beings cannot be extricated from the biosphere. 
Consequently, Metz concludes that Ubuntu is a form of monism. 
c. Ubuntu Ethics of Immortality 
Due to its reverence for life, Ubuntu ethics‘ objective is not only preservation of 
the ontological life on earth but also its survival after physical death. According to 
Ubuntu, human life is so central, so dignified, unrepeatable, sacred and unique that it 
should survive physical death. Strictly, from Ubuntu perspective human life does not end. 
Thus, death is yet another stage of initiation in the human life‘s process of continual and 
immortal initiation. 
(i) Personal Immortality 
Most African indigenous societies believe that personal immortality is achieved in 
two ways. On the level of an individual, personal immortality is ―externalized in the 
physical continuation of the individual through procreation, so that the children bear the 
traits of their parents or progenitors.‖41 Immortality is crucial for life meaning both for 
the deceased and the survivors. Mbiti explains that ―from the point of view of the 
survivors, personal immortality is expressed in acts like respecting the departed, giving 
bits of food to them, pouring out libation and carrying out instructions given by them 
either while they lived or when they appear.‖42 It is important to note that from the 
perspective of sub-Sahara Africans, the living -dead are really present, although they 
have been initiated in a higher form of existence. They oversee behavior of the living, 
and can punish in case of immorality. ―The acts of pouring libation (of beer, milk or 
water), or giving portions of food to the living-dead, are symbols of communion, 
fellowship and remembrance. They are the mystical ties that bind the living-dead to their 
surviving relatives.‖43 
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This mystical tie between the physically living and the ―living-dead‖ is, on the 
part of the survivors, an obligation. The dead are kept in memory for as long as possible. 
When there is no one living who remembers them they are believed to have gone through 
other initiations into the world of spirits which is further removed from the world of the 
living but the ties always remain. 
The ―living-dead‖ keep moving into a dimension of time that Mbiti calls zamani 
(Swahili word for past). Such a dimension is, for most Africans, more ontologically real 
than future. According to Mbiti‘s observation, sub-Sahara Africans‘ time has two major 
dimensions: zamani and Sasa (Swahili word for now or present). The future is not real 
since it has not been realized, that is, it is not yet present. Since the dead are real, they are 
actually more real than the present since they have gone through more initiations into 
reality than the living.
44
 Thus, even though it is important to survive death by procreation 
on an individual level and by personal memory on the level of the survivors, death does 
not end human life. 
Ubuntu healthcare for the terminally ill and the dying is rich with meaning and 
symbolism. The whole community participates in this significant initiation of that 
member into the community of the living-dead. The community accompanies the dying, 
giving them, as Bujo notes, ―the feeling and the awareness that they are included in the 
process of personal growth even as their physical strength declines…the sick and the 
dying find fresh courage and learn to face suffering and death with greater human 
dignity.‖45 This positive perspective on death and the participation of the community in 
the process is a great help not only to the dying but also to the living. It is both 
ascertaining death with dignity and a healthcare lesson for the community. The living 
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members of the community learn to prepare and to go through this inevitable natural 
initiation with courage when their turn comes.
46
 
(ii) The Importance of Marriage and Procreation 
Due to the importance of immortality both for the diseased and the surviving 
society, marriage and procreation is of utmost importance. Life revolves around it. 
According to Mbiti traditional African marriage ―is a complex affair with economic, 
social and religious aspects which often overlap so firmly that they cannot be separated 
from one another.‖47 The importance of marriage in African traditional society is based 
on fact that it is the central source of societal and personal immortality. Marriage is 
―thepoint where all the members of a given community meet: the departed, the living, and 
those yet to be born. All the dimensions of time meet here and the whole drama of history 
is repeated, renewed and revitalized.‖48 The centrality of marriage rests on the fact that it 
ascertains continuity of life and the community. Consequently, marriage is neither a 
personal decision nor a private matter. The community naturally expects everybody to 
marry both for personal immortality and for the sake of the community. It is a duty and 
an obligation. Bujo writes that even ―sexuality is not a private matter. The goal of 
sexuality is to keep together the community entrusted to us by our ancestors and to 
bestow ever new life on this community.‖49 
Prior to the advent of Christianity, sub-Sahara Africa has never considered 
celibacy as a valid option. Celibacy has always been a sign of selfishness, withdrawal 
from the community and its rhythm, and an offence against the natural law of generation 
and nurturing life. Benezet Bujo compares a celibate person with a magician in their 
action against life.
50
 Just as a magician destroys life, a celibate person passively by his 
omission is against life. Prostitution as such or sex for mere pleasure was seldom heard of 
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in traditional African society, mainly because of the understanding that sexual intercourse 
is meant for generation of life.
51
 
Due to its deep rooted communitarian life, and its understanding of sexuality as a 
means to procreation, sub-Sahara Africa has had few cases of openly known 
homosexuality. Once again Bujo attributes this situation to African communitarianism. 
Bujo states that ―one is a human being only in the duality of man and woman, and this 
bipolarity generates the triad man-woman-child, which leads to full community.‖52 
Community being central in Ubuntu ethics because of its necessity in support of all 
human life, marriage between man and woman is the very first stage in the creation of 
larger human community and in generation of life. Man to woman marriage is essential 
for survival of human community and for the sacred duty to generate and maximize life. 
Bujo observes that ―a man-man or woman-woman relationship would not only be looked 
on as an egotistic isolationism which dares not take the step to full human existence; 
[since existence cannot be separated from the duty to generate, protect and maximize life] 
it also leads to a sexist discrimination against part of the human race and shows an 
unwillingness to accept the enrichment that comes from heterogeneity.‖53 
In case a couple could not procreate, the community improvise a way of helping 
childless couple participate in the life of the community by adoption of children of 
relatives, generating children for an infertile husband via his siblings and polygamy. 
Homosexuality is against real community, thus against life and human race. It is always 
considered evil and great immorality. 
In most African traditional societies, failure to give birth to a child is equivalent to 
death. Although the society has had a myriad of remedies for a childless couple, even if 
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extended family is such that siblings‘ children are one‘s children, having one‘s own child 
is the norm and ideal for which all human beings should strive. Mbiti states this fact more 
explicitly when he writes, ―Unhappy is the woman who fails to get children, for whatever 
other qualities she might possess, her failure to bear children is worse than committing 
genocide: she becomes the dead end of human life, not only for the genealogical line but 
also for herself‖54 since to be truly alive is to be a link in the chain that receives life and 
passes it on via procreation. Being part of the chain of life earns an individual personal 
immortality. Mbiti writes that the greatest plight of a childless wife is the fact that ―when 
she dies, there will be nobody of her own immediate blood to remember her, to keep her 
in the state of personal immortality: she will simply be ‗forgotten…her husband may 
remedy the situation by raising children with another wife; but the childless wife bears a 
scar which nothing can erase.‖55 As much as Ubuntu protects every individual, assuring 
social and psychological security to all society members, a childless wife cannot be 
protected. Because of her fate her family and the society suffers along with her.
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In sum, marriage depicts the traditional African world view in practically all its 
perspectives. African perspective on marriage is a microcosm of the communitarian 
understanding of the Ubuntu world view. Such world view is represented in the 
symbolism, rituals, songs, proverbs, stories and poems used in the celebration of 
marriage. 
(iii) Ubuntu Theory of Moral Development 
Due to its reverence for life, the culture of Ubuntu reverences the process of birth. 
Most members of the society are involved in the process. However, the process does not 
end with physical child birth. A pregnant woman‘s labor pain is gradually taken over by 
the immediate family, the extended family and, eventually the community. From the 
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moment of conception a child starts growing more into becoming a child of the society 
rather than of its immediate parents. The life-long process of initiation that Mbiti refers to 
and its many rites and rituals are geared towards such incorporation. Thus the community 
gradually takes over the process of helping the child realize itself. The physical placenta 
and umbilical cord represent ―separation of the child from the mother, but this separation 
is not final since the two are still near each other. But the child begins to belong to the 
wider circle of society.‖57 The community has to help the child become human being, a 
person. In Mbiti‘s words ―nature brings the child into the world, but society creates the 
child into a social being, a corporate person.‖58 
The community has in place a continual process of formation of a child into a 
mature person in the community. Such process is usually in the form of initiation and 
societal incorporation. The child is helped into self-realization by the society. Self-
realization, however, is always accomplished through the medium of the community. 
Shutte makes it clear that, ―Our deepest moral obligation is to become fully human. And 
this means entering more and more deeply into community with others. So although the 
goal is personal fulfillment, selfishness is excluded.‖59 This growth is essential not only 
because it is the path to acquisition of membership in the society but also because it is 
constitutive of the essence of humanness. A person who fails to grow into relating with 
other persons in an acceptable way is regarded inhuman. Most Bantu languages use 
phrases like ―he is not a person‖ or ―he is an animal.‖ Swahili, which is used as a national 
language in Tanzania and which is spoken in most East and Central Africa, uses the 
phrase hana utu (s/he lacks personhood).
60
 Thus, it is imperative that the society 
recognizes one as a person, therefore a member. Lack of personhood means, at the same 
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time, lack of the essential qualifications to belong to the society, thus incapable of 
membership. 
Every person is helped by the community and should cooperate too in his own 
process of moral development. Essential in the process of moral development is 
becoming a part of the community as a whole. Gbadegesin refers to this objective and 
expectation when he writes ―every member is expected to consider him/herself an 
integral part of the whole and to play an appropriate role towards achieving the good of 
all.‖61 Doing that, however involves reciprocity since a person can only self-realize 
through other persons. This observation led Metz and Gaie to conclude that ―sub-Saharan 
morality is essentially relational in a way that other Western approaches usually are 
not.‖62 
Metz and Gaie compare the sub-Saharan sense of justice, impartiality, and 
understanding of human rights with the modern Western perspective. The basic substance 
of the human rights argument and theory is contained in the sub-Saharan understanding 
of justice. Metz and Gaie observe that Ubuntu includes ―an impartial element, part of 
which is a matter of individual rights. Traditional African societies have often thought of 
human life as having a dignity that implies recognition of certain universal human 
rights.‖63 Human rights are not negotiable in sub-Saharan Africa. They are a given and 
are almost identical to the modern western conception of human rights. Metz and Gaie 
argue for this conclusion when they state that, ―Despite the moral prominence given to 
their own community, indigenous sub-Saharan societies are well-known for having 
welcomed a stranger to their villages, giving him food and shelter for at least a period of 
time.‖64 This practice is not charity. It is based on the understanding of human dignity. 
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This dignity is share by all who share human life. Metz and Gaie observe that Africans 
―hardly considered a foreigner outside the bounds of moral consideration and, instead, 
tended to view all humans as potential parts of an ideal family.‖65 
There is no doubt whatsoever that the sub-Saharan indigenous communities 
recognized human dignity and the basic rights (human rights) due to such dignity. Such 
deep-rooted recognition of basic human rights is often referred to by modern sub-Saharan 
judicial systems. Metz cites some remarks by the South African constitutional court 
which occasionally appeals to Ubuntu and its understanding of basic human rights when 
making legal deliberations. To cite one concrete example, Justice Yvonne Mokgoro 
remarked ―Human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. This, in 
my view, is not different from what the Spirit of Ubuntu embraces.‖66 
Actually Metz and Gaie contend that sub-Saharan indigenous Africans‘ concept 
of justice which is represented in Ubuntu can be reduced to, and transcends both 
Kohlberg‘s theory of justice (respect for equal rights of persons model) and ethics of 
care‘s perspective (relationality and reciprocity of care model).67 The kernel of sub-
Saharan morality, which is represented by Ubuntu, is human life. The principles of justice 
and care, even Ubuntu relationality are a means to an end, which is, maximization of 
quantity and quality of human life. Onah states this objective of African morality bluntly 
when he writes: ―at the center of traditional African morality is human life. Africans have 
a sacred reverence for life…to protect and nurture their lives, all human beings are 
inserted within a given community.‖ Community therefore is a means to an end: human 
life. Onah notes that ―the promotion of life is therefore the determinant principle of 
African traditional morality and its promotion is guaranteed only in the community. 
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Living harmoniously within a community is therefore a moral obligation ordained by 
God for the promotion of life.‖68 
The community and each of its members have to participate in the duty of 
promoting and preserving life since, human life, in itself, commands human rights due to 
its inherent dignity. Thaddeus Metz coins a moral principle from this unanimously 
accepted sub-Saharan African stance towards life. ―An action is right just insofar as it 
promotes the well-being of others without violating their rights; an action is wrong to the 
extent that it either violates rights or fails to enhance the welfare of one‘s fellows without 
violating rights.‖69 Consequently, even if it is not always explicitly stated, it can safely be 
concluded that the ultimate objective of Ubuntu is protection of basic human rights. 
Desmond Tutu mentions values which ascertain protection of life when he writes, 
―Harmony, friendliness, community are great goods. Social harmony is for us the 
summumbonum – the greatest good.‖70 Although Tutu does not mention that social 
harmony is actually a means to an end, which is human life, he mentions the vices that 
should be avoided because they either threaten or undermine human life. ―Anything that 
subverts or undermines this sought-after good is to be avoided like the plague. Anger, 
resentment, lust for revenge, even success through aggressive competitiveness, are 
corrosive of this good.‖71 Social harmony is the rightful context for flourishing of human 
life; that is why even aggressive competitiveness is perceived as a vice, rather than a 
virtue. 
Ubuntu model of moral development includes, respect for dignity of other human 
beings, recognition of their personhood, establishment of human relationship with others 
while, at the same time, essential respect and praxis of human rights and execution of 
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justice. Its major objective is provision of the optimum context and environment for 
maximization of quantity and quality of human life. With regard to its objective – human 
life, Ubuntu model, which combines care and justice, is worth exploring further, 
especially because it is comprehensive in approach, comprising and encompassing the 
modern piece-meal approaches. 
2. Relevance of Ubuntu Worldview 
Being a product of many centuries of human existence in relation to nature, the 
culture of Ubuntu is discovered or spontaneously observed rather than invented. 
Individuals find themselves already bonded with each other and with the cosmos as a 
matter of necessity. The rationale for this bonding together is a product of many centuries 
of cumulative experience-based survival wisdom. Such wisdom is passed on by ancestors 
via elders.
72
 Human identity and personhood is impossible independent of community. 
Individuation occurs in a dynamic relationship with others, without which there can be no 
human personal existence. This important truth is best explained by Benhabib in her 
work, Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Post Modernism in Contemporary 
Ethics: ―Because the identity of the self is inter-subjective, the ‗I‘ can only become an ‗I‘ 
in the context of a ‗we.‘ Individuation does not precede association; rather it is the kind 
of associations which we inhabit that define the kinds of individuals we become.‖73 Thus 
Ubuntu is essentially communitarian. Individuality and personhood are facilitated by 
context, which comprises human society, biosphere, and the cosmos. The society 
precedes and defines its constituents. Human action should therefore proceed from such 
background and context. 
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a. Ubuntu Existential-Relational Epistemology 
Charles Taylor contends that our modern sense of self is constituted by some 
sense of ―inwardness.‖ Taylor notes that ―in our language of self-understanding, the 
opposition ‗inside-out‘ plays an important role. We think of our thoughts, ideas or 
feelings as being ‗within‘ us, while the objects in the world which these mental states 
bear on are ‗without.‘‖ Taylor then contends that this sort of ―localization is not a 
universal one … it is a function of a historically limited mode of self-interpretation, one 
which has become dominant in the modern West … but which had beginning in time and 
space and may have an end.‖74 Taylor then laments that that we are constantly losing 
from sight here is that being a self is inseparable from existing in a space of moral issues, 
to do with identity and how one ought to be.‖75 Then Taylor argues both for neutrality in 
the world of morals without denying one the right to hold a position in it. He argues that 
being a self in the world of morals is ―being able to find one‘s standpoint in this space, 
being able to occupy, to be a perspective in it.‖76 Being a perspective in the space of 
moral issues does not and should not change the real human moral universals. Taylor 
points out how hard it is to extract the real universals from different perspectives. He 
states that ―The really difficult thing is distinguishing the human universals from the 
historical constellations and not eliding the second into the first so that our particular way 
seems somehow inescapable for humans as such, as we are always tempted to do.‖77 
Following Taylor‘s observation and insight, there is need too for ethicists to be 
ethical in establishing what is considered universal for all humans, especially with 
regards to morals. In other words, it is possible to be unethical in the very act of doing 
what we consider authentic ethics. There is inescapable need to respect and pay serious 
attention to other ethics, or ways of doing ethics. 
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Ubuntu world-view affirms, challenges and inverts the platonic world of ideas, 
Descartes‘ disengaged self in cogito ergo sum, Augustine‘s doctrine of finding God from 
within oneself and in the order of creation and Locke‘s punctual self. Ubuntu provides a 
contrast that is necessary for a fair perspective on reality; that is, the role of otherness in 
ontology, theology and epistemology. Ubuntu states that the inner-self or selfhood can 
only be accessed via objectification; objectification, however, demands otherness. Any 
relationship with God or the self implies accepting an-other – even if by imagination. 
Imagination and ideas, however, result from reality of existence of other beings.
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Ubuntu presents a sharp contrast to the Cartesian individualist proof of existence 
cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) by its communitarian existential and relational 
cognatus sum, ergo sumus (I am known, therefore we are).
79
 This epistemology is 
relational. It means that the act of conceptualization is at its core relational, as it must 
involve two beings to be practicable. Moreover, present human individual action is a 
product of many centuries of experience, evolution and its resultant cumulative wisdom. 
Bujo notes that Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI) interestingly arrives to the 
same conclusion via his Christology. Ratzinger writes: ―Christian faith does not find its 
starting-point in the atomized individual, but comes from the knowledge that the merely 
individual person does not exist.‖ Ratzinger then affirms the Ubuntu understanding of a 
human being as a link in a long chain of evolving human history within the cosmos as its 
necessary context. Ratzinger states, ―The human person is himself only in an orientation 
to the totality of humanity, of history, and of the cosmos. This is an appropriate and 
essential dimension of the human person as ‗spirit in a body.‘‖80 
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Essentially, Ratzinger argues that a human person cannot exist as a monad. 
Solitary human existence is self-contradictory. To be human means to simultaneously be 
a member of human community, to actively participate as member of the present human 
community, and to take one‘s place in the on-going chain of human history which must 
be passed on to future generations.
81
 This approach to meaning and significance of 
human life is shared both by the Christian social teaching and Ubuntu. Bujo contends that 
the principle cognatus sum ergo sumus (I am known, therefore we are) is superior to the 
Cartesian cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) because it transcends the metaphor of 
knowledge. Cognatus sum ergo sumus―is not only a given; it is existential to such a 
degree that refusal to accept it must lead to the death, not only of the individual but even 
of the community itself.‖82 
Unlike modern trends in ontology and epistemology Ubuntu recognizes the 
significance of healthy relationality between humans and the cosmos; between the living 
and the dead; and between material world and spiritual world. Bujo regards relatedness as 
―the decisive issue…It signifies merely an openness that goes beyond what is present and 
visible in a given situation.‖83 Relatedness does not only facilitate individuation and 
intelligibility of reality, it is the kernel that keeps unity of reality thus its very existence. 
As for human relationality, Bujo summarizes the importance of relationality between 
individuals when he writes ―individuals live only thanks to the community‖84 which 
provides for the possibility of establishing relationships. By means of analogy Ruch 
states that an African ―does not feel himself like a swimmer in a hostile and foreign sea: 
he is part of this sea, he participates in it as it participates in him.‖85 This analogy 
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describes both Ubuntu ontology and epistemology in a very profound way. It is a 
summary of the Ubuntu worldview. 
Human need for community as the kernel of Ubuntu ethics has been expressed by 
a number of Ubuntu scholars. John Mbiti, for example, states that Ubuntu ethics is based 
on the premise that an individual becomes conscious of his own existence, rights, duties 
and obligations through other individuals, society and the environment. There is no real 
personal existence independent of the society and environment. Whatever affects one 
individual affects the entire society and its environment. Likewise, whatever affects the 
society affects each individual in it and that person‘s environment. Thus ―an individual 
can only say, ‗I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore, I am.‖86 
b. Ubuntu Relational and Holistic Perspective on Human Disease 
Bujo observed that in African traditional society disease and illness that befell an 
individual always indicated that something is wrong in human relationships. 
Consequently, in diagnosing an individual‘s illness ―the patient‘s family relationships are 
studied and past conflicts interpreted anew. … The healing rituals and witch executions 
in their different ways restore, or attempt to restore, harmonious social life.‖87 Any 
attempt to effect healing cannot ignore human and environmental relationships. 
Diagnosis of the ailment and its causality cannot be done independent of patient‘s 
relationships with human and non-human environment. One‘s ailment may as well be a 
consequence of disturbed or non-harmonious relationships with the world of the dead.‖88 
Thus, disease does not always result from physiogenic causes. Many diseases result from 
psychogenic, spiritual and sociological causes. It is important, therefore, that holistic 
healing be given. 
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Sub-Saharan traditional healing aims at restoration of balance in both natural and 
supernatural relations. The supernatural aspect was often done by sacrifices and specified 
rituals.
89
 The objective for traditional healing was beyond mere treatment of the specific 
disease. Kasanene affirms that traditional healing practice had as its goal the ―personal 
integration, environmental equilibrium, social harmony and harmony between the 
individual and both the environment and the community.‖90 The healer has to ascertain 
the healing is comprehensive. Alongside prescribing some herbs he ―has to go beyond the 
mere physiological and individual symptoms, until the proper psychological, moral and 
socially-conditioned cause can be traced and discovered.‖91 
Benezet Bujo describes the practice and objective of African traditional healing as 
follows: ―It treats disease not only with powerful medicines, but also with rituals that 
place the patient at the center of a social drama in which emotions are highly charged and 
symbolically expressed.‖92 The significance of the ritual and symbols is to effect holistic, 
psychological, social and physical healing.‖93 Since disease is perceived as a breakage of 
wholeness and integration within oneself with the society and the cosmos, Bujo notes on 
the importance of making the patient feel needed by society and the cosmos. He writes, 
―The afflicted person is made to feel important and the object of social concern, while the 
ritual also relates what is happening to her wider cosmological and social concerns.‖94 
According to Bujo this African healing techniques ―enhance positively the patient‘s 
psychological state - thus providing a more favorable climate for physical and 
psychological healing to take place.‖95 The patient is affirmed as an important needed 
member of the society whose dignity can never be compromised. Emphasizing this point, 
Bujo compares African perspective on the sick person to the modern western one. He 
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writes, ―The patient is not rejected as deviant, as a malingerer or as a marginal character, 
as is often the case in western medicine, but is integrated fully into the continuing 
concerns of the community.‖96 
Health care in Ubuntu culture is therefore not only comprehensive and holistic, it 
is always communitarian. Mbombo notes that whenever a member of the society was ill a 
representative group accompanies the sick person to the village of the medicine man or 
woman ―to listen for this person, or listen with this person. When they come out of the 
consulting room, what the doctor has said is also the concern of those who are waiting.‖97 
The companionship that the group gives the sick person is expressive of the bond that 
each person has with the rest of the society and it is in itself therapeutic. 
Although the healing process is communitarian, involving the whole community, 
no treatment of any two persons is alike, even if they have the same complaint. Treatment 
is as unique as each person‘s personality is unique. This can be explained by the fact that 
the way each person relates with other persons, nature, the cosmos and spirits – including 
ancestral spirits is different. Disease or an illness is a mere symptom of an underlying 
cause, which is generally a breakage of relationship and its consequent disharmony. Since 
relationships are never identical, illnesses may appear similar but healing process is 
conditioned by the cause of the disharmony, agents involved, its nature and its extent.
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It is not surprising that Pal states that African perspective on healing is based on a 
framework that is ―seemingly antithetical to a quantitative biomedical framework.‖99 
African traditional healing is based on their perspective on reality as a whole. Senghor 
represents a similar perspective when he states that Africans refuse to draw a line 
between themselves as subjects and their object of reason or act. They would rather see 
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the threads of interconnectedness between all that exists.
100
 A major part of healing is 
reconciliation which goes beyond the visible community and reality to the invisible, 
among the living and between the living and the dead.
101
 Rituals for healing continue 
even when the patient dies. Austine Okwu enumerates some of the rituals that go beyond 
burial. They include: ―charity cooking and eating, exchanging good wishes, confessions, 
the patrilineal head‘s blessing, and, in some cases societal singing and dancing, are forms 
of psychotherapeutic drama.‖102 
c. Ubuntu Communitarian Healthcare Ethics 
In Ubuntu culture, the sick and the disabled are always a responsibility of the 
society. The proximate society of the sick person takes charge and accompanies their sick 
until he/she gets well or dies. Human company, its empathic presence, and solidarity with 
the sick or dying member of the society manifest each participant‘s and the community‘s 
moral maturity. If the patient is dying, the caregiver (which is the entire immediate 
community) helps him go through their initiation and incorporation into the community 
of the living dead. They are thus ―included in the process of personal growth even as 
their physical strength declines.‖103 Usually the objective of the community is to provide 
the sick and the dying with courage, peace and dignity while easing their physical, 
emotional or psychological pain as much as possible.
104
 The practice of accompanying 
the sick and the dying is not only considered as virtue or charity, it is an obligation, a 
responsibility and duty of all members of the society. For the sick person the supportive 
presence of other members of the community is ―a manifestation of a unified concept of 
the individual, in which he or she is not isolated, but part of others.‖105 
Caring for the sick, the aged and the dying is considered to be a practical learning 
experience. Since there is no formal school in the traditional society, Alasdair Maclntyre 
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relates that ―education in virtue and the promotion of ethical living are tasks incumbent 
upon the entire community, and this implies that the community gives expression to itself 
through each individual action.‖106 There are other informal ways of learning such as 
riddles, proverbs and myths. Parrinder describes one of them, Myth. ―Myths are stories, 
the product of a fertile imagination, sometimes simple, often containing profound 
truths… some of these are philosophical, in that they consider great questions such as the 
meaning of life, the origins of all things, the purpose and end of life, death and its 
conquest. These are often the subject of myths, which are philosophy in parables.‖107 
Indigenous sub-Saharan learning was not considered successful until it was put into 
practice. Caring for the needy, in this case the sick, elderly and dying occasioned a 
moment of testing how the community as a whole and its individuals are well trained in 
life‘s important facts. By caring for the sick, the old and the dying, the community 
members learn not only what happens to human beings but, above all, they learn the joy 
giving; that is living for others and through others. 
On the part of caregivers, the companionship provided to the sick and the dying is 
an act of worship to God. There is no separation between these different aspects of the 
same act. Kasanene notes that there is really no separation between religion and ethics, 
between one‘s beliefs and one‘s actions towards others. Ethics is an integral part of 
religion.
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 Since God is considered both transcendent and immanent, it was not 
permissible to separate the secular from the religious, matter and spirit. Caring for the 
dying gives worship to God as praying or offering libation through ancestors also gives 
worship to God.
109
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The ideal of ethical maturity is not self-centered but other-centered. Tutu 
describes a mature person as ―open and available to others, affirming of others, does not 
feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance 
that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished 
when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed.‖110 
Consequently, Tutu describes Ubuntu as ―the essence of being human‖ since it ―speaks of 
the fact that my humanity is caught up and is inextricably bound up in yours. ‗I am 
human because I belong.‘‖111 
Conclusion 
This chapter has briefly explored the essence of Ubuntu in view of demonstrating 
its usefulness to Global Bioethics. Ubuntu represents many indigenous African cultures 
that can make original contributions to Global Bioethics. Ubuntu provides insights about 
human relationships with communities and the world that enable this indigenous African 
ethics to contribute to Global Bioethics. 
Ubuntu‘s fundamental objective is life itself. The unity that Ubuntu advocates is 
geared towards support of the dignity of human life. As such, harmonious community 
living which enables and promotes each life is a moral and religious obligation. Human 
dignity demands human rights. Human rights are based on the rights of the biosphere, 
since human beings cannot be extricated from the biosphere. Individuality and 
personhood are facilitated by context, which comprises human society, biosphere, and the 
cosmos. Maintaining the integrity of the biosphere and the cosmos cannot be 
overemphasized. Biosphere and the cosmos interrelate in a way that ultimately supports 
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human life. Community is of utmost importance because of its role in promoting and 
supporting each life in it. 
The ultimate personal moral obligation is to become fully human, which in 
Ubuntu, means entering increasingly into community with others without losing one‘s 
individuality. Cut off from human community, personal consciousness development and 
actualization is impossible. Maintenance of harmonious optimal symbiotic 
interrelationships between humans, the biosphere and the cosmos is the ideal of Ubuntu. 
There is a sharp contrast between Ubuntu worldview and Cartesian ontology and 
epistemology. From the perspective of Ubuntu, all knowledge, including self-knowledge, 
is other-oriented. The self has to be objectified to be accessed, even as it remains the 
subject. Relationship is inescapable in any real human existence. All ethics and morality 
are based on accepting otherness and relating to it. The relationship between the self and 
the inescapable other can be morally evaluated. Consequently, devoid of all relationship, 
there is no human life. This explains why Ubuntu treasures interdependence, initiations 
into wider circles of the society and the cosmos. Such relationships go on beyond 
physical death into the world of the living-dead and eventually spirits and divinities. To 
live, therefore, is to relate. Morality evaluates and explains human relationship with self, 
other humans, the biosphere and the cosmos. 
The centrality of heterosexual marriage in Ubuntu has been explored. Human race 
is in duality of man and woman, which duality relate intimately to generate more life. 
Heterosexual marriage is not a mere option but a moral obligation for the survival of 
human species. It is unethical not to marry and generate progeny. Since humans receive 
their existence from their predecessors, they have an obligation to be a link in the chain 
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that assures survival of the human species by producing progeny. Giving back to the 
community that way is expected of everyone. Hence, marriage and sexuality are not 
necessarily private affair. They are a concern of the entire community. 
Responsible human relationship is at the core of Ubuntu, enabling Ubuntu to be 
comparable to Care Ethics. The sick, disabled and the poor are a concern of everybody. 
Justice is secondary to, and part of, care. Ubuntu understands human disease 
comprehensively, essentially as a breach or breakage of human integrity. Ubuntu 
healthcare addresses not only the visible symptoms, but the possible underlying 
physiogenic, psychological, social and ontological causes. Healing is a process of 
reconciliation. Healing reconciles and restores the lost unity within the self, between the 
self and the society, between the self and the diseased, between the self and the cosmos 
and between the self and God. Ubuntu perspective on human disease and healing is 
comprehensive and holistic. 
Chapter one has demonstrated that healthcare in Ubuntu is a concern of all 
members of the society. Caring for the sick is not charity. It is an ethical obligation. It is a 
proof of one‘s moral maturity. For the sick person, the empathic and supportive presence 
of the community confers a feeling of belonging and sharing in the life of the whole 
community, even as their individual life declines. In the event that the sick person is 
terminal, their sickness is approached as a process of initiation into the world of the 
living-dead. Their decline becomes an eschatological hope-filled process of personal 
growth into the destiny of human life. The role of the community is to give dignity and 
courage to the dying and preparing the living to face their own mortality as they help 
others through the process. 
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The following chapter will study Ubuntu more deeply by exploring its three 
constitutive components in view of demonstrating better how Ubuntu can contribute to, 
and be enlightened by, Global Bioethics. 
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 Chapter Two
Ubuntu Ethics 
Beauchamp and Childress define the term ethics as a ―generic term covering 
several different ways of examining and understanding the moral life.‖112 Childress and 
Macquarrie describe ethics and ethical questions in three different ways. The first are 
―questions as to what is right, good, etc, or of how we ought to behave (normative ethics, 
morals).‖The second are ―questions as to the answers given by particular societies and 
people as to what is right or good. ―The third are ―questions as to the meanings or uses of 
the words used in answering questions of what is right, good.‖113 Emmet describes 
morality as ―Considerations as to what one thinks it important to do and in what ways; 
how to conduct one‘s relations with other people; and being aware and prepared to be 
critical of one‘s basic approvals as disapprovals.‖114 Dewey asserts that ―interest in 
learning from all the contacts of life is the essential moral interest.‖115 
As an ethic, Ubuntu is generally in conformity with the definitions and 
descriptions of ethics given above. Ubuntu, however, is unique in its substance, in its 
method and in its worldview. As an indigenous culture Ubuntu presents an ethical 
worldview (referred to in this work as Ubuntu ethics) with three constituent components. 
The first component of Ubuntu ethics deals with the tension between individual and 
universal rights; the contribution of this component to global bioethics emerges by 
considering the Ethics of Care as a crucial aspect of bioethics discourse. The second 
component of Ubuntu ethics concerns the cosmic and global context of life; the 
contribution of this component to global bioethics emerges by considering UNESCO‘s 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights as crucial for bioethics discourse. 
The third component of Ubuntu ethics deals with the role of solidarity that unites 
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individuals and communities within a cosmic context; the contribution of this component 
to global bioethics emerges by considering the Roman Catholic tradition on social ethics 
as a significant aspect of discourse on global bioethics. This chapter explores those three 
major components of Ubuntu ethics. 
1. Tension between Individual and Universal Rights 
The first major component of Ubuntu concerns the tension between individual 
and universal rights. The meaning of this context is enlightened by considering the Ethics 
of Care. This component has three related concepts. The first concept is inalienable 
rights. Every human individual has inherent inalienable rights to be recognized and 
respected by other human beings. The second component is human relationships. 
Recognition of personhood necessitates the development of human relationships with 
other persons in the society and with the society as a whole. The third concept is 
reciprocity of care. Fostering reciprocity of care occurs through personal acceptance and 
assumption of duties and responsibility in society. 
a. Inalienable Rights 
Ubuntu protects the inalienable rights of individuals. Each person‘s uniqueness is 
connected with rights and obligations.
116
 However, individual rights are only 
recognizable in the context of society.
117
 In Ubuntu culture every human being is entitled 
to all basic human rights. However, there is a very deep implied understanding that 
personal human rights are subordinate to, and dependent on, the basic communitarian 
interests and wellbeing.
118
 Even if a person has inalienable rights such as right to life and 
to personal human dignity, it is the community that recognizes those rights. There is, 
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therefore, a tension between individual human rights and societal basic rights and 
interests. 
(i) Personal Rights within Communitarian Context 
One of the greatest scholars of African communitarianism is Leopold Senghor 
from Senegal. In his view Africans view community as precedent to its component 
individuals. Consequently the community is more important than it‘s the individuals who 
make it. Likewise, according to Senghor‘s views, solidarity should take precedence to 
individual decision and activity. Community needs should be precedent to individual 
needs. He contends that Africans place more emphasis on the ―communion of persons 
than on their autonomy.‖119 In his work titled Consciencism, Nkrumah argues that from 
the African perspective everything that exists is in a complex web of dynamic forces in 
tension but with necessary interconnection and complementarity.
120
 Nkrumah‘s views are 
consistent with Senghor‘s observation of the African worldview. However, Nkrumah 
emphasizes the inevitable conflict and tension within the African ideal of universal unity 
in Ubuntu culture while Senghor places greater emphasis on the importance of societal 
and cosmic unity within African culture.
121
 Both authors shed light on the examination of 
the conflict between individual and universal rights while simultaneously considering the 
individual‘s inalienable rights. 
Gyekye explores the tension between basic personal rights (autonomy, freedom 
and dignity) and the underlying need for the society in realization of individual‘s 
potential.
122
 Gyekye states that there is a relationship between the individual and the 
society which is reflected in the ―conceptions of social structure evolved by a community 
of people.‖123 To explain the relationship between the society and the individual Gyekye 
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cites an Akan proverb which goes, ―The clan is like a cluster of trees which, when seen 
from afar, appear huddled together, but which would be seen to stand individually when 
closely approached.‖124 This proverb is an analogy which implies that even though some 
branches of the trees may touch, or even interlock each tree stands individually and has 
its own identity. Relationships in Ubuntu should not overshadow the importance of 
individual autonomy. There is need for discernment and distinction of the delicate 
balance between the two aspects of Ubuntu. 
In sum, Gyekye observes an inevitable symbiotic mutuality between personal 
inalienable rights and the society. The society is a needed context for realization of 
personhood and self-actualization. However, ―Individuality is not obliterated by 
membership in a human community.‖125 Each individual retains his or her uniqueness 
and basic human rights regardless the role and importance of community to the 
individual. According to Gyekye ―the most satisfactory way to recognize the claims of 
both communality and individuality is to ascribe to them the status of an equal moral 
standing.‖126 
The Ubuntu ideal of maturity is such that one retains one‘s individual rights 
without losing touch with the community which facilitates individuality. Ntibagirirwa 
states that Ubuntu arms one with ―normative principles for responsible decision-making 
and action, for oneself and for the good of the whole community.‖127 Individualistic 
action which leaves out the community would consequently be unethical. Once an 
individual has acquired enough ethical maturity to act simultaneously for self and for the 
community, such person is considered morally mature. In the words of Ntibagirirwa, 
―S/he no more does things because the community expects him/her to do so, but because 
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it is the right thing to do for both him/herself and the community.‖128 In Ntibagirirwa‘s 
view ―It is Ubuntu alone that can allow the individual to transcend, when necessary, what 
the customs of the family or the tribe requires without disrupting the harmony and the 
cohesion of the community.‖129 
(ii) Individual’s Personal Rights are Defined by Others’ Personal Rights 
One of the criticisms against Ubuntu is that it limits personal autonomy and 
freedom. On the contrary, Ubuntu champions realistic ethical freedom. Weil explains this 
position when he states that ―It is not true that freedom of one man is limited by that of 
other men.‖ Freedom is always relative to the freedom of others. ―Man is really free to 
the extent that his freedom fully acknowledged and mirrored by the free consent of his 
fellow men finds confirmation and expansion of liberty. Man is free only among equally 
free men.‖ Ubuntu recognizes the fact that ―the slavery of even one human being violates 
humanity and negates the freedom of all.‖130 Freedom in particular and virtue in general, 
therefore, are contingent to, and defined by community society and the common good. 
No individual is greater than the society; individual members of the society are parts of, 
and enabled by the society. However, Kasanene notes, ―individuals are able to think and 
act independently, as long as their actions do not harm others, and so the individual has to 
always bear in mind that excessive individualism is regarded as being a denial of one's 
corporate existence.‖131 
Thus, strictly speaking, from the perspective of Ubuntu there can be no absolute 
individual rights. All individual rights are understood within the matrix of the 
community. Consequently, Kamwangamalu argues that Ubuntu is communitarian since 
―the group constitutes the focus of the activities of the individual members of the society 
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at large…the good of all determines the good of each or… the welfare of each is 
dependent on the welfare of all.‖132 Since the individual rights are based on, and 
facilitated by, common good, individuals in the culture of Ubuntu should act for 
themselves and the community rather than for themselves against the community. The 
tension between individual rights and the community is resolved by considering 
inalienable individual rights in the context of societal common good. 
b. Human Relationships 
Ubuntu protects human relationships. Although personhood is intrinsic and innate 
to human beings its recognition is of vital importance. Morality is based on mutual 
recognition of personhood in any human parties in relationship with each other. Thus, 
independent of human relationship the innate personhood in human beings remains only 
potential.
133
 In Ubuntu culture, it is the community that defines a person by judging 
whether one has attained full moral maturity. This judgment is based on the individual‘s 
relationships with the community, that is, whether one has moral values, feelings and 
empathy that facilitate others‘ wellbeing. One contributes to the definition of oneself 
through everything one does. A person‘s identity or social status and the rights that are 
attached to that identity go hand in hand with that person‘s responsibility or sense of duty 
towards, and in relation to, others.
134
 
(i) Anthropological and Epistemological Perspective 
In order to understand Ubuntu ethics, one has to first understand African 
anthropology and epistemology. One of the most important clues into Ubuntu mindset is 
an insight into the African traditional way of thinking. Traditional African thinking is 
―not in ‗either/or,‘ but rather in ‗both/and‘ categories.‖135 The second clue is related to the 
first. That is, understanding the primacy of community in Ubuntu ethics. Bujo recognizes 
 42  
―community as a starting point in African ethics.‖136 John Macquarrie explains that in 
Ubuntu individuals can only exist as human beings in their relationship with other 
humans. The word ―individual‖ therefore, ―signifies a plurality of personalities 
corresponding to the multiplicity of relationships in which the individual in question 
stands.‖ Hence, ―being an individual by definition means ‗being-with-others.‘‖137 The 
phrase ‗being-with-others‘ in itself defines the nature of the relationship either as good or 
bad, right or wrong. It is evaluative. Relationships reveal how beneficent the parties are. 
(ii) Otherness 
To underline the importance of human relationship in the culture of Ubuntu, Van 
Der Merwe emphasizes the importance of the concept of otherness, which implies 
relationship. He observes that the African worldview is based on the understanding that 
―A human being is a human being through the otherness of other human beings.‖138 This 
observation is far reaching in Ubuntu Ethics since it is the ‗otherness‘ of an-other human 
which helps to prove one‘s humanity. Consequently, personal maturity is measured by 
the way one relates with others. That is, self-actualization happens in the process of 
fulfilling one‘s obligations and duties toward others. Menkiti states that assumption of 
responsibility towards others ―transforms one from the it-status of early child-hood, 
marked by an absence of moral function, into the personhood status of later years marked 
by a widened maturity of ethical sense – an ethical maturity without which personhood is 
conceived as eluding one.‖139 Due to the importance of ―otherness‖ in self-recognition, 
self-actualization and moral development, human relationship is vital in the culture of 
Ubuntu. It is the community which defines a person and enables that person to find the 
self through the vehicle of human relationships. Thus, there is a delicate balance between 
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individual autonomy and the role of society in personal life within Ubuntu culture. Using 
the words of Macquarrie, true Ubuntu ―preserves the other in his otherness, in his 
uniqueness, without letting him slip into the distance.‖140 This statement indicates the role 
and importance of human mutuality and interdependence. The self always stands in need 
of an-other both for the self and for the other, since there cannot be self without an-other. 
(iii) Communitarianism 
One of the distinguishing features of Ubuntu ethics is the significant role of 
community in comparison to that of individuals in any particular ethical situation. Ubuntu 
ethics is based on, has as its goal, and is validated by societal common good. The role of 
community in Ubuntu ethics is based on the premise that none of community members 
would be what he or she is without the community. Thus, naturally the community takes 
precedence over the individual without underestimating individual personal rights. Teffo 
argues that Ubuntu ―merely discourages the view that the individual should take 
precedence over the community.‖141 The objective of Ubuntu ethics is the balance 
between individual rights and the necessary communitarian conditions which facilitate 
and support those rights. 
Each member of the community has a right to self-determination which finds its 
limitation in common good. The justification of this assertion is given by a number of 
Ubuntu scholars. Michael Battle argues that personhood happens through other persons. 
He observes that ―we don‘t come fully formed into the world…we need other human 
beings in order to be human. We are made for togetherness; we are made for family, for 
fellowship, to exist in a tender network of interdependence.‖142 Mkhize states that ―the 
African view of personhood denies that a person can be described solely in terms of the 
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physical and psychological properties. It is with reference to the community that a person 
is defined.‖143 However, Ubuntu neither overlooks nor underestimates individual self-
determination. Macquarrie, writing in Existentialism, cautions against a misunderstanding 
of Ubuntu. He states that when communitarianism becomes oppressive, then Ubuntu is 
abused. Ubuntu respects individual autonomy, ―true Ubuntu incorporates dialogue. It 
incorporates both relation and distance.‖ Ndaba addresses the two aspects of Ubuntu 
when he argues ―that the collective consciousness evident in the African culture does not 
mean that the African subject wallows in a formless, shapeless or rudimentary 
collectivity…it simply means that the African subjectivity develops and thrives in a 
relational setting provided by ongoing contact and interaction with others.‖144 
Because of the role of community and human relationships in Ubuntu, Nkonko 
Kamwangamalu argued that Ubuntu is communitarian since, in his view, the society 
dictates ―not only the rights of an individual but also individual‘s duties, obligations and 
limitations/boundaries.‖145 What underlies this observation, however, is the important 
role of human relationship in Ubuntu culture. In his work, Ubuntu in Comparison with 
Western Philosophies, Ndaba asserts that ―African subjectivity develops and thrives in a 
relational setting provided by ongoing contact and interaction with others.‖146 Ndaba‘s 
assertion, however, is not limited to Africans. All human beings stand in need of human 
interaction for their personal actualization and thriving of the society. 
c. Reciprocity of Care 
Ubuntu fosters reciprocity of care. Individual/universal human rights are 
conjoined with human reciprocity of care and the assumption of responsibility.
147
 All 
beings exist in reciprocal relationship with one another. In Ubuntu culture every 
individual has an irreplaceable role to play. Everything that exists contributes to the 
 45  
equilibrium necessary for sustenance of ecosystems and integrity of the biosphere and the 
cosmos.
148
 It is the reciprocation which facilitates individual, societal and the biospheric 
survival and progress. Proper reciprocation generates harmony while failure to do so may 
generate violence.
149
 Reciprocity is a sacred duty. Exploitation is unethical and immoral. 
Life from this perspective is only real if it is shared and shares in the lives of others. In 
his work Ubuntu Management and Motivation, John Broodryk notes that Ubuntu is both 
a state of being and of becoming, both of which are anchored in reciprocity of care, thus 
as a process of self-realization through others, Ubuntu enhances the self-realization of 
others.
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Ethics of Ubuntu rest on the assumption that as one is enabled by the community 
to find oneself and grow as human person, one should use one‘s potential for the good of 
the community. Life is about receiving and giving. Failure to reciprocate is tantamount to 
violence. It is unethical. 
(i) Reciprocity as the Bond between the Community and an Individual 
Broodryk posits that, ―as a process of self-realization through others, Ubuntu 
enhances the self-realization of others.‖151 Macquarrie observes that ―being with 
others…is not added on to a pre-existent and self-sufficient being; rather, both this being 
(the self) and the others find themselves in a whole wherein they are already related. By 
nature, a person is interdependent with other people. Due to this interdependence 
reciprocity is sine qua non within the culture of Ubuntu. By nature a person receives and 
reciprocates care. The community or society is a prerequisite for personhood. Society 
facilitates reciprocation which, in turn, facilitates personhood and self-actualization. 
Personal reciprocation of care creates, sustains and strengthens the community. 
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Reciprocity in form of giving back to the community and proactive living for the 
community and others defines a person and his moral maturity. This approach to morality 
is unique since it defines personhood for community not against community. Macquarrie 
explains this perspective in detail in his work titled Existentialism.
152
 
Morality is about human relationships while a human relationship is about 
reciprocity. Wrong doing separates people, disturbs harmony, and is against life. Verhoef 
and Michel, in their article titled ―Studying morality within the African context,‖ assert 
that ―what is right is what connects people together; what separates people is wrong.‖153 
Now what connects people together involves reciprocity since human relationship is 
anchored on reciprocity. In agreement with Verhoef and Michel, Thaddeus Metz 
identified a concise ethical principle based on African relationality, solidarity and 
reciprocity: ―an act is right just insofar as it is a way of living harmoniously or prizing 
communal relationships, ones in which people identify with each other and exhibit 
solidarity with one another; otherwise, an act is wrong.‖ In other words indigenous sub-
Saharan ethics‘ (Ubuntu) objective is harmony which favors human life. Harmony, 
however, is a product of mutually favorable human actions. Reciprocity is a necessary 
component in sub-Saharan ethics. Metz explains solidarity with one another as ―to act in 
ways that are expected to benefit each other…solidarity is also a matter of people‘s 
attitudes such as emotions and motives being positively oriented toward others, say by 
sympathizing with them and helping them for their sake.‖154 
(ii) Ujamaa as Praxis of Ubuntu Reciprocity 
Many post-colonial African intellectuals tried to force Ubuntu into a political 
theory. Politicians such as Julius Nyerere
155
 of Tanzania, Kwame Nkrumah
156
 of Ghana 
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and Leopold Senghor
157
 of Senegal are some of the leading examples. Their zeal for 
Ubuntu as a political theory failed to come to fruition primarily because Ubuntu, being an 
ethic, could not be reduced to a political ideology. This section explores Nyerere‘s 
Ujamaa, a Swahili word for familyhood or fraternity, (which Nyerere interpreted as 
African socialism) as praxis of Ubuntu reciprocity. 
In Nyerere‘s own words, Ujamaa ―is an attitude of mind.‖ It is that ―attitude of 
mind, and not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is needed to 
ensure that the people care for each other‘s welfare.‖158 Ujamaa is about care and 
reciprocity. Nyerere, while trying to show that Ujamaa is socialism, ended up 
demonstrating that it really is not. Contrasting socialism and capitalism to justify Ujamaa 
as socialism Nyerere writes: ―Destitute people can be potential capitalists – exploiters of 
their fellow human beings. A millionaire can equally well be a socialist; he may value his 
wealth only because it can be used in the service of his fellow men.‖ This statement of 
Nyerere not only contradicts the meaning of socialism, it affirms Ujamaa as Ubuntu 
ethic. While socialism is imposed on the people, Ubuntu is a cultural ethic, not a political 
ideology. Nyerere describes such ethic. He paradoxically further describes it even as he 
contrasts socialism from capitalism. Nyerere writes, ―The man who uses wealth for the 
purpose of dominating any of his fellows is a capitalist. So is the man who would if he 
could. …a millionaire can be a good socialist.‖159 Nyerere argued that Ujamaa ―is 
opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the 
exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which 
seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and 
man.‖160 What Nyerere neither defines nor explains in detail is the meaning of Ujamaa. 
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By his own statements with regards to Socialism and Capitalism, Nyerere shows 
that Ujamaa is an attitude of mind and a moral mindset. It is not a socio-political and 
economic theory. Ujamaa is an ethic. As an ethic, Ujamaa transcends political and 
economic theories and systems. Ujamaa is simply praxis of Ubuntu. It is essentially an 
ethic. 
In the traditional society, everybody who was able to work had to work hard for 
personal needs and the needs of the sick, the old and children. Provision for those who 
could not provide for themselves was imperative. The traditional society didn‘t force its 
constituents to distribute their produce. It did not emphasize equality of possession but of 
personhood. Recognition of human dignity and personhood in all humans, including the 
disabled and safeguarding that dignity is the ethical ideal of both Ujamaa and Ubuntu. 
Thus, individual ownership of major means production such as land was discouraged but 
without the use of force or political ideology.
161
 People were allowed to participate in the 
process of production of wealth according to their ability. Consequently, there was 
naturally division of labor and subsidiarity. 
Traditional Ujamaa gave members of its respective society, especially the 
disabled, the less fortunate, the old, children and the sick the security they needed to live 
a meaningful and dignified life in spite of their limiting conditions. Nyerere argues that 
such security which was common in, almost all traditional societies must be preserved 
and extended beyond tribal, national and continental boundaries because all people are 
equal.
162
 
The Arusha Declaration was founded on the traditional African way of life. The 
declaration recognizes human equality, human right to life, dignity and respect; equal 
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rights as citizens, equal right of expression, movement, religious belief, right of 
association, right to be protected by the society, right to just reward for human labor, 
equal right of access to national natural resources and major means of production.
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In sum, Ujamaa is systematized Ubuntu in praxis. Ujamaa is based on the need to 
recognize human equality and the ethical imperative of investing in the community based 
on each individual‘s need for the community and the community‘s need for its 
constituents. It is ultimately about giving back to the community for the good of all 
without denying personal rights and entitlements. 
(iii) Importance of Marriage and Procreation 
Most traditional African societies hold marriage as the focus of both individual 
and societal existence. Mbiti observes that in marriage all members of the society, the 
living, the dead and the yet to be born meet. Whoever does not participate in it ―is a curse 
to the community, he is a rebel and a law-breaker, he is not only abnormal but ‗under-
human‘. Failure to get married under normal circumstances means that the person 
concerned has rejected the society and the society rejects him in return.‖164 
From the individual‘s perspective, the importance of marriage is based on the 
belief that parents are reproduced in their progeny, which means parents with children 
will be immortal as long as their children don‘t break the chain by not making children.165 
Having descendants is also crucial because one‘s immortality (in the world of the living-
dead) is acquired by having descendants who will keep the diseased in memory. ―To die 
without getting married and without children is to be completely cut off from the human 
society, to become disconnected, to become an outcast and to lose all links with 
mankind.‖166 Naturally, therefore, the society hopes and expects that everybody marries 
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and begets children. Each person has an ethical obligation to marry both for the sake of 
the self and of the community. 
Traditionally, the society improvised a system whereby a couple who have 
biological impediment such that they cannot have children of their own could have 
children who would keep them alive in their memory after they die. In patrilineal 
societies, a brother or another designated close relative of the childless deceased or 
incapable parent would help by having intercourse with the wife of the deceased or the 
incapable parent for the purpose of making children for him.
167
 Bujo asserts that ―the 
main presuppositions of African ethics are not the same as those involved in natural-law 
approaches. The main goal of African ethics is fundamentally life itself. The community 
must guarantee the promotion and protection of life by specifying or ordering ethics and 
morality.‖168 Marriage is the main way the community fulfills its duty to promote life. 
The centrality of marriage is based on the fact that marriage is the event in which 
two persons willingly express their desire to cooperate to keep the society immortal. Most 
peoples in Africa south of the Sahara hold that humans owe their existence to many 
generations of ancestors. There are many sayings to the effect that we received our 
existence from them and we must in turn give existence to the next generation. Marriage 
is an ethical responsibility and a religious sacred obligation. We walk on the graves of 
our ancestors; we should let others (our progeny) walk on our graves. We stand on their 
shoulders. It is their selflessness, best expressed in marriage, that they generated progeny. 
Marriage is the unique opportunity that reveals a couple‘s willingness to give back to the 
society by accepting the role of keeping the chain of generations going. Failure to do so 
contributes to killing of the society by rendering it futureless.
169
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2. Cosmic and Global Context 
The second major component of the culture of Ubuntu concerns its sense of a 
cosmic/global context. The meaning of this context is enlightened by considering the 
UNESCO Code of Bioethics. This component has three related concepts. The first 
concept is restorative justice which is necessary in order to maintain lasting peace and 
order. The second concept is respect for diversity in order to achieve personal and 
societal fulfillment. The third concept is respect for and protection of the cosmos as the 
context which supports the biosphere and human society. 
a. Justice 
Most indigenous African cultures that embrace Ubuntu require restorative 
justice
170
 which is founded on human dignity and equality within human society. Its 
objective is restoration of peace and order.
171
 In his autobiography, Nelson Mandela 
explains Ubuntu restorative justice. He states that the oppressor and the oppressed both 
need liberation since a person who takes another person‘s rights is a prisoner of his own 
hatred and prejudice. ―The oppressed and the oppressor alike are robbed of their 
humanity.‖172 Mandela‘s views about human freedom, which represent the Ubuntu 
cultural meaning of justice, are expressed in the statement, ―to be free is not merely to 
cast off one‘s chains, but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of 
others.‖173 
(i) Ubuntu Justice is Reparative Rather than Retributive 
Mandela‘s insight is shared by most liberation fighters during the era of apartheid 
in South Africa. Addressing the role of Ubuntu during and immediately after apartheid in 
his work, Concept of Ubuntu as a Cohesive Moral Value, Teffo expresses the general 
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prevailing spirit, ―there is no lust for vengeance, no apocalyptic retribution.‖174 On the 
contrary there is a yearning for justice, and for ―release from poverty and oppression, but 
no dream of themselves (black South Africans) becoming the persecutors, of turning the 
tables of apartheid on white South Africans.‖175 The Ubuntu ideal of justice is restorative 
rather than retributive or punitive. Ubuntu restorative justice is founded on the 
understanding that human community is analogous to an organism. If one part is hurt the 
whole organism hurts. Restoration of tranquility, equilibrium and order is the ethical 
ideal. Violence is harmful not only to its direct victim, but also to the perpetrator and the 
society. The objective of justice in Ubuntu is peace and community building.
176
 
Consequently, Maphisa attributes that the transformation of an apartheid South Africa 
into a democracy to what he termed ―a discovery of Ubuntu.‖177 
Thaddeus Metz observed an unwritten ethical principle in sub-Saharan peoples 
that most African communities South of Sahara hold that it is immoral ―to make policy 
decisions in the face of dissent, as opposed to seeking consensus.‖178 In case of dispute, 
there is no clear distinction between conflict resolution and execution of justice. The 
resolution process aims at mutual education, community education, character formation 
and consensus seeking. Since the objective is reparation and restoration of peace and 
harmony, the parties, along with the rest of the community, engage in active reflective 
listening and the discussion continues ―until a compromise is found and all in the 
discussion agree with the outcome.‖179 Dispute and conflict occasion a moment to teach 
and reinforce virtues of Ubuntu. Tutu describes a virtuous person from the perspective of 
Ubuntu as ―welcoming, hospitable, warm and generous, willing to share.‖180 Elsewhere 
he describes such a person as are ―open and available to others, willing to be vulnerable, 
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affirming of others, do not feel threatened that others are able and good, for they have a 
proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that they belong in a greater whole.‖181 
Ubuntu sense of justice is, at the same time, educative and community building. 
In sum, Ubuntu justice is restorative since it is based on the maxim ―I am human 
because I belong. …my humanity is caught up and inextricably bound up in yours.‖182 
Because of such interconnection and symbiotic interdependence virtuous persons know 
that ―they are diminished when others are humiliated, diminished when others are 
oppressed, diminished when others are treated as if they were less than who they are.‖183 
The objective of criminal justice in Ubuntu is reconciliation, not retribution.
184
 As a 
result, from the perspective of Ubuntu, retributive punitive justice is unethical and 
counterproductive. It is destructive of the ideal and objective Ubuntu. 
(ii) Ubuntu Justice is Distributive 
Ubuntu is radically opposed to libertarian philosophy represented by Locke 
regarding property and individual liberty. According to Locke, property means both 
material possessions and liberty.
185
 The concept of property is the kernel of individual 
freedom. Civil government is a product of social contract whose objective is to ensure 
protection of private property from the encroachment of others. Lockean freedom, 
therefore, simply means control and possession of one‘s own person and possessions.186 
American tradition has historically placed great faith in the Lockean vision of the 
individual with its emphasis on negative freedom and private property rights.
187
 Nozick 
agrees with Locke in many ways. In his view, distributive schemes unjustly redistribute 
assets already owned by individuals, without taking into account the way in which assets 
have been acquired.
188
 Most tax redistributions to fund health care or any other need are 
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unfair. They fail to recognize that individuals are entitled to their personal holdings.
189
 
This position implies that the poor may be unfortunate but their plight is not a moral 
problem. They have no just claim to others‘ entitlement.190 Due to the Lockean influence 
in American thought, the legacy of the firm entrenchment of property rights led to an 
exaggerated importance of the concept of individual property rights over the claims of 
other human values such as equality and fraternity.
191
 The healthcare insurance market 
can be characterized in the very same terms.
192
 
Rawls sought to resolve conflicts between the values of liberty and equality based 
on fairness. He argued for an original position in which individuals were considered to be 
under a veil of ignorance such that they were ignorant as their specific interests.
193
 The 
individual in this original state is free, rational and essentially self-interested. The aim of 
this imaginary original position is to question what would the individuals under the veil 
choose as a principle for guiding justice. In Rawls‘ view, two principles would emerge: 
first, each person would have the most extensive liberty compatible with similar liberty 
for others. Second, social and economic inequalities would be ordered so that they are to 
everyone‘s advantage and be attached to positions open to all.194 
Daniels further develops Rawls‘ concept of justice as fairness in the context of 
health care provision.
195
 Daniels emphasizes an equality of opportunity range and the 
need for a basic level of normal species functioning to provide for the degree of equality 
of opportunity. Health care that promotes the normal range of species functioning can be 
justified for all on the basis of a commitment to the idea of equality of opportunity.
196
 
Daniel‘s views are in conformity with the Ubuntu ethics. 
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Ubuntu is more agreeable to welfare liberalism and Rawls concept of justice. 
Welfare liberalism challenges the classical liberalism of Locke. It is represented by 
Charles Fried, 
197
 Allen Buchanan,
198
 Norman Daniels,
199
 and the President‘s 
Commission,
200
 all of whom have argued for the need to ameliorate the conditions of the 
market and provide enablement opportunities for all. They have argued for a two-tier 
system as a safety net for the poor, often expressed as a decent minimum. Ubuntu goes 
much deeper than mere ethics of market economy. 
According to Ubuntu ethics one‘s personhood is a potential that is realized to the 
degree one participates and contributes to the life of the community. Arguing for Ubuntu 
development theory of personhood Menkiti states that personhood is progressively 
realized through personal relationships and functioning in society. From his observation 
personhood is attained especially by doing one‘s obligations in the society. In Menkiti‘s 
own words, executing one‘s obligations ―transforms one from the it-status of early child-
hood, marked by an absence of moral function, into the personhood status of later years 
marked by a widened maturity of ethical sense - an ethical maturity without which 
personhood is conceived as eluding one.‖201 Thus, every member of the community 
should be an active player in the life of the community for the sake of every other person, 
especially the disabled. It is through being an active player in the life of the community 
that personhood is realized. Broodryk articulates that greatest personal moral obligation 
in Ubuntu ―is to become more fully human which implies entering more and more deeply 
into community with others.‖202 
Ubuntu community is experienced practically in sharing of the necessities that 
sustain human life. Gyekye notes that according to Ubuntu ethics to be a member of the 
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community also means to be entitled to the decent minimum of means of production and 
property such as land and cattle.
203
 Possession of property is never absolutely personal. 
Bujo articulates that ―the final aim is never personal enrichment. Property belongs to the 
individual, but only so that, in case of need, it may be placed at the disposal of the 
community. Attached to all property is the notion of stewardship and ministry.‖204 There 
is no absolute right to ownership of property. For instance, one cannot spoil food that 
belongs to him or her. One should keep it for any person who may need it. Bujo notes 
that helping the needy in the traditional society is an ethical obligation. He notices the 
western influence and its impact on the African values. Bujo states, ―Africa is of course 
changing under the impact of foreign cultures, but in traditional times no one questioned 
the obligation of clan-members to help each other, and no one was allowed to go without 
the necessaries of life.‖205 Equally utilization of personal potential by each person 
through hard work was a moral obligation. Consequently, ―any kind of laziness or 
parasitism was vigorously denounced. As for theft, this was never tolerated.
206
 
Disabled, sick, orphans, widows or elderly members of the African traditional 
society south of Sahara are naturally protected so that they don‘t feel insecure or inferior 
to the rest of the members of the society. If a member of an ethnic group is prosperous, 
the whole ethnic group is prosperous. If the ethnic group is prosperous each member 
considers himself/herself prosperous. Land is communally owned in that; no one has 
absolute right to it. Members of the community use it according to need. Laziness or 
refusal to work is a curse and source of shame to the respective individual and his/her 
family.
207
 Although Ubuntu is not socialism, in the sense that it does not enforce equal 
distribution of wealth, it does not tolerate disproportionate economic inequality. The gap 
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between the poorest and the richest is minimized for the sake of maintenance of harmony 
in the community.
208
 
Creation of wealth is a duty that all have to fulfill. However, there is always 
division of labor so that the principle of subsidiarity is naturally in operation. Everybody 
participates in the community in what he/she does best. No one should do what can be 
done by those who are younger or specialized in their field such as bee keepers, 
goldsmiths and crop cultivators. Each person has to work for his/her personal needs, for 
the needs of those who cannot work and for the society in general. Acquisition of wealth 
for prestige, control of other people or power is immoral.
209
 ―To create wealth largely on 
a competitive basis, as opposed to a cooperative one‖ is immoral.210 As a matter of 
principle people are ―expected to be in solidarity with one another especially during the 
hour of need.‖211 Broodryk uses simple traditional terms to demonstrate the ideal of 
Ubuntu; that is, ―If you have two cows and the milk of the first cow is sufficient for your 
own consumption, Ubuntu expects you to donate the milk of the second cow to your 
underprivileged brothers and sisters. You do not sell it: you just give it.‖212 Caring is an 
important pillar in the Ubuntu worldview. 
213
 ―One can say that Ubuntu ethics is anti-
egoistic, as it discourages people from seeking their own good without regard for, or to 
the detriment of, other persons in the community‖214 
Metz notes that in the traditional societies south of the Sahara there is always and 
underlying and unwritten ethical principle that it is immoral ―to distribute wealth largely 
on the basis of individual rights, as opposed to need.‖215 This principle is based on 
Ubuntu general principle of common human equality and communitarian understanding 
of human mutual need for each other. This Ubuntu ideal of distributive ethical principle 
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can be summarized in the following phrase: From each according to ability; to each 
according to need. 
(iii) Ubuntu Justice is Communitarian 
Ubuntu ethics revolves around all that favors life. Each individual and the 
community as a whole have a sacred duty to promote life. To underline the duty of the 
community in promotion of life and the individual duty to support community Bujo 
simply states that in traditional sub-Sahara Africa, ―Individuals live only thanks to the 
community…life is the highest principle of ethical conduct‖216 Onah notes that 
promotion of life is ―the determinant principle of African traditional morality and this 
promotion is guaranteed only in the community.‖217 Metz notes that African respect for 
personal dignity is expressive of its respect for the sacredness of human life. 
Metz articulates with clarity one of the cardinal principles of Ubuntu ethics. 
Basing his argument on Shutte‘s work Metz states that ―An action is right just insofar as 
it positively relates to others and thereby realizes oneself; an act is wrong to the extent 
that it does not perfect one‘s valuable nature as a social being.‖218 This statement explains 
the communitarian nature of Ubuntu justice. Justice is a socio-ethical principle which 
guides human interaction and relationships. The principle also entails the fact that self-
realization happens within the communitarian setting. The starting point of a moral act is 
‗other-oriented.‘ Moral action should not infringe on the rights of others. In Metz‘s 
words, ―an act is right if and only if it develops one‘s social nature without violating the 
rights of others.‖219 This principle is necessary for community life. 
Just action is that which facilitates or enhances personal realization. However, 
individual realization can only happen in the context of community. Moreover, self-
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realization should be both for self and for other related humans. Actually, Ubuntu 
contends that human self-actualization happens through other humans, which means that 
it cannot happen in isolation. Ubuntu justice is based on the identity of the self which is 
always inter-subjective, thus contingent to community. This phenomenon is best 
described by Seyla Benhabib. She states that ―Individuation does not precede association; 
rather it is the kind of associations which we inhabit that define the kinds of individuals 
we become.‖220 In other words society precedes an individual, defines the individual and 
helps the individual to self-realize. The individual is a product of the community and 
owes his existence to the community. There is mutuality of responsibility, duty and rights 
between the community and its members. Such mutuality is based on individuals‘ 
neediness of the community for survival. Using Mbiti‘s words, the ―community must 
therefore make, create or produce the individual; for the individual depends on the 
corporate group.‖221 Mbiti explains, ―Nature brings the child into the world, but society 
creates the child into a social being, a corporate person, for it is the community which 
must protect the child, feed it, bring it up, educate it and in many other ways incorporate 
it into the wider community.‖222 Consequently, the child has an obligation to live in such 
a way that his individual rights nurture and enhance the existence and flourishing of the 
community which enables not only the possibility of such rights but more importantly 
human individual life. 
Community building is represented and expressed in almost all important 
activities of an individual or family. Everybody should play a role in nurturing 
community bonds. There cannot be a completely exclusive individual right. Among the 
Chagga and Setswana society, for example, slaughtering an animal and consuming it with 
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the immediate nuclear family without giving rightful portions to members of the extended 
family, however little the piece meals may be is considered immoral. It is equivalent to 
theft.
223
 While from the western perspective there is naturally no entitlement in what one 
does not own, among the Bantu people, the entitlement is validated by the duty of each 
person to build the necessary bonds which foster and nurture community building. By 
being a member of the community everybody has a valid claim to what maintains the 
bonds without which the community cannot survive. 
In sum, Ubuntu justice is essentially and always communitarian. Metz sums up 
Ubuntu ethics of communitarianism by the moral principle he identified from his research 
in Ubuntu that ―an action is wrong insofar as it fails to honor relationships in which 
people share a way of life and care for one another‘s quality of life, and especially to the 
extent that it esteems division and ill-will.‖224 This perspective on justice is different from 
the popular tendency which focuses on justice from the perspective of individual rights 
and claims. Individual rights are only real in the context and matrix of community or 
society. 
b. Diversity 
Ubuntu respects human diversity. Diversity is beneficial to societal fulfillment; 
plurality enhances both personal and societal self-realization.
225
 The culture of Ubuntu 
realizes the importance of diversity for personal self-realization as human beings, for 
societal prosperity and for moral living. This understanding is summarized in the 
previously cited maxims that ―a person is a person through other persons,‖226 and ―a 
human being is a human being through the otherness of other human beings.‖227 Van Der 
Merwe observes that Ubuntu dictates that to be human is to recognize the genuine 
otherness of fellow citizens. The recognition of and respect for each person‘s uniqueness 
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is an essential component of society. This uniqueness involves the diversity of languages, 
histories, values and customs, all of which constitute human society.
228
 This dissertation 
will explore in depth the need and respect for diversity in human society and ethical 
discourse in light of the culture of Ubuntu. As a result of the Ubuntu perspective of 
society as analogous to an organism, Ubuntu appreciates difference and diversity as 
richness. Diversity allows for variety of contribution to the community by each member 
for each member. Consequently, human society flourishes on diversity. 
(i) Anthropocentrism and Respect for Diversity 
Most Sub-Saharan ethnic communities are radically anthropocentric. Bujo writes 
that ―life is the highest principle of ethical conduct.‖229 Everything revolves around the 
mystery of human life. Human life is so important that everybody has to take 
responsibility to nurture it prior to birth and post mortem in form of the ‗living-dead‘. All 
human life, regardless of differences in color, ethnicity, wealth, and nationality is sacred. 
God is revered through human moral life. Consequently, there is no much direct 
reference to God. Respect for any human life is considered an act of worship and 
reverence to God.
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 In praxis, as Bujo well expresses it, ―the living members of this 
―mystical society‖231 have an inalienable responsibility for protecting and prolonging the 
life of the community in all its aspects.‖232 Such responsibility extends to all humans. 
One should only be allowed to kill in self-defense. However different or unconforming 
human life is, it should be treasured and respected. No wonder Bujo notes that ―the 
morality of an act is determined by its life-giving potential.‖233 This respect for human 
life implies tolerance, patience and respect for diversity. Bujo observes, however, that 
―since the common good must have precedence over the individual good, an individual 
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who is really a danger for the community, or threatens the clan with loss of life or goods, 
must be simply removed.‖234 However, ―the main goal of African ethics is fundamentally 
life itself.‖ The community is at the service of each life.235 
(ii) Otherness as Source, Objective and Rationale of Morality 
Even though Ubuntu is basically Unitarian, diversity is an important part of it. 
Diversity belongs to the very essence of Ubuntu. It is the diversity that underlies the 
importance of unity. One of the maxims most expressive of the core meaning of Ubuntu 
and which has been discussed earlier in this work underlies importance of diversity for 
any meaningful community and individual social, moral, and psychological development. 
The differentness of others helps people recognize their own uniqueness, role, 
importance, duty and neediness.‖236 The differentness of others includes diversity of 
languages, histories, values and customs, all of which constitute human society.
237
 Mbiti 
writes that ―in traditional life, the individual does not and cannot exist alone except 
corporately. He owes his existence to other people, including those of past generations 
and his contemporaries. He is simply part of the whole. The community must therefore 
make, create or produce the individual; for the individual depends on the corporate 
group.‖238 Implied in Mbiti‘s statement is the fact that the community helps the individual 
become different and unique while at the same time instilling in him or her 
communitarian accepted moral norms and ideals. 
Personhood is a developmental concept in the culture of Ubuntu. Such 
development is facilitated by the community. Mbiti relates that, ―Physical birth is not 
enough: the child must go through rites of incorporation so that it becomes fully 
integrated into the entire society.‖ The initiation rites are usually age-related and vary 
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depending on the specific ethnicity. According to Mbiti the rites signify moral, social, 
religious and behavioral development. ―These rites continue throughout the physical life 
of the person, during which the individual passes from one stage of corporate existence to 
another. The final stage is reached when he dies and even then he is ritually incorporated 
into the wider family of both the dead and the living.‖ The dead members of the society 
remain living-dead until they are no longer remembered by any living person. They are 
believed to be constantly undergoing rites of incorporation into the world of the dead 
even as they are gradually forgotten by the living. Rites of initiation imply the role of the 
society in the work of creation. Mbiti elaborates this role when he writes that ―Just as 
God made the first man, as God‘s man, so now man himself makes the individual who 
becomes the corporate or social man.‖ Initiation rites need other people. Personal 
existence completely independent of the society is absurd. Thus Mbiti writes that ―only in 
terms of other people does the individual become conscious of his own being, his own 
duties, his privileges and responsibilities towards himself and towards other people.
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In the process of individual formation by all other individuals and in all formal 
processes of initiation individual uniqueness is not only accepted or tolerated, it is 
cherished and given a special role in the society. The person is helped to know that he or 
she is unique, thus a needed organ within the community. Diversity is a blessing to the 
community. To the individual, diversity and pluralism helps distinguish the self from the 
rest of the community members. 
Initiation processes aim at cutting the umbilical cord continually so that the child 
is continually born into the wider human family, incorporated in it as his personhood 
unfolds. One moves from one‘s mother into the nuclear family then extended family, then 
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the ethnic group and then human family in general.
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 Mbiti writes that those initiation 
rites have great formational and educational purposes. ―The occasion often marks the 
beginning of acquiring knowledge which is otherwise not accessible to those who have 
not been initiated. It is a period of awakening to many things, a period of dawn for the 
young. They learn to endure hardships, they learn to live with one another, they learn to 
obey,‖241 to mention but a few things. Initiation, therefore prepares the candidates to deal 
with, accept, and use diversity for the common good. The continual rites of initiation aim 
at helping the youth, to accept their role in the wide human society, honor, respect and 
nurturing of every human life. One of the most important tests in the rites is a lesson of 
accepting diversity and using it for both communal and self-benefit. 
Just as an individual cannot survive without the support of other individuals and 
the community at large, Ubuntu believes that no community can survive in the cosmos 
alone without being in solidarity with the rest of communities which share the earth. 
Diversity and uniqueness, both among individuals and among societies is riches, 
especially because, according to Ubuntu, humanity is, by large a product of human 
relationships. This world-view is seen in Ubuntu‘s emphasis on establishment and 
maintenance of harmony between different ethnicities. 
(iii) Tension between Diversity, Communitarianism and Human 
Freedom 
According to Mbiti there can neither be freedom nor real ethical existence 
independent of the community. Mbiti states that individuality is based on plurality, in the 
sense that among the Bantu peoples of the sub-Saharan Africa individual existence is 
based on communal existence. This is a major contention in ethics of individual rights, 
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since such ethics does not necessarily view individual existence as contingent to 
communal or societal existence; at least it does not emphasize the role of the community 
as Ubuntu does. Ubuntu communitarian ethics is based on the indebtedness of any 
particular individual both to the current community and to his ancestors who are 
responsible to who any particular individual becomes.
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 Mbiti‘s interpretation of Ubuntu 
worldview reveals tension between individual autonomy, which is necessary for real 
human freedom, and Ubuntu communitarianism which is sine qua non of individual 
existence. Since the community defines the individual and that it takes precedence over 
individual personal autonomy and liberty, individual existence is only significant within 
the confines of the community. Obviously, Ubuntu‘s understanding of individual identity 
as interpreted by Mbiti resonates with Taylors‘ but it goes much further. According to 
Taylor, one‘s identity is not worked out in isolation. It is a work in progress, a negotiation 
through dialogue ―partly overt, partly internalized, with others.‖ Self-identity, therefore, 
cannot be independent of others or society.
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 Mbiti posits that ―the community must 
therefore make, create or produce the individual…Physical birth is not enough: the child 
must go through rites of incorporation so that it becomes fully integrated into the entire 
society.‖244 This later statement reveals yet another difficult tension between Ubuntu 
respect for diversity and Ubuntu communitarianism. If the society produces the 
individual through continual initiations throughout life, one could validly question 
Ubuntu‘s tolerance of diversity and pluralism within and outside the community. 
However, Ubuntu does not only nurture diversity, it encourages diversity provided that it 
doesn‘t threaten communal existence. Communal existence is the measure of morality of 
a human act in Ubuntu. 
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The ideal of Ubuntu ethics is moral identification of an individual and the 
community. The approach Mbiti uses can be simplified by analogy of an organism. Since 
the community and the individual are one, whatever hurts the individual hurts the 
community and whatever hurts the community hurts the individual just as whatever hurts 
any part of an organism hurts the whole organism and whatever hurts the whole organism 
hurts all its parts. To be cut off from the community is tantamount to homicide since ―to 
be is to belong.‖ Interpreting Mbiti‘s perspective of Ubuntu, Chachine245 states, since ―to 
‗be‘ is to ‗belong,‘ therefore to separate the individual from his social existence is to deny 
the individual the very freedom he seeks.‖246 Interpreting Mbiti‘s perspective on freedom 
Chachine writes, ―One cannot extricate the individual from his or her social environment 
without harming the very foundations of his or her freedom; without undermining the 
very social surroundings where he or she belongs.‖247 This statement means that moral 
life require human freedom, while human freedom is limited by the community or society 
in which a person is a member. ―So to understand the context of the self is equivalent to 
understanding what one‘s freedom entails or should be.‖248 Consequently, freedom is a 
relative term whose definition is provided by the community. The self being part of its 
social environment, ―the ideal of freedom which may follow is that of ‗situated‘ freedom 
as contrary to the idea of freedom as autonomy, ‗choice‘, or self-determination. 
Therefore, the ideal of social solidarity is a central concept in Mbiti‘s justification of 
freedom.‖249 
Individual existence along with all its rights, duties, and responsibilities is absurd 
and unintelligible outside of the community since ―in African terms, one‘s freedom is 
correspondent to one‘s ability to harmonize oneself with one‘s own social 
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surroundings.‖250 Traditional African communities‘ regard the self as an extension of the 
community and the community as an extension of the self. There can only be freedom to 
relate, not to dissociate. Dissociation from the community is fatal. Gyekye contends that 
the community and the individual should be ascribed the same moral status because the 
community cannot exist without the individuals who gives it its corporate existence 
while, at the same time, no individual could survive without the conducive supportive 
environment provided by the community. Gyekye concludes that ―the most satisfactory 
way to recognize the claims of both communality and individuality is to ascribe to them 
the status of an equal moral standing.‖251 
The process of helping a person deal with diversity and plurality starts at birth. 
Mbiti notes how the ―placenta and umbilical cord symbolize separation of the child from 
the mother, but this separation is not final since the two are still close to each other.‖252 
The society has to help the child get into the process of gradually and continually 
belonging ―to the wider circle of society… [It] begins to get away from the individual 
mother, growing into the status of being ‗I am because we are, and since we are therefore 
I am.‘‖253 Some traditional societies have a way of expressing this important symbolism 
ritually by, for example, throwing the placenta into the river, whose symbolic meaning is: 
―the child is now public property, it belongs to the entire community and is no longer the 
property of one person, and any ties to one person or one household are symbolically 
destroyed and dissolved in the act of throwing the placenta and umbilical cord into the 
river.‖254 The child grows away from its nuclear family into the wider world to embrace 
global pluralism and diversity without losing touch with its original circles of 
relationship. The more a person can recognize other persons as his equals, and address 
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their needs with empathic understanding regardless their uniqueness, the more ethically 
mature that person is. In this way Ubuntu communitarianism is as well, and at the same 
time, pluralistic and universalistic. 
Ubuntu meaning of freedom is different from the popular western meaning of 
freedom. Justification of human freedom in Ubuntu is absurd if it is does not involve the 
community or society. Chachine and Mbiti easily show why this is the case: if ―to ‗be‘ is 
to ‗belong‘, this implies that to be ‗free‘ is to ‗relate.‘‖255 This understanding of freedom 
is almost foreign to the popular understanding of freedom as detachment and non-
relationship, if need be; or freedom as ―self-mastery, the elimination of obstacles to my 
will, whatever these obstacles may be – the resistance of nature, of my ungoverned 
passions, of irrational institutions, of the opposing wills or behavior of others.‖256 
The traditional concept of freedom is different from the understanding of freedom 
as equality. Freedom as equality means that individual humans are considered of equal 
moral standing and the society as of secondary moral standing. This perspective holds 
individual‘s dignity as much more important than any societal or corporal moral 
entities.
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 However, realistic freedom is always relational. Interpreting Mbiti, Chachine 
distinguishes freedom from liberty: ―‗I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I 
am‘ inspires us to see freedom as tolerance and inclusion, it invites us to distinguish mere 
freedom from liberty, whereby freedom stands as being, as a natural endowment; since 
all human beings are born free.‖ Chachine implies that realistic freedom involves 
personal relationships and engagements, since human beings are by nature relational and 
their realization is enabled by personal relationships with other humans. In other words 
one cannot be humanly free if one does not have human relationships with other persons. 
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Freedom thus understood, ―stands as what a person is in the original stage; while liberty 
by being a process in itself it stands as a practical action into becoming, emerging in the 
context of social interactions, as one‘s capacity or attempt to become free.‖ In Chachine‘s 
observation, therefore, liberty is a means to an end, which end is freedom. He states that 
Liberty ―results in the context of human striving for freedom, in the context of one‘s 
attempt to become free or to become fully human.‖ Consequently, liberty is a process not 
an end in itself. Chachine explains that ―ethically, in the Ubuntu conceptual moral 
scheme liberty, thus defined, emerges as our human attempt to move from is moral 
universe into ought moral platform.‖ Thus, liberty is a fluid transitional term which 
―implies action into becoming.‖ Its end is more freedom because ―in the context of is it 
expresses what one ought to be, while in the context of act it illuminates what one ought 
to do.‖258 
Freedom however is an end, not a means. Human growth and development aims 
at greater freedom. However, freedom does not exclude human need for, and capacity to 
relate. According to Mbiti ―what gives our lives meaning and purpose is our belonging 
and our capacity to exercise our own freedom in the realm of our human commitment and 
relationships.‖259 
Ubuntu freedom is consistent with Temple‘s description of freedom. He states 
that freedom may be justified ―only when it expresses itself through fellowship; and free 
society must be so organized as to make this effectual; in other words it must be rich in 
sectional groupings or fellowships within the harmony of the whole.‖260 Ubuntu 
integrates and weaves together communitarianism, diversity and freedom as the ideal of 
morality. There is no question that Africa is a composition of many unique cultures and 
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languages; however, one can rightly speak of a common African culture, the unifying 
culture that underlies all the unique different sub-cultures.
261
 Tangwa refers to this 
synthesizing ability of Ubuntu and similar African cultures when he states that African 
cultures are ―characterized by diversity and, left to themselves, united in their tolerance 
and liberalism, live and let live attitude, non-aggressivity, non-proselytizing character and 
in their accommodation of the most varied diversities and peaceful cohabitation of the 
most apparently contradictory elements.‖262 
c. Biosphere 
Ubuntu calls for respect of the biosphere. The cosmos has an inherent hierarchy of 
rights on which human rights are based. Every society and individual has an obligation to 
promote and protect the rights of the biosphere.
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 The culture of Ubuntu respects and 
reverences the integrity of the cosmos which supports the biosphere and human society. 
Dona Richards expresses this Ubuntu attitude toward the cosmos when she states that 
exploitation of the cosmos is self-defeating.
264
 Richards notes that there is harmony in 
nature that should be respected as a matter of justice.
265
 Since religion permeates all 
aspects of life in the culture of Ubuntu, there is no formal distinction between the sacred 
and the secular, between the religious and non-religious, between the spiritual and the 
material areas of life. Likewise, morality permeates all aspects of life and environment. It 
matters how one treats wildlife or even non-living parts of creation. Violence towards 
anything inevitably meets a violent reaction.
266
 It can be concluded that Ubuntu 
encourages a view of human life that is not independent of the biosphere, ecosystem and 
the cosmos. Ubuntu realizes that there is a network of interdependence without which 
individual and societal human life is impossible. Since the biosphere and the cosmos 
sustain human society, the society should preserve the integrity of the biosphere and the 
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cosmos. Consequently, Senghor notes that African culture conceives the world beyond 
the diversity of its forms, as a fundamentally mobile, yet unique, reality that seeks 
synthesis.
267
 This work enlightens this aspect of the culture of Ubuntu as useful for 
discerning ethical concerns when applied to modern trends in global bioethics regarding 
pollution, climate change, extinction of some species, and the human role in the 
destruction of the biosphere. 
(i) The Self and the Cosmos in Relationship 
In order to understand the indigenous African conception of reality, causality and 
the network of relationships between realities, one has to study the work of Placide 
Tempels
268
 and his idea of ‗force.‘ Even though some scholars have criticized Tempels‘ 
work and many have discredited it especially because of its exaggerated ambition, pride 
and generalization,
269
 the work has a basic world view that is fairly representative and 
universal, at least to most indigenous African communities South of Sahara. In his view, 
Africans perceive and conceive of the world as a field of forces. Force is, in their view, 
nature of beings. Such forces are ordered hierarchically with God as the source of all 
force. God is the one ―who has force, power, in himself. He gives existence, power of 
survival and of increase to other forces.‖270 
Because all forces in their hierarchy of ability come from the same source, God, 
they are all related and interconnected. God enables all of them, consequently they are all 
related. In Tempel‘s words, ―Created beings preserve a bond with one another, an 
intimate ontological relationship, comparable with the causal tie which binds creature and 
creator. For Bantu there is interaction of being with being, that is to say, of force with 
force.‖271 According to Tempel the concept of force is metaphysical. He observed that 
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Africans perceive not only the empirical forces but their causality. He states that 
―Transcending the mechanical, chemical and psychological interactions, they [Africans] 
see a relationship of forces which we should call ontological…the Bantu sees a causal 
action emanating from the very nature of that created force and influencing other 
forces.‖272 Simply stated being or existence is perceived as force and it all comes from 
and is sustained by God. It is all related although there is a hierarchy as per the kind of 
force and its influence on other forces. 
The hierarchy of the forces is explained by J. Jahn who adapted the categories of 
A. Kagame.
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The categorization separates everything into basic four categories. 
Muntu is the philosophical category which includes God, spirits, the departed, 
human beings and certain tress. These constitute a ‗force‘ endowed with 
intelligence. Kintu includes all the ‗forces‘ which do not act on their own but only 
under the command of muntu, such as plants, animals, minerals and the like. 
Huntu is the category of time and space. Kuntu is what he calls ‗modality‘, and 
covers items like beauty laughter etc.
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Mbiti proposes an ontology which is slightly different from Kagame‘s although it 
is equally anthropocentric. According to Mbiti there are five categories of being or 
forces: 
God as the ultimate explanation of the genesis and sustenance of both man and all 
things 
Spirits consists of extra-human beings and the spirits of men who died a long time 
ago 
Man including human beings who are alive and those about to be born. 
Animals and plants, or the remainder of biological life Phenomena and objects 
without biological life.
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The root –ntu is shared by all different kinds of forces and it represents 
force/being in general. Since being manifests itself only in particular beings. The root 
never appears without its manifestation as Muntu, Kintu, Huntu or Kuntu since it is the 
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metaphysical being in itself or universal force. The universal force, however is the base 
of all force and by necessity relates all forces. No force can dissociate itself from it. Thus, 
reality is a unity which appears in a hierarchy of manifestations according based on the 
four categories mentioned above.
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Humans being are a force that is endowed with intelligence, freedom and 
autonomy. They are responsible for the necessary order and harmonious interaction of 
forces around them without detaching themselves from the lower forces in the hierarchy 
and the higher forces (elders, ancestors, spirits, divinities and ultimately God himself). 
Senghor explores how individuals in traditional African society are supposed to be 
responsible for ecosystems around them. Violence to nature was considered as violence 
to humanity, including the subject
277
 since, as Sindima puts it, ―nature and persons are 
one, woven by creation into one texture or fabric of life.‖278 Consequently, the interests 
and wellbeing of an individual are subordinate to and dependent on the community and 
cosmic wellbeing.
279
 That is why Murove argues ―that our human well-being is 
indispensable from our dependence and interdependence with all that exists, and 
particularly with the immediate environment on which all humanity depends.‖280 To 
underline the direct relationship and symbiotic mutuality between an individual and the 
biosphere and the role of human individuals in within the cosmos Kasanane states that 
―An individual's good health is buttressed when he or she maintains environmental 
equilibrium, for instance, in the preservation of nature.
281
 The interactive and symbiotic 
interrelationship between living beings and between the biosphere and the cosmos is 
fundamental in Ubuntu. The relationship is not only physical, biological and ethical; it is 
as well religious and eschatological. Writing about the role of a forest to human life, for 
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example, Sindima states that ―The forest provides the African with all basic needs - food, 
materials for building a home, medicine, and rain; it also provides a sanctuary for 
religious practices as well and a home for the fugitive; in addition, it serves as a cemetery 
and the abode of ancestral spirits.‖ There is, therefore, recognition of the role and 
significance of nature in Ubuntu which calls for ethical responsibility on the part of 
humans who stand in constant need of the rest of biosphere and cosmos. With regards to 
the role of forest to Africans, Sindima concludes, ―In short, the forest is everything for 
the African. It is this understanding of belonging to one texture of life which gives 
Africans the sense of respect and care for creation.‖282 
Thus, while striving to promote and maintain both individual and societal 
wellbeing, Indigenous Africans have always strived to attain and maintain personal and 
societal integration and equilibrium with their environment. They have always known 
that holistic human wellbeing is illusive if it excludes the environment which maintains it 
and without which human existence, live alone its wellness, remains an illusion. The 
environment is a partner and an extension of the individual and the community.
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(ii) Role of and Respect for Other Forms of Life 
It must be stated that there is no treatise or consistent written account that explains 
the rationale behind most practices of African peoples south of Sahara. Most practice is 
based on unanimous understanding deducted from the nature of reality itself. Such 
understanding is based on the observation of cosmic interrelationships. Shutte observes 
that ―Bantu psychology cannot conceive of man as an individual, as a force existing by 
itself and apart from its ontological relationships with other living beings and from its 
connection with animals or inanimate forces around it. The Bantu cannot be a lone 
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being.‖284 He finds himself in a web of necessary ontological relationships with other 
beings including both past and future beings. His greatest value and objective is life itself. 
Consequently, Mbiti states that ―average Africans see no need to enter into a rational and 
theological squabble, to justify what they do, their concern is life and its wellbeing, how 
to protect and enhance it. ‗Their philosophy of forces serves as sufficient guide‘.‖285 
Most indigenous peoples south of the Sahara believe that God created the world 
and established the order which humans discover. Human beings should respect the 
natural order as a matter of justice and respect for God. Nature serves human beings but 
injustice to it is punishable by God. For the Chagga, Akan, Ankore, Igbira, Kpelle and 
Illa, for example, the sun is central as a proof of God‘s providence in sustenance of living 
creatures for human beings. For the majority of African peoples rain is the most 
important expression of God‘s care for human beings. People like the Illa, Ngoni and 
Akamba hold that rain is the most important of the activities of God. When it rains God is 
generally happy with human beings. When there is drought, there is something amiss in 
people‘s relationship with God, especially in their treatment of nature.286 
Ideally, the balance reflected in natural ecosystems should not be disturbed at all. 
Humans should limit the damage they inflict on animals and trees as much as they can. 
Food chains and the balance seen in habitats reflect God‘s wisdom and desire for order in 
creation. Human beings ought to respect it even as they have to fit into it and get their 
food from it. Destruction to nature should, therefore be minimal.
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Most African peoples South of Sahara believe in a real and organic relationship 
between humans and the land. Such relationship is usually expressed symbolically. Some 
Africans express this relationship by the burial of the placenta and the umbilical cord.
288
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Some tribes plant the placenta with a seed of a fruit tree so that ―as the person grows up, 
the tree also grows and he/she builds up a relationship with the tree. Since his/her 
umbilical cord has become part of the tree, the two (person and tree) are like brothers and 
sisters. Even if that person is to move far away there will always be a symbolic link of the 
invisible umbilical cord pulling the individual back to his/her homeland.‖289 The burial of 
the placenta and the umbilical cord serves as a covenant between the new-born child and 
the ancestral land. Exploring the relationship between land and African peoples, Ali 
Mazrui states that African attitude to land and nature in general is one of ecological 
concern and preservation. The ―totemic frame of reference‖ is a caution against 
destruction or unjust exploitation of land.
290
 Giles-Vernick observes that the solidarity 
between indigenous African peoples and nature is ―mainly an acknowledgement of 
mutual interdependence.
291
 The interdependence implies co-responsibility which on the 
part of humans includes restraint from ―plunder of nature‖292 because it would hurt the 
human species. 
According to Sindima by ―interacting with nature, both creation and people give 
themselves a new meaning of life and through this relationship people discover 
themselves within the totality of all creation. As nature opens itself up to humankind, it 
presents possibilities of experiencing life in its fullness. In the interaction with nature, 
people discover their being inseparably bonded to all life.‖293 It consequently breeds a 
sense of oughtness, which is the source of ethical reflection. Thus, African people South 
of Sahara ―conceive the world beyond the diversity of its forms, as a fundamentally 
mobile yet unique reality that seeks synthesis.‖294 Ubuntu recognizes the unity of matter 
and its relationship with humans.
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Violence to land and nature is violence to the self and humanity in general. This is 
because of the intimate and necessary symbiotic relationship between humans and the 
biosphere in particular within inescapable cosmic context. Consequently, sub-Saharan 
Africans have a great sense or respect for the biosphere and the cosmos. Their view of 
human life is so holistic and inclusive that nothing is left out. There is interdependence, 
not only between human beings and their environment but also between material and 
spiritual aspects of reality.
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The relationship between human beings and their environment can be described 
as one of reverence. The reverence given to material reality is based on human need for 
it. Such reverence takes into account not just the current generations but, even more, 
future generations. Kamalu notes that respect and protection of material reality expresses 
a sense of responsibility for future generations and for the cosmos. It is about the survival 
of human species and other species in general. It ―implies an ecological responsibility for 
the current generation of the living whereby the consequence of any actions for future 
generations must be considered.‖297 
(iii) Sacredness of the Biosphere 
Most indigenous people south of the Sahara view nature with deep reverence. It is 
―their first home, the home that holds the wisdom of the cosmos…Nature is profoundly 
intelligent as it stands, and human beings would do well to learn from its wisdom.‖298 
Some articulates how the sub-Saharan indigenous people respect order in nature. They 
believe that there is an on-going almost sacred wordless communication between 
different creatures which should not be disturbed. Sustenance of ecosystems and food 
chains reveals part of nature mind which should be kept sacred. Humans should never 
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disrupt natural order. Nature sustains itself, regenerates itself and supports all it contains. 
Its integrity is sacred.
299
 
Most Africans don‘t have to prove God‘s existence because; they have no 
problem perceiving God in their environment, leave alone believing that he exists. In 
their view nature manifests God. Mbiti observes that ―all African peoples associate God 
with the sky or heaven…the majority thinks that He lives there; and some even identify 
him with the sky…among many societies the sun is considered to be a manifestation of 
God Himself and the same word or its cognate is used for both.‖ This association of God 
with the sun is based on the centrality of the sun in the universe and its role in generation 
and sustenance of life. Mbiti cites some examples of such societies to be ―the Chagga 
(Ruwa for both God and Sun), peoples of the Ashanti hinterland (We for both), Luo 
(Chieng for both), Nandi (Asis for God, asita for sun and Ankore (Kazooba for both).‖300 
Other African peoples such as the Elgeyuo, Ibbo, Suk and Tonga associate God 
with rain. Some trees, hills, rivers and caves are associated with God, thus regarded 
sacred.
301
 Mbiti argues that for an indigenous African ―nature is filled with religious 
significance…God is seen in and behind these objects and phenomena. They are his 
creation, they manifest Him, they symbolize His being and presence.‖302 
Human psychic, emotional or physical disease results from either broken 
relationships with nature or with community. Human integrity and wellness cannot be 
conceived independent of nature and its principles and intelligence which is the context 
which is the base for all that is human. Thus Some argues that ―our relationship to the 
natural world and its natural laws determines whether or not we are healed. Nature, 
therefore, is the foundation of healing…within the natural world are all of the materials 
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and tenets needed for healing human beings.‖303 Some argues that human emotion is a 
door that connects humans with natural energy around them. Emotional energy 
communicates with natural waves of energy emitted by other beings in the biosphere. 
One should always learn to listen to the voice of one‘s emotions. Holistic healing should 
include emotional healing which ultimately grounds us with the biosphere.
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The indigenous peoples‘ ultimate meaning of illness is a breakage of relationship. 
―Some connection is loose or completely absent, or has been severed. What the villager 
sees in the physical illness is simply an aftermath of something that has happened on the 
level of energy or relationship.‖305 This means that healing is a form of reconciliation, a 
―conjuring up an energy that will repair the spiritual state so that the spiritual healing can 
be translated into healing of physical disease.‖306 In an attempt to bring about authentic 
healing one should know the proper herbs but, more importantly, one should know ―the 
energetic background of the patient and the reason for the physical illness.‖307 Moreover, 
the healer ―has to go beyond the mere physiological and individual symptoms, until the 
proper psychological, moral and socially-conditioned cause can be traced and 
discovered.‖308 
Human harmonious relationship with nature is of greatest importance since, as 
Some puts it, ―when people die nature is the only hospitable place where their spirits can 
dwell.‖309 The dead maintain their relationship with the material world. They remember 
clearly the ―experience of walking on the earth…the moments when they contributed to 
the greater good and helped to make the world better…they also remember with great 
remorse the failed adventures and the gestures that harmed others and made the world a 
less dignifying place.‖310 
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Indigenous people south of the Sahara have a holistic world view. The Dagara 
peoples, for example, have a cosmology which is inseparable from their psychology, 
ontology and eschatology. According to the Dagara, ―matter and spirit are fused. The two 
phenomena are complementary, each a reflection of the other.‖ The physical world we 
live in came into existence simultaneously with another world, a spiritual one which is 
more dynamic, expansive and much brighter. Each of the two aspects of reality, the 
material and the spiritual is manifestation of the other. Humans are both spirit in form of 
matter. Some explicates the duality and mutuality of this cosmology in form of 
symbiosis. He states, ―The connection to Spirit and the Other World is a dialogue that 
goes two ways. We call on the spirits because we need their help, but they need 
something from us as well…they look at us as an extension of themselves‖311 For their 
unrealized dreams which they can realize through us. They help us visualize and realize 
our own sacredness. We are looking up to each other and humans should take from this a 
sense of dignity.‖ In Mbiti‘s view, the ―invisible world presses hard upon the visible and 
tangible world.‖312 Although matter reflects the real reality, matter is a mere shadow of 
the reality; however, the real reality needs matter to express itself. The Dagara view of 
reality is very similar to the platonic perspective of reality as a shadow of the ideal world; 
the world of ideas and concepts.
313
 Mbiti views the spiritual and the physical as ―two 
dimensions of one and the same universe. These dimensions dove-tail each other to the 
extent that at times and in places one is apparently more real than, but not exclusive of, 
the other.‖314 Consequently, reality for an African is essentially one; separation from the 
unity of nature which manifests spiritual unity of all that is in existence is annihilation. 
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Ubuntu unity as proof of individual existence is thus demonstrated in the holistic 
worldview of the sub-Saharan indigenous peoples. 
3. The Role of Solidarity 
The third major component of the culture of Ubuntu emphasizes the role of 
solidarity. The meaning of this role will later be enlightened by considering the Roman 
Catholic ethical tradition. This component has three related concepts. First, pursuit of 
common good in every human action; second, inculcation and maintenance of social 
cohesion; third, minority empowerment for the sake of common good as a sign of ethical 
maturity. 
a. Common Good 
One of the most important objectives of Ubuntu is the pursuit of the common 
good for current and future human and non-human generations.
315
 One of the qualities 
that differentiate Ubuntu from modern western ethics is the fact that Ubuntu does not 
seek to promote the individual‘s interests more than it seeks to promote community 
interests and vice versa.
316
 The culture of Ubuntu considers human action to be social. 
Every individual action has social implications and repercussions. Consequently, 
Symphorien Ntibagirirwa notes that Ubuntu arms one with ―normative principles for 
responsible decision-making and action, for oneself and for the good of the whole 
community.‖317 An ethically mature person is one who acts for common good. Such a 
person ―can transcend, when necessary, what the customs of the family or the tribe 
require without disrupting the harmony and the cohesion of the community.‖318 The 
ethically mature person in the culture of Ubuntu does things not because they are required 
or expected but ―because it is the right thing to do for both him/herself and the 
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community.‖319 This understanding will be paralleled with both Kohlberg‘s and 
Gilligan‘s theories of moral development. Ubuntu ethics considers any human act which 
ignores the common good to be unethical on the grounds that personhood is facilitated 
by, and dependent on, human society. Moral maturity implies awareness of the fact that 
one is a product of present and previous generations of human community. Therefore 
giving back to the common good is a matter of justice rather than charity. 
(i) Common Ownership of the Major Means of Production 
Indigenous African people fostered the common good. Common good is a 
contested phrase since it has been traditionally defined differently by different people. 
The 19
th
 century individualist Jeremy Bentham defined it as ―The sum of the interests of 
the several members who compose it.‖320 Gyekye describes common good as ―a good 
that is common to individual human beings – at least those embraced within a 
community, a good that can be said to be commonly, universally, shared by all human 
individuals, a good the possession of which is essential for the ordinary or basic 
functioning of the individual in a human society.‖321 Gyekye further summarizes his 
description of common good as ―that which inspires the creation of a moral, social, or 
political system for enhancing the well-being of people in a community generally.‖322 It 
is Gyekye‘s understanding of common good that is employed in this work. 
Indigenous sub-Saharan peoples resisted privatization of major means of 
production in order to safeguard the common good. Land, for example was almost always 
the property of all members of a given society. Everybody had a right of use according to 
the laws recognized by the society.
323
 This was the community‘s way of ascertaining 
equality in acquisition and access to contribution to both the private and common good. 
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Several post-independence African politicians interpreted this ethical regulation 
politically. They concluded that African traditional societies were socialist.
324
 However, 
due to the fact that Ubuntu was an ethical culture which could not be reduced to political 
ideology, such politicians‘ ambitions failed. 
To ascertain the decent minimum of survival requirements for all members of the 
society and to foster human dignity and security, Tangwa observes, ―It was a taboo to sell 
or otherwise commercialize certain things, such as water, housing, fuel wood, the staple 
food, etc.‖325 
In sub-Saharan Africa, human labor, as a means of production, has always been 
considered social and public. Although individuals retain their personal autonomy and 
private interests, there is a limit to the extent of private interest with regards to the 
outcome of their labor. The indigenous culture discourages extreme differences between 
the wealthiest and the poorest. There is a basic poverty line below which no one should 
be permitted to sink. There is also a ceiling line of wealth above which no one should go, 
relative to average individual and community wealth. Human labor is for private needs 
but within the limits and conditions set by the community so that it is for all as well.
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(ii) Distribution of Wealth on the Basis of Need 
Sub-Saharan indigenous African societies are not socialist as many early post-
independence African politicians argued.
327
 Helping others is considered a moral 
requirement that cannot be overlooked. It is inconceivable to amass excessive wealth 
while fellow humans are in dire need. Amassing wealth for selfish reasons, regardless 
common good is considered a very dangerous sign in the unity and life of the society.
328
 
In the traditional society an individual who proved to be so selfish that he would 
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accumulate wealth while others are in need of basic human needs would be considered as 
a criminal and an enemy of the community. Distribution of wealth, was not forceful as is 
the case with political socialist approach, neither was it achieved through rhetorical 
persuasion. It rather happened naturally as an obvious moral requirement that everyone 
should observe. Wealth distribution aimed at attainment of the equilibrium that is 
considered by most sub-Saharan Africans to be an ethical ideal. In the words of 
Kasenene, ―in all they do, Africans strive to promote the wellbeing of the members of 
society, and this is attained when there is personal integration, environmental 
equilibrium, social harmony, and harmony between the individual and both the 
environment and the community.‖329 It is that equilibrium that will support life. 
Because human life is of the greatest value in African morality, and the health of 
the biosphere is necessary for flourishing of human life, Mbiti notes that ―indigenous 
Africans see no need to enter into a rational and theological squabble to justify what they 
do. Their concern is life, its wellbeing, how to protect and enhance it. ‗Their philosophy 
of forces serves as sufficient guide‘.‖330 Distribution of wealth helps protect and enhance 
human life. The one who refuses to support life is an enemy of life, thus poison to the 
community and its survival. 
The culture of Ubuntu had in place mechanisms to ascertain that every member of 
the society is enabled to employ his or her potential for the personal good and for 
common good. In practice, if one had two cows for milk, he would donate one to a person 
who has none so that the person who has no cow would feed the cow loaned to him so 
that he can get a supply of milk for his family needs. Usually if the cow gets a calf, the 
first calf would belong to the owner of the cow and the second one would belong to the 
 85  
person feeding the cow, then the alternate cycle repeats itself. In that way, laziness is 
discouraged and every member of the society is enabled to participate both in personal 
and common good. For immediate need food and other basic needs should be provided 
without hurting the human dignity of the recipient. No one can claim to be free from the 
plight of any other person in the community.‖331 The donation in this case is not charity 
but a duty. Refusal to donate is an ethical violation, especially if the poor party‘s life is 
jeopardized in any way. This example shows that Ubuntu is not a socialist ideology but a 
cultural ethic which values life. Ubuntu sharing aims at supporting all life by the 
community and each of its members. This perspective of Ubuntu is a great contribution to 
global bioethics and an element of constructive dialogue. 
Distribution of wealth in sub-Saharan Africa is a practical application of the 
indigenous meaning and objective of justice as reparation and restoration. In many ways 
it is similar to Jewish understanding of justice as tzedakah . The word tzedakah literally 
means righteousness, charity, justice and obligation to the needy. In absolute terms the 
word is applicable to God only. ―For the Lord your God, he is God of gods and Lord of 
Lords… he doth execute justice for the fatherless and widow and loveth the stranger, in 
giving him food and raiment‖ (Deuteronomy 10:19; 15:7-10; Psalm 132:15; 145:15-16). 
However, since human beings are created in God‘s image, they are challenged to be like 
God in holiness and justice. Actually, charity is analogous to lending to God as is 
indicated in Proverbs 19:17. In Judaism, as in sub-Saharan Africa, nothing really belongs 
to anyone. What is given to the poor, therefore, belongs to God and no human being has 
an absolute right to it.
332
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The Jewish scriptures reveal that justice is fundamental and a prerequisite if one is 
a believer or a member of society. If members of the society are just there will be no 
exploitation and each member will ―enjoy at least a basic level of material security.‖333 
The poor, therefore, have a right and the rich have an obligation to give in tzedakah 
(charity) as a way of practicing justice. According to Jewish spirituality, ―the poor man 
does more for the house holder (in accepting alms) than the house holder does for the 
poor man (by giving with charity).‖334 The major difference between tzedakah and 
Ubuntu is that Ubuntu is neither enforceable nor does it have mathematical calculation of 
the exact amount to be given by each member of the community to the poor like tzedakah 
does which limits Ubuntu into cultural ethic. The second difference is that tzedakah  does 
not limit one‘s possessions in relation to the average wealth of individuals in the 
community. The third important difference between Ubuntu and tzedakah  is that 
tzedakah  does not concern itself much about production. Ubuntu ethics compel every 
member of society to employ his potential and participate to the best of his ability and 
talent in the production of wealth for self and the community. 
(iii) Moral Obligation to Participate in the Process of Production 
Ascertaining common good is not based only on distribution it is important that 
everybody who can work does work. Nyerere notes that ―in traditional African Society 
everybody was a worker. There was no other way of earning a living for the community. 
Even the elder who appeared to be enjoying himself without doing any work and for 
whom everybody else appeared to be working, had, in fact, worked hard all his younger 
days.‖335 Thus the system was so organized that there is assurance that the elderly would 
be naturally protected as a matter of justice. Nyerere states that ―the wealth he [the elder] 
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now appeared to possess was not his, personally; it was only ‗his‘ as the elder of the 
group which had produced it. He was its guardian. The wealth itself gave him neither 
power nor prestige.‖336 
Nyerere argues that traditional society had no room for an ‗idler‘ or a ‗loiterer.‘ It 
was an offence to the society not to work. The society was very hospitable to strangers 
and guests. However hospitality did not allow exploitation. To explicate this point 
Nyerere uses a common Swahili saying: ―Mgeni siku mbili; siku ya tatu mpe jembe. –or 
in English, treat your guest as a guest for two days; on the third day give him a hoe!‖337 
Usually, the guest would ask for the hoe long before his host is obliged by the demands 
of Ubuntu to hand him one.
338
 Observing the traditional sub-Saharan African community 
one finds embedded within it the principle of subsidiarity which enabled each member to 
be a participant according to his ability. Nyerere notes that the traditional community 
strives to make sure that each person has the means to realize his potential both for the 
self and for the society.
339
 Membership right (which is essential for survival as a person) 
in any given indigenous sub-Saharan community, cannot be separated from individual 
rights and responsibility for the good of the self and the community.
340
 Consequently, 
there is mutual need between an individual and the community. Neither the community 
nor the individual can survive without the other. 
It can be safely concluded that sub-Saharan indigenous African societies were 
―moderate communitarian‖ since, as Gyekye states, ―the communitarian ethic 
acknowledges the importance of individual rights but it does not do so to the detriment of 
responsibilities that individual members have or ought to have toward the community or 
other members of the community…responsibility is an important part of morality.‖341 
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Gyekye suggests ascribing the community and the individual in such a community ―the 
status of an equal moral standing.‖342 
b. Social Cohesion 
Ubuntu fosters social cohesion.
343
 Individual humans and the society as a whole 
exist in a symbiotic relationship. Each exists only in relationship with the other. The 
pursuit of the common good depends on all members of society recognizing of this 
relationship.
344
 Since one becomes aware of one‘s own existence, duties, obligations and 
rights in and through, the community, Mbiti observes an implied but obvious bond 
between individuals so that when one suffers one does not suffer alone but one suffers 
with the whole group. The culture of Ubuntu views human society as an organism whose 
parts are all important for their contribution to the entire organism. That is why Mbiti 
argued that whatever happens to one affects the entire group; whatever happens to the 
group affects each member.
345
 This reciprocal relationship between an individual and the 
community increases the sense of belonging. Mnyaka and Motlhabi affirm that in Ubuntu 
culture ―Everyone belongs and there is no one who does not belong.‖346 Ubuntu is 
committed to upholding the values of the community. Community values are shared 
between ―the living and their ancestors in a way that shows the living‘s commitment to 
fellowship with their ancestors and those values that have enabled them to live life in 
harmony with everything else in the community.‖347 Social cohesion for the sake of 
protection, nurturing and fostering all human life is the ideal of Ubuntu. 
(i) Moral Responsibility to Participate in Community Building 
Indigenous African people south of Sahara hold that it is a moral responsibility 
for members of communities to actively participate in all that contributes to the life of the 
community. Self-realization is undeniably dependent on the community. Individual self-
 89  
realization is concomitant to, and in mutuality with community health. Consequently, 
Gyekye argues that, ―the communal definition of constitution of the individual can only 
be understood in partial terms, requiring that both the individual and community be given 
equal moral worth.‖348 Since individual life depends on communal life, one has to 
participate in the activities such as communal norms, rituals and traditions that contribute 
to the life of the community. Failure to do so is tantamount, not only to suicide but also to 
killing of the society. It is a crime. Personal behavior and conduct that upset integrity of 
the community is consequently immoral, therefore, to be discouraged.
349
 
Normal interaction, spending time with others, and communication with one other 
in a community is not optional but a requirement for the life of the community. This 
societal obligation is best explained by a study done by Augustine Shutte. The study 
involves two groups of nuns in one convent: Africans and Germans. While the German 
nuns would continue engaging themselves in some materially productive activity after 
their daily chores, such as weaving and knitting, the African nuns spent a lot of time in 
conversations with one another. According to the study, each group blamed the other as 
morally lacking and irresponsible.
350
 While the German nuns blamed the African nuns for 
wasting time and for being irresponsible, the Africans blamed the German nuns for caring 
more for their hobbies and practical matters than for people. According to the African 
nuns it is unethical to not to engage others in maintaining and actively contributing life to 
the community. The German nuns did not see any sense in the mere lengthy unproductive 
talk among African nuns. This clash of cultures caused conflict based on different ethics. 
The German nuns failed to understand the significance of the dialogue between the 
African nuns. Its significance is in the very fact that it is not business oriented or geared 
 90  
towards any material gain. It was simply for the sake of community life in the sense of 
Ubuntu. This is best summarized by Ruch. For Africans living according to the ethic of 
Ubuntu, states Ruch, ―What I am myself for and by myself, matters less than what I am 
with, in and through the others.‖351 The African nuns were there with, for, in and through 
their colleagues, and that is what really matters. Ideally their fulfillment is based on, not 
exclusive of, their confreres fulfillment. Life is all about participation and contribution in 
the rhythm of the community. Ruch says it in a very simple categorical statement: ―to be 
is to participate.‖352 According to Ubuntu participation is a moral ideal; failure to 
participate is an ethical omission. 
While human dignity may be considered from an individualistic perspective, in 
Ubuntu human dignity is meaningless independent of the community. The role of 
community in in recognition and ascertaining human rights cannot be exaggerated. 
Gyekye states that moderate communitarianism should not be obsessed with individual 
rights. ―The communitarian society, perhaps like any other type of human society, deeply 
cherishes the social values of peace, harmony, stability, solidarity, and mutual 
reciprocities and sympathies.‖ In Gekye‘s view such values are essential for existence of 
any real human community. He asserts that ―in the absence of these and other related 
values, human society cannot satisfactorily function but will disintegrate and come to 
grief.‖ In order that such values may be there, however, there is need for definition of 
individual limits. In Gyekye‘s words, ―the preservation of the society‘s integrity and 
values enjoins the individual to exercise her rights within limits, transgressing which will 
end in assaulting the rights of other individual or the basic values of the community.‖353 
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It is the community which by recognizing one as human gives him his due respect 
as an equal and a participant in the life of the community. Mnyaka and Motlhabi state 
that a ―person has dignity, which is inherent; but part of being a person is to have feelings 
and moral values that contribute to the well-being of others…it shows that one 
contributes to the definition of oneself through everything one does. One‘s identity or 
social status goes hand in hand with one's responsibility or sense of duty towards, or in 
relation to, others.‖354 This means that human dignity is to be always understood in the 
matrix of the community.
355
 Kasanene explains this status quo at best when he writes, 
―one cannot regard even one‘s own life as purely personal property or concern. It is the 
group which is the owner of life, a person being just a link in the chain uniting the present 
and future generations.‖356 The main contribution that this worldview illuminates to the 
global understanding of human dignity and human rights in general is the contingence of 
rights to community. It also highlights the responsibility of the individual to the 
community which prescribes the dignity due to any individual as human. 
(ii) Respect for Personal Autonomy as a Requirement in Community 
Building 
Teffo notes that due to the importance of social cohesion Ubuntu ―discourages the 
view that the individual should take precedence over the community.‖357 Ubuntu, 
however, does not suppress the individual‘s unique rights and privileges within the 
context of the community. Using the words of Macquarrie, Ubuntu ―preserves the other 
in his otherness, in his uniqueness, without letting him slip into the distance.‖358 In other 
words Ubuntu defines, respects, and promotes personal autonomy within the limits of 
common good. Common good is severely damaged if self-determination is not honored 
 92  
by the community. However, membership in the community is sine qua non. Bujo 
explains this when he states ―– individuals live only thanks to the community.‖359 Mbiti 
provides an explanation of the statement of Bujo when he writes ―in traditional life the 
individual does and cannot exist alone except corporately. He owes his existence to other 
people, including those of past generations and his contemporaries. He is simply part of 
the whole.‖ In other words self-hood does not develop entirely from within a person. Its 
stimulus is outside the person. It also means that a person is really a product of both his 
or her current human society and preceding generations. ―The community must therefore 
make, create, or produce the individual; for the individual depends on the corporate 
group.‖ Although Mbiti does not mention it for the sake of emphasizing the role of the 
community in personal formation, reciprocity is essential in the process. Mbiti 
emphasizes that ―physical birth is not enough: the child must go through a rite of 
incorporation so that it becomes fully integrated into the entire society.
360
 However, the 
child in the initiation process retains his or her uniqueness and autonomy as a person. The 
child responds and reciprocates to the community by becoming a unique, proactive and 
productive member for the sake of the self and for common good. Michael Battle 
elaborates the same argument provided by Mbiti when he writes ―We say a person is a 
person through other persons. We don‘t come fully formed into the world…we need 
other human beings in order to be human. We are made for togetherness; we are made for 
family, for fellowship, to exist in a tender network of interdependence.‖361 
Being preceded by the community and being dependent on it for his survival, the 
individual needs the community just as the community needs the individual. To explain 
this fact Kwame cites Akan saying ―When a human being descends from heaven, he [or 
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she] descends into a human society.‖ So the person should not live in isolation from other 
people since part of his constitution comes from inevitable social relationships, without 
which self-realization is impossible. There is, therefore, a delicate balance between 
individual self-determination and the context in which it is practiced, which context is the 
community. Regarding this delicate balance Gyekye states ―It might be thought that in 
doing so, such an arrangement tends to whittle away the moral autonomy of the person – 
making the being and life of the individual totally dependent on the activities, values, 
projects, practices, and ends of the community… that arrangement diminishes his 
freedom and capability to choose or re-evaluate the sheared values of the community.‖362 
However, as John Macquarrie, writes in Existentialism, when communitarianism 
becomes oppressive, then Ubuntu is abused. Ubuntu respects individual autonomy, ―true 
Ubuntu incorporates dialogue. It incorporates both relation and distance.‖ Ubuntu 
maintains personal autonomy without encouraging individualism.
363
 Ndaba makes this 
important point clear when he argues ―that the collective consciousness evident in the 
African culture does not mean that the African subject wallows in a formless, shapeless 
or rudimentary collectivity.‖ On the contrary it ―simply means that the African 
subjectivity develops and thrives in a relational setting provided by ongoing contact and 
interaction with others.‖364 
Although there is an inclination towards collectivism and a sense of communal 
responsibility in the philosophy of Ubuntu, individuality is not negated but affirmed in 
interpersonal relationships within the society. The 1997 South African Governmental 
White Paper for Social Welfare officially recognized Ubuntu as ―the principle of caring 
for each other‘s well-being‖ It called it a ―principle of mutual support.‖365 Mutual support 
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is not contradictory, but supportive of individual identity and autonomy. Teffo explains 
that Ubuntu ―merely discourages the view that the individual should take precedence over 
the community.‖366 Furthermore mutual neediness within community members is crucial 
as Broodryk explains. He posits that as a process of self-realization through others, 
Ubuntu enhances the self-realization of others.
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Realistically, Ubuntu recognizes the importance of human relationship without 
which autonomy cannot be comprehended. John Macquarrie explains that in Ubuntu 
individuals can only exist as human beings in their relationship with other humans. The 
word ―individual‖ therefore, ―signifies a plurality of personalities corresponding to the 
multiplicity of relationships in which the individual in question stands.‖ Hence, ―being an 
individual by definition means ‗being-with-others‘‖368 Weil affirms that Ubuntu 
champions realistic freedom; that is, ―it is not true that freedom of one man is limited by 
that of other men.‖ Freedom is always relative to the freedom of others. ―Man is really 
free to the extent that his freedom fully acknowledged and mirrored by the free consent 
of his fellow men finds confirmation and expansion of liberty. Man is free only among 
equally free men.‖ Ubuntu recognizes the fact that ―the slavery of even one human being 
violates humanity and negates the freedom of all.‖369 
Due to indigenous Africans‘ rootedness into community as the only way to 
survive and grow as an individual, colonialism and neo-colonialism had not only a 
political impact on indigenous African communities, but had also psychological, social, 
ontological and ethical impact. Mbiti refers to African situation after colonialism when he 
writes ―modern change has brought many individuals in Africa into situations entirely 
unknown in traditional life…The change means that the individuals are severed, cut off, 
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pulled out and separated from corporate morality, customs and traditional solidarity. 
They have no firm roots anymore.‖ One of the worst legacies of colonialism consists of 
taking a people from the culture and ethics that define them without replacing it with 
another. Mbiti describes such situation in a dramatic way. He says, ―They are simply 
uprooted but not necessarily transplanted. The traditional solidarity in which the 
individual says ‗I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am‘, is constantly 
being smashed, undermined and in some respects destroyed.‖ Colonialism imposed not 
only political and economic control over the peoples of Africa; it imposed a foreign 
culture which was opposite the traditional culture and ethics of Ubuntu. Mbiti noted that 
at his time emphasis was ―shifting from the ‗we‘ of traditional corporate life to the ‗I‘ of 
modern individualism.‖370 
In sum, personal autonomy is essential in Ubuntu caring since in its absence 
neither caring nor community is possible. Ubuntu forms persons to be autonomous, 
although always within the limits of what is acceptable by the society, since there cannot 
be real individual human existence outside human community. Personal autonomy in 
Ubuntu, therefore, is logically and simultaneously for the good of the self and for 
common good. In addition to its illumination on the necessity of human relationships, 
which are facilitated by the implied personal autonomy, Ubuntu reinforces the role of 
human society, which formulates principles of ethics, as indispensable. 
(iii) Community as an Extension of the Individual 
Ubuntu social cohesion is an expression of care that is essential for the existence 
of the human community as a whole and for each individual in it. It is the kind of care 
advocated by most care ethicists. Ubuntu social cohesion means assumption of 
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responsibility and active participation in the community for self-realization and for other 
people‘s realization. For this reason Ubuntu culture fosters a feeling of integration 
between individuals and their society. The society is almost regarded as an extension of 
the self in the sense that whatever is done by any member of the society affects each 
other member of the society and the society as a whole. Such understanding fosters 
regard for responsibility, duty and care. 
Due to its communitarian mindset, indigenous sub-Sahara African communities 
represented by Ubuntu world view define individuality by a different criterion from the 
popular western criterion. It is not an individual vis-à-vis (against) community but an 
individual a la (with) community. It is pro-community rather than against community.‖371 
This mindset promotes a caring attitude. Caring for one‘s neighbor and community 
means taking part in all communal and neighborhood activities, and caring is crucial in 
the culture of Ubuntu. One is naturally ―expected to be in solidarity with one another 
especially during the hour of need.‖ That kind of solidarity is clearly manifest in events 
such as death. Neighbors would spend hours, sometimes days with the bereaved family as 
a way of alleviating their pain and strengthening them.
372
 Munyaradzi observes that in 
traditional African ethics, a patient would not go the doctor alone. He would usually be 
accompanied with his or her relatives and neighbors. The company of relatives and 
neighbors helps to provide for the needed support, counseling, interpretation and 
understanding of both the diagnosis and prognosis.
373
 Munyaradzi‘s observation is one of 
many illustrations which helps explore the communitarian and Unitarian ethics of 
Ubuntu. Simply put, the analysis means that there is no absolute secrecy. The 
communitarian nature of the culture of Ubuntu cannot allow the separation caused by the 
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demand for privacy that modern medicine would expect. In fact, in some instances, the 
doctor would avoid giving the detail of the diagnosis of a patient directly to the patient 
while revealing it to family. Often times this happens to protect the patient from the pain 
of dealing with the bad news while, at the same time helping the family help the patient 
coup. 
Ubuntu can rightly be said to be at least minimally moderate communitarian. 
Gyekye describes moderate communitarianism as ―a model that acknowledges the 
intrinsic worth and dignity of the individual human person and recognizes individuality, 
individual responsibility and effort.‖374 Ubuntu, however, is much more communitarian 
than moderately so. Senghor describes African communitarianism more elaborately when 
he states that among Africans community and community activity takes precedence over 
individuals and their individual activity without disregarding or underrating the 
importance of each individual, for himself or herself and for the community.
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Ubuntu therefore is essentially and inescapably communitarian. Gyekye explains, 
―Communitarianism immediately sees the human person as an inherently communal 
being, embedded in a context of social relationships and interdependence, and never as an 
isolated, atomic individual.‖376 The Bantu people help to explicate this fact in their casual 
conversational language. Nussbaum notes how the Shona people of Zimbabwe, for 
example, have this morning greeting: ―Mangani, marara sei? (Good morning, did you 
sleep well?‖ The response is always: ―Ndarara, kana mararawo. (I slept well, if you slept 
well).‖377 Mbombo writes about how an individual from the country would ―go to town, 
to tell us the whole story of their illness and how somebody else is not well in the family, 
and how somebody is not well in the community.‖378 Broodryk notes the same mindset in 
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the greeting ―ninjane‖ which represents not just an inquiry about personal well-being but 
also about the well-being of the subject‘s relatives, friends and neighbors.379 Sanon 
observes that ―Where a European may only inquire after the health of someone he meets, 
the African wishes to know, even from a total stranger, whether his family members are 
well. Not only a ‗How are you?‘ is important, but rather, ‗How are your people?‘ is 
decisive in regarding health.‖380 There is no doubt, therefore, that communitarianism is at 
the heart of indigenous African way of life, so much so that immediate community is 
viewed an extension of the self. This state of affairs is based on what Mbiti observed, that 
is, ―the individual in African tradition does not and cannot exist alone, but that he or she 
exists corporately, such that they owe their existence to other people.‖381 
Thus Ubuntu is about intrinsic connectedness of humanity. Using an analogy of a 
swimmer and the sea Ruch explores African perspective on life as that of 
interconnectedness.
382
 In Ubuntu culture life is participation of an individual in the life of 
his or her community, in the eco-system, and in the cosmos even as the human 
community, the biosphere and the cosmos participates in the life of each individual. Thus 
life is about connectedness and participation. Individuals recognize the life of the 
community and affirm it in its riches; the community recognizes the life of each 
individual in it and affirms it in its uniqueness. 
No one is exempt from Ubuntu communitarianism since there is no life outside it. 
Consequently Macquarrie observes that ―being with others…is not added on to a pre-
existent and self-sufficient being; rather, both this being (the self) and the others find 
themselves in a whole wherein they are already related. By nature a person is 
interdependent with other people.‖383 Realization of human interdependence commands 
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what Teffo calls ―respecting the historicality of the other. Respecting the historicality of 
the other means respecting his/her dynamic nature or process nature.‖384 Consequently, 
notes Tutu, a person who embraces Ubuntu is ―open and available to others, affirming of 
others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper 
self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is 
diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or 
oppressed.‖385 In brief, the community is an extension of the individual; ideally, the 
individual must see himself or herself in the community in whose existence he shares. 
c. Minority Empowerment 
Ubuntu supports minority empowerment. Minority recognition, protection, 
enablement and empowerment for the sake of the common good are measures of a 
specific community‘s ethical maturity.386 Minority empowerment in Ubuntu is not just a 
matter of charity, or a religious practice, it is an ethical imperative which defines a person 
and society at large. Mutual, peaceful co-existence with decent minimum for all is an 
inevitable ideal of life since there is no separation between human rights, religion, ethics 
and other aspects of life.
387
 Ubuntu culture opposes the individualism that Naomi 
Scheman considers repulsive due to its marginalizing effect on the minority.
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(i) Minority Empowerment as Defense of Basic Human Right to Life 
and Dignity 
Sub-Saharan indigenous African communities have the concept of, and have been 
living according to human rights based on human dignity. Sundman defines right as ―a 
legitimate claim and corresponding duties.‖389 Sundman further defines human right as a 
―right which human individuals have simply by virtue of being human.‖390 Generally, 
―human rights protect the value of welfare, but only to the extent that this corresponds 
 100  
with our authentic needs.‖391 The fact that human rights incorporate both legitimate claim 
and corresponding duties, implies that human rights are based on human reciprocity. 
Thus human rights result from human relationships within society. Since indigenous sub-
Saharan Africans ―do not think in ‗either/or,‘ but rather in ‗both/and‘ categories,‖392 their 
concept of human rights appears to weigh more on the side of duties of the society and its 
members rather than on the claim of an individual. The claim is implied in the duties 
because, as Ruch puts it ―myself, matters less than what I am with, in and through the 
others…Existence is not merely ‗being there;‘ it is power of participation in the pulsation 
of life. ‗To be is to participate.‘‖393 
The sub-Saharan concept of human rights revolves around human life. Bujo 
observes that ―the community must guarantee the promotion and protection of life by 
specifying or ordaining ethics and morality.‖394 The indigenous preoccupation with 
human life has led some scholars to misjudge Africa to be too anthropocentric and 
communitarian to have a clear separation of claims from duties or ethics from religion.
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Bujo states that in the past some scholars have argued that a person in Africa ―is ethically 
subsumed under ethnic group to such an extent that he scarcely merits to be considered as 
an autonomous ethical subject.‖396 If this were the case, it would be impossible to speak 
of individual human rights. Bujo observes that recent research, however ―has proven 
conclusively that the group does not at all dissolve the ethical identity of the individual. 
This is confirmed in a number of proverbs.‖397 Consequently, Africans do have human 
rights. Actually, the community is at the service of each human life with its uniqueness as 
an irreplaceable organ of the community. At the same time, the role of community in 
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ethical conduct and human individual human rights is indispensable. Cut off from human 
community, the individual loses personhood along with all its rights and privileges.
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In the culture of Ubuntu, the basis and objective of all rights are human rights. 
Human rights, however, are all geared towards promotion, protection, enhancement and 
maximization of human life. Kanyike states that ―In traditional Africa, procreation - the 
reproduction and transmission of human life - is one of the most important values, if not 
the most important value in life. An individual is simply not alive, if he/she is not 
engaged in transmitting life to another human being.‖399 Thus, like many other scholars 
of African cultures Kanyike concludes that ―Life is the greatest preoccupation of the 
African…Everything is centered on the communication of life, participation in that one 
life, its conservation and its prolongation.‖400 No matter how broken human life is, it is 
held with almost absolute dignity and respect. The centrality of life in Ubuntu is the 
reason behind minority empowerment. 
Due to the centrality of life in the culture of Ubuntu, marriage occupies a central 
place. Mbiti notes that ―marriage is a duty, a requirement from the corporate society, and 
a rhythm of life in which everyone must participate. Otherwise, he who does not 
participate in it is a curse to the community, he is a rebel and a law-breaker, he is not only 
abnormal but ‗under human‘.‖401 Celibacy is inconceivable as Kanyike observes: ―No 
one remains celibate just for the sake of it or in order to be free and no society can ever 
set celibacy as an ideal without running into the danger of extinction.‖402 In Mbiti‘s 
interpretation celibacy is an abnormality. It is an offence against the primitive command 
―to increase and to multiply,‖ and against ‗immortality‘.403 The right to life (even for the 
unborn, which implies the duty to generate life) is the center of all rights. The precedence 
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of communal life over individual life in the culture of Ubuntu is based on the logic of 
utilitarian maximization of the greatest good, which in the case of Ubuntu is life. 
The whole community is geared towards promotion of life. If an individual proves 
to be an obvious impediment to the community‘s concern with each and all life, that 
individual is suppressed or eliminated. The life of the community precedes each 
individual life. The community is the foundation of individual life. It is the community 
which, not only defines and enables individuation, but individuation is absurd if not 
based on the community. Using the words of Benhabib Seyla, ―Individuation does not 
precede association; rather it is the kind of associations which we inhabit that define the 
kinds of individuals we become.‖404 For this reason Mbiti states that in sub-Saharan 
Africa the ―community must therefore make, create or produce the individual; for the 
individual depends on the corporate group…Physical birth is not enough: the child must 
go through rites of incorporation so that it becomes fully integrated into the entire 
society.‖405 Consequently, the association must precede individuation. The community as 
a whole and the morally mature members of the community are responsible for each of 
its members, especially the disadvantaged and the disabled. 
Due to the centrality of human life in the culture of Ubuntu, minority enablement 
and empowerment is naturally ascertained by the community in a very natural way. 
Decent minimum for all is ascertained in a variety of ways. Tangwa notes, for example, 
that ―in traditional Africa practitioners of the medical and healing arts, like many other 
artists and specialists, normally did not charge any fees for their services‖ however, 
patients who were treated, as a matter of unspoken sense of justice and custom, ―always 
voluntarily came back with appropriate gifts and rewards for their healer/doctor…Nso‘ 
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traditional society, for instance was organized in such a way that what one needed for 
mere survival was at the disposal and within the reach of all and sundry.‖406 Tangwa also 
points out that land, being a major means of production, was not owned individually. The 
king ascertained that everybody who needed land for cultivation or building got it and 
that nobody had more than he needed. It was a taboo among the Nso‘ ―to sale or 
otherwise commercialize certain things, such as the staple food, housing, water, fuel-
wood, etc.‖ Nyerere notes the same thing. He writes that in traditional African society no 
one was allowed to fall below the acceptable poverty line, just as no one was allowed to 
rise above an acceptable ceiling of richness relative to average community wealth. This 
spontaneous and almost natural unanimous agreement is based on the recognition of 
human dignity and equality, as Nyerere later observes.
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Necessities of life such as food, clothing and temporary shelter were given out or 
simply taken as needed.
408
 Such practice would ascertain human life and dignity for all. 
Production of wealth in the culture of Ubuntu was never based on competition. Amassing 
wealth for individual security or for immediate family security only is anathema. 
Production was for the self without excluding the disadvantaged.
409
 It is a shame for the 
entire society to have destitute people. It is unjust, inhuman, antisocial and an ethical / 
moral immaturity on the part of the society to have desperately poor in their midst. It 
always meant that the society was in decadence and perishing. In sum, it is a moral 
obligation to help those in need. By the virtue of their being human, the poor and the 
disabled have a just claim to the labor, talent and time of fellow humans in whose lives 
they share. It is a moral duty and obligation to provide for those who cannot provide for 
themselves. 
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(ii) Minority Empowerment in Ubuntu is Based on Human Equality 
Ubuntu‘s stance on empowerment of the minority is founded on a deep rooted 
understanding of human equality. It is also rooted in the fact that nobody is self-sufficient 
or perfect. Humans need each other. As a result of this understanding, every person in the 
society is equally important and a gift to every other person in it. The ability to empower 
the minority and ‗going an extra mile‘ for them determines both personal and societal 
fulfillment and moral maturity. Personal fulfillment or actualization as human is based on 
the ability to engage and help other people in the community. Using Ramose‘s words, ―to 
be a human be-ing is to affirm one's humanity by recognizing the humanity of others and, 
on that basis establish human relations with them,‖410 whereby establishing human 
relations with other humans means engaging them and enabling them to the extent of 
their need and your ability. Consequently, Ubuntu supports the Biblical teaching that 
there is more joy in giving than in receiving.‖ (Acts 20:35). Human equality facilitates 
care and creates community. It can fairly be concluded that sub-Saharan indigenous 
Africa cannot conceive of humanity completely cut off from community. 
Ubuntu‘s belief in minority empowerment and human equality is based on 
Ubuntu‘s communitarianism. Ubuntu communitarian world view holds that if one 
member of the community is suffering the whole community suffers. One cannot separate 
oneself from needy members of the community. Ignoring minority is a direct attack on 
Ubuntu communitarianism. Gyekye writes that ―Communitarianism immediately sees the 
human person as an inherently communal being, embedded in a context of social 
relationships and interdependence, and never as an isolated, atomic individual.‖411 Bujo 
perceive the Bantu communitarianism as a worldview. It is not based only on humans. It 
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involves the entire cosmos. He writes, ―In the African world-view, all things hang 
together, all depend on each other and on the whole. This applies particularly to human 
beings who are closely connected with each other and with the ancestors and God.‖412 
Bujo further explains that this Bantu worldview which is based on Africans‘ experience 
of the world is ontological, spiritual and eschatological. He writes, ―The way they think 
and feel is in union, not only with other people around them, but, indeed, with the 
deceased, even God, and the entire universe is drawn into this flow of life.‖413 
All the values that increase bonding between different people within the 
community were considered virtue. The values that break the bond between members of 
the community are considered vices. That is why Broodryk writes ―Ubuntu demands 
respect for all other human beings irrespective of race, gender, beliefs, class, and material 
possessions: all are equal beings reliant on each other for a happy life.‖414 Equality 
between human beings was based on the ontological fact of being human. Everybody is 
recognized, given attention and engaged by everybody else. To ignore others is 
considered immoral since everybody commands attention of everybody else. Metz sums 
up this state of affairs which has been researched by many scholars into a moral principle. 
He states that it is immoral ―to ignore others and violate communal norms, as opposed to 
acknowledging others, upholding tradition and partaking in rituals.‖415 
Ubuntu human equality is on the basis of subsidiarity. There is a systematic 
spontaneous agreement that everybody should, in his or her capacity, be helped to 
participate in the life of the community. Production is based on ability and distribution on 
need. Leopold Senghor attempts to define and explain and distinguish African 
communitarianism, which is based on equality, participation, inclusion and sharing of 
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life, from what he called ―collectivist society‖ using relativistic and comparative 
language. He states, ―The collectivist society inevitably places emphasis on the 
individual, on his original activity and his needs. In this respect the debate between ‗to 
each according to his labour‘ and ‗to each according to his needs‘ is significant.‖ 
According to Senghor, Ubuntu is not Collectivist in approach. He states that ―Negro-
African society puts more stress on the group rather than on the individual, more on 
solidarity rather than on the activity and needs of the individual, more on the communion 
of persons rather than on their autonomy.‖ However, the value of the individual along 
with his or her basic human rights remains indispensable. Senghor clarifies, ―ours is a 
community society. This does not mean that it ignores the individual, or that collectivist 
society ignores solidarity, but the latter bases this solidarity on the activities of 
individuals, whereas the community society bases it on the general activity of the 
group.
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In effect, individual contribution to the common good is not pronounced within 
Ubuntu culture. The maxim is ―from each for all and all for each.‖ Ruch verbalizes this 
mind set best when he states, ―What I am myself for and by myself, matters less than 
what I am with, in and through the others.‖417 Nyerere explains that within the culture of 
Ubuntu there was neither room nor tolerance for exploitation. He states, ―In traditional 
society, everybody worked for his or her personal needs and for the needs of the extended 
family or ethnic group. Caring for the wellbeing of the sick, children, elderly and the 
disabled was a responsibility of each individual member of the society and of the society 
as a whole.‖418 
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Ideally, the culture of Ubuntu expects everybody to be responsible for everybody 
else in the community. Children, for example, belonged to the extended family and to the 
entire clan and tribe. Every adult would discipline or teach any child. The disabled are a 
responsibility of everybody else. They need to be helped to feel equal to other members 
of the society. Nyerere notes that ―in Ubuntu, the disabled, sick, orphans, widows or 
elderly members of the society are automatically protected so that they do not feel 
insecure or inferior to the rest of the members of the society.‖ No one would be at peace 
if a minority is in need. The minority is a responsibility of everybody else. Any morally 
mature person should naturally take upon himself to address the plight of the minority in 
his environment. There is a delicate balance between individual property and common 
property. Nyerere elaborates on this fact when he writes ―If a member of an ethnic group 
is prosperous, the whole ethnic group is prosperous. If the ethnic group is prosperous, 
each member considers himself or herself prosperous‖ Ubuntu ascertains that everybody 
has the means necessary for production and that exploitation is discouraged. This was 
achieved as Nyerere notes by common ownership of the major means of production. 
―Land is communally owned in that no one has absolute right to it. Members of the 
community use it according to need. Laziness or refusal to work is a curse and source of 
shame to the respective individual and his/her family.‖419 To underline African deep 
rooted communitarianism based on human equality Nyerere writes elsewhere that, ―all 
basic goods were held in common, and shared among all members of the unit. There was 
an acceptance that whatever one person had in the way of basic necessities, they all had; 
no-one could go hungry while others hoarded food.‖ The gap between the richest and the 
poorest is minimized as a matter of virtuous society. Nyerere observes that ―within the 
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extended family, and even within the tribe, the economic level of one person could never 
get too far out of proportion to the economic level of others.‖420 
Ubuntu world view does not consider enabling or helping a needy person as a 
matter of choice or charity. One is obliged to share that which is necessary to make 
another human being live a dignified life. If one has more than he needs and another 
member of the society does not have the basic needs, the wealthy is considered as an 
immoral person. Refusal to provide for the basics of life is a moral omission which makes 
one a criminal.
421
 
In sum, Bantu ethics is inseparable from human life lived in community and based 
on acceptance of human basic equality. Human rights in Ubuntu are rights because of the 
dignity of human life, its equality with any other human life and its helplessness 
independent of the community. It can safely be stated that the essence of Ubuntu ethics is 
human life in the context of community of human equals. 
(iii) Minority Empowerment as a Matter of Religious and Ethical 
Imperative 
Minority empowerment is not only an ethical imperative, it is a religious 
imperative. The objective of Ubuntu is tranquil and harmonious coexistence between 
humans and between humans and the cosmos. This objective is both ethical and religious 
because it supports life. The community is at the service of each life within it. God‘s will 
is order, peace and tranquility which are an optimal context for nurturing and protection 
of each human life. Like Mbiti, Bujo, Kasenene, Tangwa and Shutte, Onah observes that‖ 
The promotion of life is therefore the determinant principle of African traditional 
morality and this promotion is guaranteed only in the community.‖ Consequently, 
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community becomes necessary for the sake of life. The importance of community for 
human life is not only ethical but religious as well. Onah states that ―Living 
harmoniously within a community is therefore a moral obligation ordained by God for 
the promotion of life. Religion provides the basic infra-structure on which this life-
centred, community-oriented morality is based.‖422 
Failure to enable and empower the minority works against the objective of 
Ubuntu because it violates life. Flourishing of their lives depends on those who are able 
in the community. Every person is religiously and ethically responsible for all life in 
accordance to his ability and enablement.
423
 Onah concludes that ―Living harmoniously 
within community is therefore a moral obligation ordained by God for the promotion of 
life.‖424 In line with Onah, Desmond Tutu writes, ―harmony, friendliness, community are 
great goods. Social harmony is for us the summum bonum – the greatest good. Anything 
that subverts or undermines this sought-after good is to be avoided like a plague. Anger, 
resentment, lust for revenge, even success through aggressive competitiveness, are 
corrosive of this good.‖425 Failing to pay attention to, and address the plight of the 
minority is considered a violation of harmonious community life. One is not only guilty 
before oneself and the community for failing to empower the minority; he or she is 
responsible and culpable before God for the omission.  
Minority empowerment among the Chagga people of Kilimanjaro Tanzania is 
much more sophisticated and realistic. However, it is one of the best examples of Ubuntu 
as practiced in real life with regards to minority empowerment. For the Chagga people 
instead of giving a poor person milk the poor person is helped to own a cow. However he 
has to prove over time to the society that he can assume the responsibility of taking care 
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of the cow. He doesn‘t get to own it instantly. He keeps the cow as borrowed property, 
gives back to the owner the first calf produced by the cow, then own the second calf; then 
the cycle repeats itself until he or the owner decides to terminate the contract. The 
Chagga of Uru calls this practice iarà (iarà is infinitive which means lending with an 
intention to help another person help himself. The verb and root of Iarà is arà). Iarà 
redeems the poor person from his misery, enabling him to salvage himself, be 
independent and be responsible. Interestingly, this practice is an application of the 
principle of subsidiary and a perfect illustration of recognition of human equality. Iarà is 
enablement per excellence. Iarà is an illustration of not only the presence of ethical 
principles within indigenous Bantu people but of a highly developed practical ethics, 
concept of justice, fairness, responsibility and human equality.  
Minority empowerment is necessary for a peaceful community. For sub-Saharan 
Africans peace is not merely an absence of war and active conflict. Rather peace is 
conceived ―in relation to order, harmony, and equilibrium.‖ Peace in the universe is not 
only ideal for the survival of human life and other lives, but the will of God. God wills 
that there is harmony and favorable equilibrium in the universe. ―The order, harmony and 
equilibrium in the universe and society is believed to be divinely established and the 
obligation to maintain them is religious.‖ Peace is a moral value because its attainment 
and sustenance requires human proactive and initiative participation.
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Sub-Saharan Africans believe that the order ordained by God is upset when any 
human life is not treated in accordance with its due dignity and respect. The order is upset 
when there is no ontological, religious, social and economic equality among human 
beings. For both human dignity of the minority and equality of humanity, minority 
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empowerment is sine qua non. If the minority is not empowered there can be no peace 
within the majority or the minority. 
―Peace is good relationship well lived; health, absence of pressure and conflict, 
being strong and prosperous…‖427 Peace is the totality of well-being: fullness of life here 
and hereafter…‗the sum total of all that man may desire: an undisturbed harmonious 
life.‘‖428 Absence of peace means, at the same time, a moral evil. According to Bujo 
personal health is contingent to community and the cosmos. Bujo concludes, ―Health, 
therefore, implies safe integration into the bi-dimensional community as the place where 
life grows.‖429 This means that personal health cannot exclude the minority in the 
community. The ideal of health is on-going growth into bonding with other humans, 
especially by addressing recognizing their humanity, engaging it as an equal partner. In 
Broodryk words, it ―is to become more fully human which implies entering more and 
more deeply into community with others.‖430 Life as such is not completely personal 
concern. To a very large extent all life belongs to the immortal community. The 
individual is ―just a link in the chain uniting the present and future generations,‖431 using 
the words of Kasanene. It is the concern of everybody to bring every life to its fullness to 
the best of his ability. 
Desmond Tutu explains the ideal personal stance towards other people from 
Ubuntu perspective in these words, human beings ―are diminished when others are 
humiliated, diminished when others are oppressed, diminished when others are treated as 
if they were less than who they are.‖432 In other words, failure to empower minority in the 
society is not only a violation against them, it violates also the humanity of the subject 
who ignores the minority. The community expects everybody to engage and empower the 
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minority as a way of affirming not only the humanity of the minority but, especially, his 
own humanity.
433
 Among the Chagga people of Tanzania, if one harvests crop from his 
land, he or she should leave a little portion on the land for the needy. The minority 
naturally know that it is meant for them. Among most Bantu people who are travelling 
don‘t carry much food with them. They would stop at any community village on their 
way and expect to be given something to eat, a drink and a place to spend the night if 
tired. 
Ubuntu stance towards the minority is in line with what John Finnis recommends 
in his work Natural Law and Natural Rights. Nature of property rights requires it.
434
 
Julius Nyerere points out that in the traditional society the minority were protected so that 
they did not feel insecure or inferior to the rest of the members of the society. From the 
perspective of Ubuntu culture prosperity of one member of the community was 
considered prosperity of the whole community.
435
 As a way of assuring the decent 
minimum for all, and equality of access and ownership of the major means of production 
land and other major means of production is basically communally owned in that, no one 
has absolute right to it. This mode of owning and using major means of production 
ascertained inescapability of communitarianism and assurance of enablement and 
subsidiarity for all. Community members use it according to need and ability for self and 
the society.
436
 
One ought to work for oneself and for the minority. Refusal to work is equivalent 
to suicide because it implies cutting oneself from the community.
437
 Consequently 
Broodryk observes that caring for oneself and for other members of the community 
through human labor is a moral imperative in Ubuntu. Thus, responsible ―Caring is an 
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important pillar in the Ubuntu worldview.‖438 Since care enables one to realize his 
humanity, Michael Battle argues that the minority helps the majority to realize their 
humanness in the very act of recognizing and empowering the minority.
439
 Thus, Mnyaka 
and Motlhabi are justified when they state that ―Ubuntu ethics is anti-egoistic, as it 
discourages people from seeking their own good without regard for, or to the detriment 
of, other persons in the community.‖440 
Minority empowerment is within the kernel of Ubuntu worldview. It is ethical, 
social, religious and psychological imperative. Deliberate refusal to engage and empower 
the minority is self-defeating since it means annihilating one‘s own humanity by 
estranging him or her from oneself, from the community and from God. 
Conclusion 
In Ubuntu ethics, the community determines and defines individual rights and 
obligations. Even though individuals have innate individual dignity, Ubuntu assumes that 
the welfare of individuals is dependent on the welfare of the community as a whole, just 
as it assumes that ‗being an individual is being with others and that the self stands in 
constant need of an-other. Consequently the community takes precedence over its 
constituent individuals. Even though Ubuntu ethics recognizes the individual‘s need for 
the community for survival, self-definition, development and actualization, every 
individual remains unique and with autonomy. Since each person has a right to self-
determination, there is inevitable tension between individual rights and universal rights. 
Individual rights being subordinate to universal rights, there cannot be absolute individual 
rights in Ubuntu. This tension, however, is inevitable since existence itself is a web of 
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interconnections, interactions, and symbioses between humans and between humans and 
the non-human part of the universe. 
The tension between individuals and the community in Ubuntu ethics is managed 
by an on-going process of initiation into the wider community. Initiations are geared 
toward acknowledgement that ethically, individual rights meet their limit in the rights of 
other individuals represented in sum by the community. It is the continual process of 
initiation which enables sub-Sahara Africans to think in ‗both/and rather than either/or‘ 
categories. In other words, individual autonomy is not practicable if it doesn‘t recognize 
other persons‘ right to autonomy. The community ascertains that. Since individuals 
realize their humanity in their relationships with other humans, the tension between 
individual rights and universal rights is constructive as it enables and facilitates cognitive 
and moral development. 
From the perspective of Ubuntu, the poor and the underprivileged have a just 
claim to the labor, talent and time of the community in whose life they share. It is a moral 
duty to provide for those who cannot provide for themselves while recognizing and 
appreciating their contribution, according to the principle of subsidiarity. No human life 
is in vain. When human life is at stake, no individual rights holds. Human life overrides 
all individual rights, except when such life is a threat to more lives or the life of the 
community. 
Ubuntu ethics not only recognizes cognitive and moral development with regards 
to ethical maturity, which in Ubuntu is equivalent to the ability to care, it facilitates the 
process. When an individual has objectively been proven to be mature, such individual is 
allowed to transcend the limitations and boundaries imposed by the community and act 
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freely. Such individuals are allowed to do so because they are believed to be really 
mature, which means they always act in the interests of the community as they act in their 
individual interests. 
Recognizing human dependence on the biosphere and the cosmos, Ubuntu 
recognizes non-human biospheric and cosmic rights. Humans have duties and obligations 
to provide good stewardship, treasure and safeguard their environment for the current and 
for future generations as a matter of ethics. 
Having analyzed the components of Ubuntu, clearly, at the core of Ubuntu is 
ethics of care. The following chapter explores ethics of care as it enlightens Ubuntu and 
as it is enlightened by Ubuntu. Ethics of care recognizes individual rights having merits 
because they have universal meaning. Individual and universal rights need to be 
interpreted in light of ethical responsibility having meaning within human relationships. 
There is need for reciprocity of care that clarifies the meaning of ethical responsibility. 
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 Chapter Three
Ethics of Care: Enlightening the Role of Rights in Global 
Bioethics. 
There has been some opposition concerning acceptability of care as an ethic. 
Allmark, for example, argues that, in itself, care is ―morally neutral,‖ except when ―it is 
for the right things and expressed in the right way.‖ Thus, in his own words, ―‗Caring‘ 
ethics assumes wrongly that caring is good … ‗caring‘ ethicists take the fact that care-
related terms are used to express moral judgment to imply that care is itself a good, or the 
good. This inference is both invalid and false.‖441 According to Allmark, therefore, the 
whole concept of care ethics is fallacious and empty of substance. He argues, ―mutatis 
mutandis a caring person is not someone who cares indiscriminately. She is someone who 
cares in the core sense about the things she ought to care about, and to the right degree.‖ 
Only then such a person can claim that her care is morally evaluable and justifiable as 
good or bad. In sum, Allmark contends that ―focusing on care as a moral quality in itself, 
something it is not, the ethics of care can tell us nothing of what those right things (the 
objects of care) are.‖442 However, this section of the dissertation assumes acceptability of 
care as a valid ethic which has been globally recognized and which cannot be ignored or 
sidelined. 
The first component of the concept of Ubuntu recognizes the tension between 
individual and universal rights. The meaning of this tension can be enlightened by 
considering the Ethics of Care. The first major component of Ethics of Care concerns 
individual rights having merit because they have universal meaning. The second major 
component of Ethics of Care concerns human relationships. Individual and universal 
rights need to be interpreted in light of ethical responsibility having meaning within 
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human relationships. The third major component of Ethics of Care concerns reciprocity 
of care. To integrate the debate on individual/universal rights and relationships, there 
needs to be reciprocity of care that clarifies the meaning of ethical responsibility. This 
section explores competing individual rights in relation to moral development; human 
relationships with regards to morality in general and narrative in particular; and 
reciprocity of care with special emphasis on the role of context in ethics and the problem 
of universalization of care. 
1. Individual Rights 
The first major component of Ethics of Care concerns individual rights. Individual 
rights have merit because they have universal meaning. This component has two related 
concepts. The first concept concerns rights and moral development as seen from the 
perspective of Lawrence Kohlberg. The second concept concerns competing rights 
contrasted with care and responsibility as seen from the perspective of both Lawrence 
Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan. 
a. Rights and Moral Development 
The principle of moral development is based on, and concerned with the 
conception of justice.
443
 Kohlberg‘s major assumption is that a human being‘s conception 
of justice develops in stages. Kohlberg‘s premise is based on Jean Piaget‘s psychological 
theory of human development. According to Kohlberg, the process of moral development 
is concerned with the conception of justice. His focus is on how people justify 
behaviors.
444
 Kohlberg proposed six stages of moral development, based primarily on 
age. The six stages can be grouped into three levels: Pre-conventional (hedonistic stage: 
physical consequences of human action determine their moral value), conventional 
 127  
(conformity with authority and society/meeting expectations of others determine morality 
of human action) and post-conventional (discernment of moral value of human action 
should be independent of their physical rewards, societal expectations, authority and 
personal bias). The pre-conventional stage includes two stages: first, obedience and 
punishment; second, an orientation of self-interest. The conventional level includes two 
stages: first, interpersonal accord and conformity; second, authority and social-order 
maintaining orientation. The post-conventional level has two stages: first, social contract 
orientation; second, universal ethical principles.
445
 The main implication of Kohlberg‘s 
theory of moral development is that since fairness depends on how one perceives justice, 
and perception of justice is relative to the six stages, ethical fairness for each human 
person is relative to the six stages of development. 
Kohlberg noted that few people get to the fifth stage (social contract orientation) 
and even fewer get to the sixth stage of moral development (universal ethical principles). 
That being the case, actual maturity in universal ethical principles would be unattainable 
by the majority of the human population. However, moral development is undeniable. 
(i) A Case Against Bag of virtues / Indoctrination Approach to Morality 
Kohlberg criticizes and refutes the traditional theory of moral development, the so 
called ‗bag of virtues‘ approach to morality. The traditional theory, which has been 
accepted universally, assumes that ―moral values are not universal, that they are culture 
relative, and that they are not innate.‖ If the traditional theory of moral development is 
accepted as valid, a child would be morally a mere potency that is helplessly and totally 
dependent on the society for any moral development since potency has to be given a form 
to be real. Such assumption denies a child not only responsibility for its moral 
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development; it denies the child its innate human nature making the society totally 
responsible for the moral development of each of its members. In a similar manner 
Kohlberg argues against relativity of moral principles. He contends that ―there are in fact 
universal human ethical values and principles.‖ And such values are not infused by the 
community, they essentially develop from within.
446
 
According to Kohlberg the traditional approach to moral development is 
essentially ―indoctrination of conventional or social consensus morality.‖ In his view the 
relativistic theory of morality leads to absurdity. In sum it is destructive of actual 
personal moral formation and maturation. In Kohlberg‘s own words relativistic theory of 
morality ―is a theory of virtue that commends itself to the ‗commonsense‘ of those whose 
view of morality is conventional.‖ Kohlberg disqualifies such an approach because it is 
based on ―social relativism, the doctrine that, given the relativity of values, the only 
objective framework for studying values is relative to the majority values of the group or 
society in question.‖ It lacks authenticity and credibility.447 
Kohlberg observes that human beings share the same basic universal moral values 
regardless social consensus. Different decisions that particular persons make, whether 
morally correct or erroneous, do not change the universal innate tendency toward moral 
goodness. Social experience may be helpful but it is not the source of morality. Kohlberg 
posits that ―our values tend to originate inside ourselves as we process our social 
experience.‖ Consequently, human race share the ―same basic moral values.‖ Culturally 
specific practices differ greatly but the principles underlying such practices or beliefs are 
constant and common to all. The difference in specifics differs due to social experience 
and environment (such as: eating squirrels is wrong, sharing a room with one‘s mother-
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in-law is wrong) do not ―engender different basic moral principles (for example, consider 
the welfare of others, treat other people equally).‖ Kohlberg attributes difference in basic 
moral values to ―different levels of maturity in thinking about basic moral and social 
issues and concepts.‖ However, he realistically acknowledges the role of society in 
individual moral maturity. He states that ―exposure to others, more mature than ourselves 
helps stimulate maturity in our own value process.‖448 
To support his argument about universality and innate nature of moral values 
Kohlberg makes a presumptive statement that ―All parents know that the basic values of 
their children do not come from the outside, from the patents, although many wish they 
did.‖ To illustrate this general statement Kohlberg uses an example of his son who at the 
age of four joined a pacifist movement and became vegetarian in protest to killing of 
animals for meat. Listening to the story of Eskimo seal hunting, the same child remarks, 
―‗you know, there is one kind of meat I would eat, Eskimo meat. It‘s bad to kill animals 
so it‘s all right to eat Eskimos [because they kill animals]‘.‖ According to Kohlberg this 
simple observation of his own child‘s moral reasoning makes clear two important points: 
―(1) that children often generate their own moral values and maintain them in the face of 
cultural training, and (2) that these values have universal roots.‖449 
(ii) Kohlberg’s Explanation of Dynamics behind Human Development 
One of the most basic assumptions of the developmental theories noted by 
Kohlberg is that ―development involves basic transformations of cognitive structure 
which cannot be defined or explained by the parameters of associanistic learning.‖ 
Notably, this assumption rules out the traditional theory of development which explains 
Psychosocial and moral development in terms of human interactions and relationships 
 130  
exclusively. According to this new understanding development ―must be explained by 
parameters of organizational wholes or systems of internal relations.‖450 
There is real relationship between cognitive development and both the biosphere 
and the cosmos. Kohlberg notes that development of cognitive structure is induced by, 
and results from ―processes of interaction between the structure of the organism and the 
structure of the environment.‖451 According to Kohlberg, proper cognitive development 
seeks reconciliation, harmony, balance and healthy equilibrium between an individual 
and the environment. Greater equilibrium between an organism and its environment is the 
ideal of cognitive development. This means ―greater balance or reciprocity between the 
action of the organism upon the (perceived) object (or situation) and the action of the 
(perceived) object upon the organism.‖ Even though optimal equilibrium is hardly 
measurable, leave alone being attainable, it always remains the ethical ideal; not only for 
human individuals but also for the biosphere and the cosmos.
452
 
Cognitive development requires not only the subject but also the object since it is 
by nature interactive and reciprocal. Kohlberg posits that ―Cognitive structures are 
always structures (schemata) of action. While cognitive activities move from the 
sensorimotor to the symbolic to verbal-propositional modes, the organization of these 
modes is always an organization of actions upon objects.‖453 
Kohlberg underlines the role of unity in personal development. Development may 
be termed physical, social, psychological, emotional or moral but it all refers to the same 
ego or self. He states that ―these strands are united by their common reference to a single 
concept of self in a single social world.‖ Selfhood as a unity is essential in personal 
development. The self is not only the nucleus; it is both the basis and target of personal 
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development. Social relationship is secondary to selfhood. Kohlberg writes that ―Social 
development is, in essence, the restructuring of the (1) concept of self, (2) in its 
relationship to concepts of other people, (3) conceived as being in common social world 
with social standards.‖454 Thus, Kohlberg‘s observation of the importance of the self as 
unity does not undermine or downplay the role of other selves and the cosmos in the 
conception and development of the self. Different aspects of the self are equally 
important for self-development. In Kohlberg‘s words, ―there is no distinction between the 
affective and the cognitive in terms of precedence or importance. They both are equally 
important representing ―different perspectives and contexts in defining structural 
change.‖455 
Even though physical and cognitive development is not based entirely on social 
interactions, Kohlberg notes that ―All the basic processes involved in ‗physical‘ 
cognitions, and in stimulating developmental changes in these cognitions, are also basic 
to social development.‖ Social and moral development however, is based on role-taking. 
It rests on the ―awareness that the other is in some way like the self.‖ Reciprocity is an 
important part of social cognition and development. Social development is absurd and 
self-defeating if it is not based on the fact that the other is able to recognize the self, 
know him, relate with him and respond to the self. Reciprocity is the core of mutual 
complementarity and fulfillment. Kohlberg writes, ―Accordingly developmental changes 
in the social self reflect parallel changes in conceptions of the social world.‖456 
Social and moral development tends towards optimal equilibrium that promotes 
harmony without undermining the ego/self. There is an ongoing balancing between 
―actions of the self and those of others toward the self.‖ According to Kohlberg such 
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social equilibrium viewed from its general perspective is the ―end point or definer of 
morality, conceived as principles of justice, i.e., reciprocity or equality.‖ From more 
personal individual perspective such equilibrium ―defines relationships of ‗love,‘ i.e., of 
mutuality and reciprocal intimacy.‖ However through role assumptions and 
transformations in the process of social self-development, there is an inner undeniable 
instinct to preserve and maintain self/ego-identity in spite of inevitable adjustments.
457
 
(iii) Facilitation / Stewardship of Moral Development 
According to Kohlberg ethical and ideal cognitive/moral development should not 
be mere traditional ―value clarification.‖ Kohlberg‘s theory of moral development in 
particular and cognitive development in general is deductive rather than inductive. 
According to this deductive theory, the best way to educate is to help students to find 
reasons and explanations from within, making education an introspective process. 
Depending on the student‘s moral/cognitive maturity, some reasons may be better 
interpretation of the universal constants than others. Although this theory can be traced 
all the way to Plato and Socrates, it was immediately borrowed from Blatt (Kohlberg 
acknowledges it). The theory is based on the assumption that there are innate universal 
goals and principles. Such universals are neither culture-specific nor relativistic in nature. 
They are constants which go deeper than the changing cultural values.
458
 
The main difference between Kohlberg‘s proposed methodology (which I refer to 
as stewardship or facilitation) and the traditional methodology is that while the traditional 
method of moral and cognitive formation is indoctrinative, consequently patronizing, by 
―moving the student in the direction of accepting the teacher‘s moral assumptions,‖ 
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Kohlberg‘s approach ―avoids preaching or didacticism linked to the teacher‘s 
authority.‖459 
Traditional moral education ―reflects the unconscious wisdom of society and its 
needs for ‗socializing‘ the child for his own welfare as well as that of society.‖ While 
such approach is not ill intentioned, it may not be beneficial for the recipient of 
education. It may actually deny the recipient an opportunity to develop authentically. 
Kohlberg states that ―when such ‗socialization‘ or rule enforcement is viewed as 
implying explicit positive educational goals, it generates a philosophy of moral education 
in which loyalty to the school and its rules is consciously cultivated as a matter of 
breeding loyalty to society and its rules.‖460 Since personal moral development is not 
mere loyalty to the society, such method of education is patronizing. Assuming that a 
child acquires moral values and principles by internalizing cultural norms reduces 
development into ―direct internalization of external cultural norms.‖ Personal 
development is thus reduced to conformism. ―The growing child is trained to behave in 
such a way that he conforms to societal rules and values.‖461 
Just as conformism is detrimental to cognitive and moral development, so is value 
relativism. Kohlberg describes value relativism as ―both a doctrine that ‗everyone has 
their own values,‘ that all men do not adhere to some set of universal standards, and a 
doctrine that ‗everyone ought to have their own values,‘ that there are no universal 
standards to which all men ought to adhere.‖ Logically, value-relativity leads to 
irrelevance of ethics and morality since it relativizes ethical principles and values. In 
Kohlberg‘s words, ―value-relativity position often rests on logical confusion between 
matter of fact, what ‗is,‘ and matter of value, what ‗ought to be.‘‖462 
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Real developmental moral education is ―neither an indoctrinative nor relativistic 
classroom discussion process.‖463 Since there are universal objective moral principles 
which ―transcend both individual personal differences and cultural specific differences,‖ 
indoctrination may be harmful to cognitive and moral development because ―moral 
development is directly related to cognitive development.‖464 According to Kohlberg 
authentic ethical resolution of moral problems can be achieved by ―creating a democratic 
classroom in which issues of fairness are settled by discussion and a democratic vote.‖465 
Although through this method objective universality is compromised by the moral and 
cognitive maturity of participants, the approach is more ethical as it respects each 
participant‘s autonomy and empowers their authentic development. 
Kohlberg contends that moral thought ―seems to behave like all other kinds of 
thought. Progress through the moral levels and stages is characterized by increasing 
differentiation and increasing integration, and hence is the same kind of progress that 
scientific theory presents.‖466 Kohlberg refutes the traditional assumption that ―morality 
and moral learning are fundamentally emotional, irrational processes.
467
 On the contrary, 
moral education permeates all aspects of human life. It requires ―multi-disciplinary 
approach. It requires sociological and psychological approach. Moral education cannot 
ignore social psychology.‖468 Kohlberg notes that schools and teachers are, unfortunately, 
―engaged in moral education without explicitly and philosophically discussing or 
formulating its goals and methods.‖469 This purposeless and often unintended education 
may be counterproductive, impeditive or even destructive of real cognitive and moral 
development needed. 
In sum Kohlberg concludes that: 
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1. The current prevalent definition of the aims of education, in terms of academic 
achievement supplemented by concern for mental health, cannot be justified 
empirically or logically. 
2. The overwhelming emphasis of educational psychology on methods of instruction 
and tests and measurements that presuppose a ‗value-neutral‘ psychology is 
misplaced. 
3. An alternative notion that the aim of the schools should be the stimulation of 
human development is a scientifically, ethically and practically viable conception 
that provides the framework for a new kind of educational psychology.
470
 
 
b. Competing Rights 
Kohlberg notes that moral problems arise from competing rights; their resolution 
depends on a proper conception of human rights.
471
 Kohlberg states that the first sense of 
the word moral corresponds to a perspective that emphasizes impartiality, 
universalizability and the struggle to come to consensus.
472
 Competing rights are 
reflected in Kohlberg‘s stages of moral development at stage 5. It is the first stage of the 
post-conventional level. At this stage the individual realizes that each person is a separate 
entity within the society and that each individual‘s views may take precedence over the 
society‘s views. Each tends to develop a set of principles about what is right and wrong. 
At this stage, rules help maintain order but even rules are subject to criticism and change 
since they are regarded as social contracts. Human rights and the utilitarian principle of 
―the greatest good for the greatest number of people‖ play a big role in maintaining peace 
and order.
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(i)  Six-Staged  Psychosocial  Moral  Development  Theory 
Inspired by Piaget‘s study of structural moral development, Kohlberg develops 
what he describes as a ―typological scheme describing general structures and forms of 
moral thought which can be defined independently of the specific content of particular 
moral decisions or actions.‖474 Such structures and forms are developmental in nature, in 
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the sense that they are stages that lead to moral maturity. Kohlberg‘s basic argument is 
that there is ―definite and universal levels of development in moral thought.‖475 Such 
stages or levels represent ―separate moral philosophies, distinct views of the socio-moral 
world.‖ People in one level have an objective moral perspective that is limited to that 
particular level or stage of moral development. Kohlberg clarifies this point when he 
writes ―We can speak of the child as having his own morality or series of moralities.‖476 
Kohlberg‘s study reveals that children don‘t receive their morality from outside. It 
essentially comes from within them regardless their parents, or their human 
environment.
477
 
Kohlberg‘s six stages are based on human life in its natural development. They 
are universal, in the sense that, they are not limited by socio-cultural confines. They start 
from human need for self-preservation in the first stage, which all children have. They 
then develop into the sixth stage, that of objectivity and recognition of the sacredness of 
human life, breaching which is self-condemnatory. Thus, the six stages are found in all 
cultures. Kohlberg observes that 
The social worlds of all people seem to contain the same basic structures. All the 
societies we have studied have the same basic institutions – family, economy, law 
government. In addition, however, all societies are alike because they are societies 
of - systems of defined complementary roles. In order to play a social role in the 
family, school, or society, children must implicitly take the role of others toward 
themselves and toward others in the group. These role-taking tendencies form the 
basis of all social institutions. They represent various patternings of shared or 
complementary expectations.‖478 
In order to be able to evaluate moral development in other cultures, however, 
there is need to eliminate all bias. When Kohlberg decided to locate moral development 
in other cultures, he was advised by anthropologists to ―throw away‖ his ―culture-bound 
moral concepts and stories and start from scratch learning a whole new set of values for 
 137  
each new culture.‖479 Kohlberg contends that strictly speaking, ―cultural relativity of 
ethics, on which almost all contemporary social scientific theorizing about morality is 
based, is in error.‖480 Hence, morality is universal to human species. 
Kohlberg‘s main argument is that there definitely is moral development. 
Secondly, moral development is invariant and sequential. He states that ―‗True‘ stages 
come one at a time and always in the same order…In our stages, all movement is forward 
in sequence and does not skip steps.‖481 The development is in form of differentiation, 
integration and universalization. In Kohlberg‘s own words, ―each step of development 
then is a better cognitive organization than the one before it, one which takes account of 
everything present in the previous stage, but making new distinctions and organizing 
them into a more comprehensive or more equilibrated structure.‖482 Apparently there is 
no regress into previous stages. Backward movement is not desirable, forward movement 
is. ―The child in the third stage tends to move toward or into stage 4, while the stage-4 
child understands but does not accept the arguments of the stage-3 child.‖483 
At level one of Kohlberg‘s theory of cognitive moral development (pre-
conventional level) ―value resides in external quasi-physical happenings…physical needs 
rather than in persons and standards.‖484 Consequently, at stage one; obedience is based 
on avoidance of punishment to the self. At this stage ―The value of human life is 
confused with the value of physical objects and is based on the social status or physical 
attributes of the possessor.
485
 At stage two of the first level ―the value of human life is 
seen as instrumental to the satisfaction of the needs of its possessor or of other people.‖486 
At this stage people are still highly egotistic. The motive behind conforming is obtaining 
rewards. 
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At level two of Kohlberg‘s theory of cognitive moral development (conventional 
level) ―moral value resides in performing good or right roles, in maintaining the 
conventional order and the expectancies of others.‖487 At stage one of level two there is 
clear desire for approval and pleasing others. Acceptance of natural role and judgments 
are based on intentions. At this stage there is acceptance of duty, although it is often 
confused with self-interest and the assumption that authority represents moral rightness. 
A person at this stage would seem to say ―I have deprived myself of something by 
conforming or working and the social order should see to it that I have not been deprived 
in vain.‘‖488 The motive behind conforming, however, is avoidance of disapproval by 
others. Hence ―the value of human life is based on the empathy and affection of family 
members and others toward its possessor.‖489 At stage two of level two moral value 
resides in blind obedience and compliance to social order for its own sake as though it is 
the ideal of a moral life. People at this stage have special respect for duty and social 
expectations. The motive behind conforming is avoidance of ―censure by legitimate 
authorities and resultant guilt…Life is conceived as sacred in terms of its place in a 
categorical moral and religious order of rights and duties.‖490 
At level three of Kohlberg‘s theory of cognitive moral development (post 
conventional level) ―moral value resides in conformity by the self to shared or shareable 
standards, rights or duties.
491
 At stage one of level three there is clear recognition of 
arbitrariness, need for rules and need for agreement. Hence duty is ―defined in terms of 
contract, general avoidance of violation of the will or rights of others, and majority will 
and welfare.‖ At this stage ―Life is valued both in terms of its relation to community 
welfare and in terms of life being a universal human right.‖492 At stage two of level three 
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there is clear transcendence of recognized social rules to ―principles of choice‖ based on 
―logical universality and consistency‖ the orientation tends toward ―conscience as a 
directing agent and to mutual respect and trust.‖ The motive behind conforming is 
avoidance of ―self-condemnation…Human life is sacred – a universal human value of 
respect for individual.‖493 
To explicate the different stages of moral and cognitive development Kohlberg 
used the famous Heinz dilemma. Basically, the dilemma is a practical moral problem 
resolution of which indicates one‘s location in Kohlberg‘s six stages of moral 
development. In Kohlberg‘s view the stages are universal and they ―lead toward an 
increased morality of value judgment, where morality is considered as a form of judging 
as it has been in philosophic tradition running from analyses of Kant to those of modern 
analytic or ‗ordinary language‘ philosophers.‖494 Persons in different stages of moral 
development have different moral perspective, reasoning and judgment. Heinz dilemma 
helps demonstrate the difference: 
In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one 
drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist 
in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the 
druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to produce. He paid $200 
for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman‘s 
husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only 
get together about $1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his 
wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the 
druggist said: ―No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it.‖ So 
Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. 
Should the husband have done that? Was it right or wrong? Is your decision that it 
is right (or wrong) objectively right, is it morally universal, or is it your personal 
opinion?
495
 
The post conventional level is considered the ideal of moral maturity. According 
to Kohlberg the post conventional levels is characterized by ―a major thrust toward 
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autonomous moral principles which have validity and application apart from authority of 
the groups or persons who hold them and apart from the individual‘s identification with 
those persons or groups.‖496 The post conventional level of moral and cognitive 
development transcends cultural limitations of morality. A few people are universally 
known to have attained the post-conventional level of moral and cognitive maturity. In 
the words of Kohlberg, ―Socrates, Lincoln, Thoreau and Martin Luther King tend to 
speak without confusion of tongues, as it were.‖ Kohlberg attributes their moral and 
cognitive maturity to the fact that ―the ideal principles of any social structure are 
basically alike, if only because there simply aren‘t that many principles which are 
articulate, comprehensive and integrated enough to be satisfying to the human 
intellect.‖497 
(ii) Objectives and Methods of Education Should Not Contradict the 
Process of Moral and Cognitive Development 
The cognitive development theory of Kohlberg calls to question both the content 
and method of education. Kohlberg questions the general objective of education from the 
perspective of his theory of moral and cognitive development. In his research, Kohlberg 
identifies three different understandings and consequential development of education 
ideology in the western world. The first of the three understandings is Romanticism. 
Originating from Rousseau Romanticism holds that ―what comes from within the child is 
the most important aspect of development; therefore, the pedagogical environment should 
be permissive enough to allow the inner ‗good‘ to unfold and the inner ‗bad‘ to come 
under control.‖498 This understanding believes in the innate nature of cognitive 
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development. It basically affirms the presence of the potential which only needs right 
environment to develop on its own. 
The second understanding of development or education is called ―cultural 
transmission.‖ This is the western traditional stream. Believers in this stream hold that the 
basic task of educators is ―the transmission to the present generation of bodies of 
information and of rules or values collected in the past; they believe that the educator‘s 
job is the direct instruction of such information and rules.‖499 To a large extent this 
understanding dominates most contemporary learning with very few exceptions, 
generally found in innovative research. 
The third understanding of education is progressivist. Progressivism holds that 
―education should nourish the child‘s natural interaction with a developing society or 
environment.‖ Believers of this stream of education ―define development as a progression 
through invariant, ordered sequential stages. The educational goal is the eventual 
attainment of a higher level or stage of development in adulthood, not merely the healthy 
functioning of the child at a present level.‖500 According to this theory integration of the 
child within the supportive society is integral. It facilitates personal development without 
suppressing autonomy. 
Kohlberg first suggests that the objective of education be ―identified with 
development, both intellectual and moral.‖ This suggestion is based on his observation of 
necessarily developmental and progressive nature of education. He therefore posits that 
―education so conceived supplies the conditions for passing through an order of 
connected stages.‖501 In his view, education should not be internalization of bodies of 
knowledge but conceptualization of principles. Kohlberg concludes that ―a notion of 
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education for development and education for principles is liberal, democratic, and 
nonidoctrinative. It relies on open methods of stimulation through a sequence of stages, 
in a direction of movement that is universal for all children. In this sense, it is neutral.‖502 
Although cognitive and moral development is a realization of an innate potential, social 
interaction is a necessary environment for the actualization of the potential. Actually, 
morality is naturally relational. ―Every child believes it is bad to kill because regard for 
the lives of others or pain at death is a natural empathic response, although it is not 
necessarily universally consistently maintained.‖503 
Social dimension is crucial in Kohlberg‘s theory of moral and cognitive 
development essentially, as he states himself, because ―developmental theory assumes 
formalistic criteria of adequacy, the criteria of levels of differentiation and integration. In 
the moral domain, these criteria are parallel to formalistic moral philosophy‘s criteria of 
prescriptivity and universality.‖ In other words differentiation and integration are at the 
core of both cognitive and moral development since they are the ones which make moral 
and cognitive development a process and they are represented by the society. When 
combined ―the criteria of prescriptivity and universality represent a formalistic definition 
of the moral, with each stage representing a successive differentiation of the moral from 
the nonmoral and more full realization of the moral form.‖504 
Obviously, therefore, even though the potential remains within the subject, the 
process of moral and cognitive development is conditioned by, and contingent on society, 
social order and personal relationship with both with the society. Kohlberg states, 
―Although there are major theoretical differences among sociological role theorists, 
psycho-analytic theorists, and learning theorists, they all view moral development 
and other forms of socialization as ‗the process by which an individual, born with 
behavior potentialities of an enormously wide range, is led to develop actual 
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behavior confined within the much narrower range of what is customary and 
acceptable for him according to standards of his group.‘‖505 
Kohlberg‘s stages of cognitive and moral development cannot be understood 
independent of society. He argues that his study ―has indicated the feasibility of looking 
at individual differences in morality as representing a sequence of stages in 
conceptualizing the social order and the self‘s relation to it.‖506 Kohlberg‘s argument 
indicates that greater social participation and responsibility is indicative of greater moral 
maturity. In his own words: ―we felt in terms of the informal, and statistical analyses, we 
carried out, that we could not in a general way narrow down our interpretation beyond 
saying that greater social participation and responsibility in general is related to greater 
moral development in general.‖507 
Due to the fact that there is personal potential seeking autonomy and the 
necessary and inescapable social frame within which the individual is allowed to develop, 
there is tension between the individual and the society in the process of differentiation 
and integration. Kohlberg argues that ―only a third ideology can resolve the conflict 
between the society and the individual as the determinant of moral values. The ideology 
is progressive interactionism, which escapes the trap of either indoctrination or 
relativism.‖ Progressive interactionism reconciles the process of differentiation and 
integration as a necessary means to an end. Kohlberg states that ―such ideology is 
philosophically sound because it first rationally attempts to define and justify what should 
be the ends of education. Moreover it is psychologically sound because it is supported 
empirically by cognitive developmental research.‖508 
In sum Kohlberg‘s theory of moral development demonstrates that moral 
development is not independent of cognitive development. That is why Kohlberg‘s types 
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―reflect, on the whole, both an order of increasing internalization and an order of 
increased cognitive adequacy or ‗rationality‘ in the moral area.‖ There is correlation and 
interdependence between the two aspects of development, even though neither can be 
reduced to the other. ―The course of moral development in our data does not seem to be 
describable in separable cognitive and affective areas. However, this does not imply that 
the growth of morality is the growth of intelligence our correlations with intelligence 
contradict this.‖509 Secondly, Kohlberg‘s theory of moral development attempts to show 
morality as a dimension of development which ―could not be reduced to growing 
cognitive skill in manipulating value clichés and in anticipating consequences.‖ The 
theory shows as well that moral development ―could not be reduced to learning of 
‗internalizing‘ the ‗right‘ values as a readymade set of preferences.‖510 The social and the 
moral aspects of development cannot be separated from each other since ―the moral as a 
fundamental dimension of social development.‖511 Essentially, morality is shared by all 
humans even as it remains transcendental to all. Kohlberg states that ―morality introduces 
a dimension of conformity common to all groups and transcending all. The trends of 
moral development we have sketched may provide a key to the developmental integration 
in the individual of the multiple groups to which he belongs.‖512 
Kohlberg‘s theory of education is observably a marriage of the Romanticism of 
Rousseau, progressivism and some cultural transmission principles of education. 
However, the theory is much more reliant on Romanticism and progressivism than on 
cultural transmission. Education, in Kohlberg‘s view is a kind of initiation which allows 
the individual to realize his potential without transgressing societal regulations. In 
Kohlberg‘s view education is both active participation within favorable environment and 
 145  
definition of societally established boundaries beyond which the student cannot go. 
Therefore ―a more complete approach implies full student participation in a school in 
which justice is a living matter.‖513 The process is simultaneously limited by, and 
dependent on, the society in which the individual person is located. Apparently, Kohlberg 
foresees the possibility of an ideally mature person to transcend societal limitation in 
stage 6 into an ideal (projected) stage seven. Presumably, at that ideal stage an ethically 
mature person acts both within the framework of societal limitation while taking the 
whole society to a higher ideal level. In Ubuntu such a person is allowed to act freely 
because he has proven to be so mature that his action proceeds from his care, not just for 
the self but also for the society in general. 
(iii) The Ethical Principle of Justice as Ultimate End of Moral 
Development 
Kohlberg‘s theory of moral and cognitive development is based on Platonic and 
Aristotelian philosophies. Kohlberg cites Plato and Aristotle on issues like moral 
education, moral development, meaning of virtue, and its innate nature. Although 
Kohlberg formally disagrees with Plato, he nevertheless agrees with the Platonic 
understanding that teaching of virtues is not a mere instruction. Kohlberg accepts the 
view that ―virtue is ultimately one, and it is always the same ideal‖ for all cultures. 
Justice is the ideal form of virtue. ―Virtue is knowledge of the good,‖ and since ultimate 
good is one for all people, virtue in general, and justice in particular is universally 
accessible by all humans. Good can be taught because ―we know it all along dimly,‖ so 
teaching is ―more a calling out than an instruction.‖ The good may not be easily taught 
under some circumstances because ―the same good is known differently at different 
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levels and direct instruction cannot take place across levels.‖ Thus, virtue cannot be 
taught by impartment. It is truly taught by ―asking of the questions and the pointing of the 
way, not the giving of answers.‖ Thus, moral education is like labor process whose 
purpose is ―leading of people upward,‖ rather than ―putting into the mind of the 
knowledge that was not there before.‖ Education, therefore, is autonomous process of 
growth, a development towards the ultimate good, understanding of which is virtue. In its 
ideal form though, virtue is justice.
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Kohlberg argues that the principle of justice is central, not only in moral 
development but also in cognitive development. He argues that psychologically ―both 
welfare concerns (role taking, empathy) and justice are present at birth of morality and at 
every succeeding stage. Only justice, however, ―takes on the character of a principle at 
the highest stage of development.‖ Justice eventually ―takes precedence over law and 
other considerations, including welfare.‖ According to Kohlberg other principles ―do not 
work, either because they do not resolve moral conflicts or because they resolve them in 
ways that seem intuitively wrong.‖ Justice is ―the only one that ‗does justice to‘ the 
viable core of lower stages of morality.‖ According to Kohlberg, therefore, justice is the 
ultimate principle of morality. ―The reason that philosophers have doubted the claims of 
justice as ‗the‘ moral principle is usually that they have looked for a principle broader in 
scope than the sphere of moral or principled individual choice in the formal sense.‖515 He 
states that ―if a formalistic definition of moral principle is unjustified, no one has 
proposed a better definition. And if an equation of moral principle with justice is 
injustified, no one has proposed a satisfactory alternative.‖516 Kohlberg also observes that 
―Denial that justice is the central principle of morality thus tends to coincide with a 
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refusal to accept a formal deontological concept of morality but is not backed by an 
alternative positive definition of morality.‖517 
Kohlberg distinguishes rule from principle: ―a rule says ‗don‘t do that,‘ or ‗do 
that,‘ – it prescribes an action. A principle is some ‗rule‘ which tells us how to make a 
choice between two more or less legitimate or ruleful alternatives.‖518 In other words, 
rules are prescriptive. They operate within principles. Thus, principles are ―neither rules 
(means) nor values (ends).‖ They are guides that perceive and integrate ―all the morally 
relevant elements in concrete situations. They reduce all moral obligations to the interests 
and claims of concrete individuals in concrete situations; they tell us how to resolve 
claims that compete in a situation, when it is one person‘s life against another‘s.‖519 
Principles therefore transcend concrete situations and the rules applicable in those 
situations. Kohlberg states that ―besides regularity or consistency in use of a reason for 
choice, a principle implies the universality and ideality of such reason. The basis of 
choice is one which it would be desirable for all to use.‖520 
The principle of justice makes it possible to execute human rights. Kohlberg 
defines human rights as ―a claim for some positive action by another. It is a legitimate 
expectation as to the actions of other persons or of the social system.‖521 Claims are 
relational in nature as they involve two parties. The language of rights, therefore, calls for 
the principles of justice. According to Kohlberg ―by definition, principles of justice are 
principles for deciding between competing claims of individuals, for ‗giving each person 
his due.‘ When principles, including considerations of human welfare, are reduced to 
guides for considering such claims, they become expressions of the single principle of 
justice.‖522 Consequently, ―The most basic principle of justice is equality: treat every 
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man‘s claim equally, regardless of the man.‖523 Without acknowledging human equality 
most moral principles remain baseless. 
Basing his thinking and logic on Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, Kohlberg 
makes a general conclusion that ―the man who understands justice is more likely to 
practice it…youths who understand justice act more justly, and the man who understands 
justice helps create moral climate which goes far beyond his immediate and personal acts. 
The universal society is the beneficiary.‖524 However, moral principles are general by 
nature and their ―generality cannot be coercive…one can never coerce others to think or 
decide in any given way…accordingly, a principle of choice must appeal to ‗reason,‘ for 
its acceptability. It must seem to command assent intrinsically.‖525 Moreover, Kohlberg 
asserts, ―moral judgments, unlike judgments of prudence or esthetics, tend to be 
universal, inclusive, consistent, and grounded on objective, impersonal, or ideal 
grounds.‖526 
Kohlberg refers to Socrates and Martin Luther King as teachers of justice who put 
their teaching in practice regardless of the cost. They died for justice.
527
 Martin Luther 
King and Socrates knew the good and pursued the ultimate good regardless of the 
impediments. They could not avoid doing the good. According to Kohlberg, such people 
were really mature in their understanding of justice. They transcended and surpassed their 
respective communities in their pursuit of justice. ―King makes it clear that moral 
disobedience of the law must spring from the same root as moral obedience of the law, of 
respect for justice‖ because there cannot be contradiction with regards to the good, justice 
or rights. ―We respect the law because it is based on rights both in the sense that the law 
is designed to protect the rights of all and because the law is made by the principle of 
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equal political rights. If civil disobedience is to be stage 6, it must recognize the 
contractual respect for law of stage 5, even to accepting imprisonment.‖528 
Once again, Kohlberg, like Plato, uses generality of ―the good‖ and justice to 
relate knowledge and practice. According to this understanding, one who knows the good 
will seek it. To the degree one knows the good one will pursue it. Justice follows from 
the universal nature of good and right. Justice therefore ―must appeal for acceptance on 
the grounds that it is appropriate for ‗a reasonable being‘ to adhere to.‖529 There is a 
difference between understanding of a virtue or principle and its practice. Practice of a 
principle is based on, and affected by, many other factors than merely understanding it. 
Such factors like emotion, uniqueness due to different personalities, and concrete 
situation impact practice of justice. 
In sum, the end or objective of all cognitive and moral development in Kohlberg‘s 
theory as it is in Ubuntu seems to be societal, biospheric and of the cosmic good. 
Kohlberg indicated that there is a tendency for someone who is really mature, one who 
really lives a just life to transcend the principle of justice because ―what empowers a 
person to live a life of justice, and to face death for it, is itself something ‗beyond justice,‘ 
something I metaphorically call ‗stage 7.‘‖ Thus moral and cognitive development is a 
continuum. Moral maturity is not really fully attained. It tends to become progressively 
all-embracing and universal as inters into stage seven. Kohlberg states that people at 
stage 7 ―affirm life from a ‗cosmic perspective‘; feel some mystic union with God, Life, 
or Nature; and accept the finitude of the self‘s own life, while finding its meaning in a 
moral life, a life in which a sense of love for, and union with, Life or God is expressed in 
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a love for fellow human beings.‖530 Stage 7 of Kohlberg‘s theory of cognitive and moral 
development has been demonstrated as the ideal of Ubuntu culture. 
2. Human Relationships 
While Kohlberg may be justified to contend that the majority of moral problems 
arise from competing rights and that their resolution depends on conception of human 
rights, resolution of moral problems cannot ignore the parties‘ respective location in the 
six stages of moral development because people perceive justice differently at different 
stages of moral development. If perception of justice is compromised by the six moral 
development stages and if very few people get to the sixth stage, moral objectivity and 
universality of values and principles are at least compromised and at most relativized by 
the stages. This assertion calls for further research. Carol Gilligan disagreed with 
Kohlberg‘s criterion of moral development based solely on perception of justice. Later 
Kohlberg acknowledged that morality may not be based solely on justice and human 
rights. He acknowledged that Gilligan captured ―a second sense of the word moral‖ 
which focuses on care and responsibility.
531
 Thus the second major component of Ethics 
of Care concerns human relationships. Individual and universal rights need to be 
interpreted in light of ethical responsibility having meaning within human relationships. 
This component has two related concepts. First, self in relationship according to Carol 
Gilligan‘s three stages of moral development; second, ethics and narrative based on Nel 
Nodding‘s perspective on uniqueness of each moral problem and the need for personal 
contact. 
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a. Self in Relationship 
The first concept of human relationships is based on the self in relationship. 
Reacting to Kohlberg‘s theory of moral development, Gilligan asserts that moral 
development proceeds from egocentrism to an-other-oriented stance and culminates in a 
final stage in which the self in relationship with another comes into balance.
532
 Gilligan 
argues that Kohlberg‘s theory of moral development was not impartial, that it excluded 
women and an important aspect of moral development. Kohlberg‘s theory excludes the 
role of human relationship and responsibility. Gilligan‘s theory of moral development has 
its foundation in Kohlberg‘s theory of moral development but then expands upon it. 
According to Gilligan, there are three stages of moral development: pre-conventional, 
conventional and post-conventional. The goal of pre-conventional stage is individual 
survival. The goal of the conventional stage is responsibility to others (self-sacrifice is 
goodness). The goal of the post-conventional stage is truth (That is a person too!). The 
major difference between Kohlberg and Gilligan‘s theories of development is that in 
Gilligan‘s theory the transition is fueled by a change in the sense of the self, while in 
Kohlberg the transition is fueled by changes in cognitive ability.
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(i) Buber’s I and Thou as an Inspiration to Care Ethics 
There is an epistemological and ontological truth, both in Ubuntu and in ethics of 
care which cannot be overlooked. Although such truth does not inspire Ubuntu, because 
Ubuntu outlives Buber, it either directly or indirectly inspires ethics of care. The truth is 
about the human neediness of others both for conception of self and of any reality. Such 
neediness is reflected in human communication and it is inevitable. Human beings realize 
that their life is interlocked and contingent to other human lives and other reality around 
them a posteriori. That means the relationship is a priori, a condition for human 
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existence, and relationship. Exploring human language, Buber refers to human 
existence‘s contingency to other existents. ―If Thou is said, the I of the combination I-
Thou is said along with it. If it is said, the I of the combination I-It is said along with it.‖ 
In other words, human language reveals nature of reality; that is, reality‘s ontological 
unity. Buber elaborates this fact when he writes, ―There is no I taken in itself, but only 
the I of the primary word I-Thou and the I of the primary word I-It…For where there is a 
thing there is another thing. Every it is bounded by others; it exists only through being 
bounded by others.‖534 
Buber‘s use of the I-Though language underlines the importance of relationships 
between humans and between human beings and the rest of reality. He states, ―The 
primary word I-Thou establishes the world of relation.‖535 It is through such relationship 
that the self becomes self. ―Through the Thou a man becomes I. That which confronts 
him comes and disappears, relational events condense, then are scattered, and in the 
change consciousness of the unchanging partner, of the I, grows clear, and each time 
stronger.‖ Any human being, however, remains constantly, as Buber puts it, ―caught in 
the web of the relation with the Thou, as the increasingly distinguishable feature of that 
which reaches out to and yet is not Thou.‖ It is the I-Thou relationship which enables 
even self-examination or introspection. Buber states that the I-Thou relationship 
facilitates consciousness and development as it ―continually breaks through with more 
power, till a time comes when it bursts its bonds, and the I confronts itself for a moment, 
separated as though it were a Thou; as quickly to take possession of itself and from then 
on to enter into relations in consciousness of itself.‖536 
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There is no doubt, therefore, that individuality develops from relationships. 
Relationships, however, indicate human neediness of preexistent others, with whom to 
relate both for his own psychological, moral and social development and for their 
development. Such neediness for others is basic and, as it were, a prerequisite of personal 
development. In Buber‘s words, ―The person becomes conscious of himself as sharing in 
being, as co-existing, and thus as being. Individuality becomes conscious of itself as 
being such-and-such and nothing else. The person says, ‗I am,‘ the individual says, ‗I am 
such-and-such.‘‖ Consequently, personal consciousness is self-definition or distinction 
from the other (Thou). In other words, as Buber puts it, ―‗Know thyself,‘ means for the 
person ‗know thyself to have being,‘ for the individual it means ‗know thy particular kind 
of being.‘ Individuality in differentiating itself from others is rendered remote from true 
being.‖537 
Since reality is essentially a unity, or so to say, an organism. As much as 
individuation and individuality is important for any relationship, it should be controlled 
by reality for it depends on it. Buber writes, ―The more a man, humanity, is mastered by 
individuality, the deeper does the I sink into unreality. In such times the person in man 
and in humanity leads a hidden subterranean and as it were cancelled existence – till it is 
recalled.‖538 If this is the case, there is a need for balance between individuality and its 
relationship with reality as a whole. This balance is important because ―Every real 
relation in the world rests on individuation, this is its joy – for only in this way is mutual 
knowledge of different beings won – and its limitation – for in this way perfect 
knowledge and being known are foregone.‖ Cognitive awareness does not only reveal 
interdependence of reality but also human limited control of reality and his exposure to it. 
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Buber points to this fact when he writes, that ―in the perfect relation my Thou 
comprehends but is not my self, my limited knowledge opens out into a state in which I 
am boundlessly known.‖539 The ontological and cognitive interaction between an 
individual and the rest of reality is transformative, which means, it is in a state of flux or 
constant change. ―Every real relation in the world is consummated in the interchange of 
actual and potential being; every isolated Thou is bound to enter the Chrysalis state of the 
It in order to take wings anew.‖ The change in individuals, which is inevitable, is based 
on relation and it is on-going. However, ―in pure relation potential being is simply actual 
being as it draws breath, and in it the Thou remains present.‖540 Thus, no individual 
human can exist as human independent of other humans and the cosmos, just as no 
individual can resist being simultaneously actual and potential, due to the fact of human 
inevitable interaction with reality and its consequential change. 
(ii) Mcquarrie’s Existentialism as Care Ethics’ Worldview 
Exploring Ubuntu, one finds that it is essentially a kind of existentialism, not 
substantially different from the one found in the philosophy of Mcquarrie. Ethics of care 
is equally based on existentialism. Existentialism has either directly or indirectly 
influenced the discourse and the perspective of ethics of care. Like Buber, Macquarrie 
observes and asserts that ―the existent lives in constant interaction with other existents.‖ 
In other words, existence is not and cannot be devoid of interaction between beings. 
Human beings cannot exist as human in isolation. Macquarrie categorically states that 
―existence is ‗being-with-others‘ or ‗being-with-another‘‖ Macquarrie‘s statement 
indicates existence is contingent to otherness. Ethical principles such as autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice are based on the assumption of otherness 
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without which they are rendered meaningless and irrelevant. This fact underlines what 
Macquarrie says, that is, ―existence is fundamentally communal in character, and without 
the others I cannot exist.‖541 
In compliance with Ubuntu worldview, Macquarrie posits that ―society is not 
formed by the banding together of individuals‖ as it has traditionally been assumed, 
rather, ―Individuals emerge from a society that is prior to them.‖ Macquarrie explains that 
this assertion has been argued and accepted by most modern anthropologists and 
sociologists.
542
 By his observation and argument on the precedence of society over 
individuals, Macquarrie positions individuality in realistic balance, exaggerating or 
undermining which is an ontological and epistemological mistake. He states that 
―Individualism and collectivism are, at bottom, different forms of the same error. We can 
avoid them only if we begin with the concreteness of existence as ‗being-with-others.‘‖543 
In Macquarrie‘s view, the world and otherness have to be taken seriously because 
―this world is an a priori condition of all my practical concerns…so one may also claim 
that the others are a priori – they are conditions of existence rather than ‗extras‘ that are 
added on to existence.‖ An individual finds himself in a world of many other individual 
humans and non-humans mutually interrelating in a way that makes individuality 
possible and realizable.
544
 However, only human beings are capable of personal existence 
and relationship. Macquarrie observes that ―no animal, no crystal, no manufactured thing 
says ‗I.‘‖ The ability to use the personal pronoun I defines, not only uniqueness and 
specialness of a human being but also his different interaction and relationship with the 
rest of reality. Macquarrie argues that ―the uniqueness of the human existence lies in the 
felt ‗mineness‘ of that existence which knows itself as ‗I,‘ almost a microcosm.‖ A 
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human person is capable of self-reflection. He is aware of his own existence. Macquarrie 
states that a human being is a center ―different from every other, at once lonely and cut 
off, yet also in a sense embracing the world and embraced by it.‖545 
Due to humans‘ unique capability of relating with their environment, humans are 
not only capable of consciously effecting change in their environments; they are capable 
of evaluating the change that they effect. With regards to their relationship with other 
humans, Macquarrie posits that a human‘s being with others ought to be authentic: 
―Authentic being-with-others is precisely that mode of relation to the other that promotes 
existence in the full sense; that is to say, it lets the human stand out as human, in freedom 
and responsibility.‖ Therefore, being with others authentically means being responsible in 
recognizing and respecting the other in his uniqueness. It also means recognizing the 
inviolable rights of the other. ―On the other hand, inauthentic being-with-others 
suppresses the genuinely human and personal. Whatever kind of relation to the others 
depersonalizes and dehumanizes is an inauthentic one…True community allows for true 
diversity.‖546 Macquarrie implies that failure to recognize other humans‘ personhood and 
its rights and obligations is falsifying reality, which in turn makes our relationship with 
such humans both self and other-deceptive, in other words, unethical. Unethical 
relationship or treatment of the other is thus inauthentic deceptive and falsifying. 
Representing an existentialist perspective, Macquarrie objects to the Cartesian 
perspective which, in his view exaggerates the importance of thought, especially because 
thinking secondary to existence. There can be existence without rationality. Macquarrie 
argues, ―I am not primarily a thinking subject. I am first of all an existent: existence is 
something much broader than thinking, and prior to it.‖547 While existence is of utmost 
 157  
importance, its dependence on its environment is crucial. Like Buber Macquarrie 
recognizes dependability of human existence on its immediate environment and the 
cosmos. He simply but categorically states, ―Existence is being-in-the-world, and there is 
no existence without environment.‖548 With regards to human relationship Macquarrie 
recommends genuineness. Ideal human relationship is essentially mutually affirmative, 
mutually respectful, mutually equal and mutually reciprocal. ―A genuine relation to 
another person cannot be one-sided, dominating, or possessive; it must consist in 
openness and willingness to listen and receive as well as to speak and to give.‖549 Thus, 
as humans find themselves already related to other humans, their environment and the 
cosmos, they have an ethical duty to genuine human relationship, which by nature is 
incapable of reducing the other into anything less than human. 
(iii) Gilligan’s Theory of Women Cognitive and Moral Development 
Based on Care 
Gilligan‘s theory of women‘s cognitive and moral development is a reaction 
against the male-dominated one of Kohlberg. According to Gilligan, Kohlberg‘s theory, 
which is based on Pieget‘s theory of cognitive development, is not representative of 
women. This accusation is easily proven by the mere fact of Kohlberg‘s using only male 
subjects in his research. Kohlberg‘s theory of cognitive and moral development at most 
represents at least marginalization of women in the world of morality and at most 
exclusion of women from the moral field. Kohlberg‘s approach explored above is rights 
based. Individual human beings have basic inalienable rights which all other humans 
should respect. The role of morality, therefore, is to define boundaries and impose 
restrictions in order to protect those rights. Thus morality is concerned with justice in the 
 158  
allocation or recognition of individual rights and in the protection of the defined 
boundaries of individual rights. However, Gilligan comes up with an important 
dimension of cognitive and moral development that Kohlberg overlooked, care and 
human mutual responsibility for one another. According to Gilligan, a female approach to 
morality is based on relationship and responsibility. The main assumption in this theory is 
that individuals have responsibility toward other individuals. Morality should be 
concerned with individual responsibility and care for other individuals. Gilligan assigned 
this perspective to the female gender. This perspective is almost opposite to that of men: 
men desire to limit interference (desire for separation and fear of commitment) while 
women desire for meaningful harmonious connections and commitments.
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In the first stage of Gilligan‘s theory of moral development, children are 
preoccupied with individual survival. The importance of the need to survive renders them 
basically selfish. However, as they develop, children learn to pay attention to what 
happens to others and eventually learn to empathize with them. Empathy challenges them 
to start equating their needs and their very selves with others. They gradually start 
moving away from their selfishness as they develop greater concern for others. This 
concern for others at stage two (conventional morality stage) is based on recognition of 
basic human equality. Empathizing with others tend to be exaggerated before, in reaction, 
children start realizing that ignoring their own needs for those of others is as equally 
wrong as ignoring other people‘s needs. This realization brings them to the final stage 
(stage three) in which responsibility and care for both self and others is perceived as the 
moral ideal. Such responsibility is indicative of, and requiring some sacrifice. ―The 
woman at this stage validates her claim to social membership through the adoption of 
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societal values. Consensual judgment about goodness becomes the overriding concern as 
survival is now seen to depend on acceptance by others.‖ Resolution of moral problems 
should seek not only care for others but inclusion and minimization of harm.
551
 At the 
final stage there is need for balance between self and others. Selflessness is not ideal as it 
hurts both the self and her relationships. In case of conflict involving power and care 
women in the third stage of development would give up power for care.
552
 
Gilligan argues that, owing to women‘s tendency to avoid harm to anyone, which 
in her view, is a fundamental concern for women, women tend to avoid judging. 
However, women‘s reluctance to judge is not moral relativism. She argues that women 
recognize and take into consideration practical world situations and uniqueness of 
individual experience which is not easily always reducible to a simple theory or moral 
principle. Real human situation is unique and complicated. Women tend to consider that 
fact better than men do.
553
 One of the major claims that Gilligan makes concerns 
relationships. She argues that women differ from men in the way they experience, and 
deal with relationships, especially dependency. According to Gilligan men develop 
differently from women. Actually, Gilligan portrays the two trends of development, that 
of boys and that of girls as opposites: 
For boys and men, separation and individuation are critically tied to gender identity 
since separation from the mother is essential for the development of masculinity. 
For girls and women, issues of femininity or feminine identity do not depend on the 
achievement of separation from the mother or on the progress of individuation. 
Since masculinity is defined through separation while femininity is defined through 
attachment, male gender identity is threatened by intimacy while female gender 
identity is threatened by separation. Thus males tend to have difficulty with 
relationships, while females tend to have problems with individuation.
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Apparently, at least from Gilligan‘s view point, this argument explains the 
difference between male and female perspective on morality. Women go on defining 
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themselves in terms of, and in the context of human relationship and ability to care, while 
men tend to perceive relationship and care as weakness which rivals autonomy and 
independence. Gilligan asserts that ―when the focus on individuation and individual 
achievement extends into adulthood and maturity is equated with personal autonomy, 
concern with relationships appears as weakness of women rather than as a human 
strength.‖555 In the case of women, however, the case is different. Ability to relate, 
engage and care is not a weakness but strength. Care and mutual responsibility neither 
compromise nor threaten ethical autonomy. According to Gilligan‘s study for women 
―obligation and sacrifice override the ideal of equality,‖ thus creating conflict between 
care and justice.
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Like Buber and Macquarrie, Gilligan asserts that the self needs the other in a 
fundamental, existential and ontological way. Gilligan states that ―the truth of 
relationship, however, return in the rediscovery of connection, in the realization that self 
and other are interdependent and that life, however valuable in itself, can only be 
sustained by care in relationships.‖557 The main difference between Buber‘s and 
Macquarries assertion against Gilligan‘s assertion is that Buber and Macquarrie make 
universal and categorical statement while Gilligan‘s statement is biased towards women 
care. According to Gilligan, ―in all the women‘s descriptions, identity is defined in a 
context of relationship and judged by a standard of responsibility and care.‖ This general 
statement about women, however, seems to exclude men. One wonders whether men‘s 
identity can be defined independent of relationship. Gilligan goes on to assert that women 
perceive morality ―as arising from the experience of connection and conceived as a 
problem of inclusion rather than one of balancing claims.‖558 Gilligan‘s conclusions with 
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regards to her distinction of women‘s against men‘s perception of morality seem to be 
sweeping and overgeneralizing. This problem shows that she is as biased as Kohlberg, 
though for women and against men. 
b. Ethics and Narrative 
The second concept of human relationships is based on ethics and narrative. 
Morality is concerned with the activity of care, hence moral problems arise from 
conflicting responsibilities; thus their resolution should be practical, contextual and 
narrative.
559
 Noddings argues that ―Since so much depends on the subjective experience 
of those involved in ethical encounters, conditions are rarely ‗sufficiently similar‘ for me 
to declare that you must do what I must do.‖560 This approach towards care would imply 
that care ethics does not stipulate any substantive norms, but rather consists of an attitude 
of attending to the other‘s wants and needs. Even though Noddings argues that care 
represents a universal morality, she claims it occurs only in intimate relations where it is 
highly variable and subject to the practical judgments of the care-giver. Consequently, 
Noddings concedes that her meaning of care entails a particular situational morality. We 
may ―care about‖ strangers in the sense of maintaining ―an internal state of readiness to 
try to care for whoever crosses our path, but she distinguishes this perspective from 
‗caring-for‘ to which we refer when we use the word ‗caring‘‖561 Caring per se requires 
personal contact and varies according to individuals and situations. Indeed, because of the 
particularity of care, Noddings is wary of passing judgment on the caring activities of 
others. What is good for one individual in one situation may not be good for another in 
another situation. Consequently, each moral situation being unique, effective moral 
resolutions to moral situations are highly relative and situationally determined. 
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(i) Derrida on the Injustice of Law 
According to Derrida, There is an injustice in the process of law. Such injustice is 
based on overriding of individuality and its multi-dimensional contexts, all individuals 
and their contexts being unique, thus different from any other. The law over-generalizes 
by treating everybody more or less equal with everybody else. Real morality recognizes 
and deals with ―singularity, individuals, irreplaceable groups and lives, the other or 
myself as other, in a unique situation.‖562 In his view, justice is generally uncaring. 
Strictly speaking, caring justice is impossible even between intimates. Caring justice 
would be only possible if an individual would be able to assume another person‘s 
existence fully so that he could address the needs of the cared-for person authentically, 
truly and really. Derrida states, ―To address oneself to the other in the language of the 
other is, it seems, the condition of all possible justice.‖ Unfortunately, it is impossible 
since ―I cannot speak the language of the other except to the extent that I appropriate and 
assimilate it according to the law of an implicit third.‖563 
Derrida‘s concern is really finding fairness in justice as practiced in civil law. In 
trying to discern justice in the practice of the law, Derrida finds out that the law may be 
unjust and irreparably so. Like Noddings, Derrida holds that moral ideal consists of 
paying ―infinite attention to the needs and perspectives of others.‖ Since giving infinite 
attention to another person is attainable, there is a sharp distinction between ―caring 
justice and the exercise of justice as law or right, legitimacy or legality, stabilizable and 
statutory, calculable a system of regulated and coded prescriptions.‖564 One may rightly 
state that there is inevitable irreparable injustice in the practice of civil justice if one 
thinks of ‗caring justice‘ using the language of Derrida. However, warns Derrida, infinity 
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of justice ―cannot and should not serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political 
battles, within an institution or a state or between one institution or state and another.‖565 
Even if there is room for improvement within the law, the ideal of the law cannot be 
achieved. Real caring justice in its ideal form remains an inspirational ideal. 
With human inability to achieve perfect justice, the ideal of justice should remain 
an ideal while praxis should strive to realize it as much as that is possible at any 
particular time in any specific issue. The best way to do it according to Derrida is to 
―hear, read, interpret it, to try to understand where it comes from, what it wants of us, 
knowing that it does so through singular idioms.‖ Derrida then recommends ―never to 
yield on this point, constantly to maintain an interrogation of the origin, grounds and 
limits of our conceptual, theoretical or normative apparatus surrounding justice.‖566 
Through philosophical ethics and politics, Derrida addresses the ideal of Ubuntu which is 
represented in the ideal of care: identification with the cared-for. In Ubuntu, however, the 
ideal does not remain abstract but always made present so that it constantly inspires and 
challenges each individual. In Ubuntu the ideal is represented by the maxims, I am who I 
am because you are who you are; and human beings are human because of the otherness 
of other human beings. Both statements, when explained not only inspire caring justice, 
they challenge care-givers to identify with recipients of care while, at the same time, 
respecting and not compromising their unique identity and singularity. 
(ii) Noddings’ Argument for Contextual, Particular and Symbiotic 
Nature of Care 
According to Noddings care is fundamental and universal because, in her view, it 
is an ―attitude which expresses our earliest memories of being cared for and our growing 
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store of memories of both caring and being cared for.‖ Since nobody could ever survive 
without being cared for by others, care is ―Universally Accessible.‖ Thus, care as such 
cannot be rejected.
567
 In her view, caring involves ―stepping out of one‘s own personal 
frame of reference into the other‘s.‖ Thus care is empathic and sacrificial because, as 
Noddings puts it, ―when we care, we consider the other‘s point of view, his objectives, 
needs, and what he expects of us. Our reasons for acting, then, have to do both with the 
other‘s wants and desires and with the objective elements of his problematic situation.‖568 
Noddings interpretation of care, however, is relativized by proximity, kinship and 
geographical distance. Although people have, as they should, caring attitude, their care 
for strangers is limited. For strangers she uses the phrase ―care about‖ while for those 
close to, the caring subject she uses the phrase ―caring for.‖569 From Nodding‘s 
perspective, care real care cannot be universalized. She rejects ―the notion of universal 
caring – that is, caring for everyone – on the grounds that it is impossible to actualize and 
leads us to substitute abstract problem solving and mere talk for genuine caring.‖570 
Noddings advocates for fundamental moral relationship between human 
individuals, their immediate environment and the cosmos in a plausible and convincing 
style which is very similar to that found in Ubuntu. She views human beings‘ immediate 
environment as an extension of their bodies. Humans interact with their space in a way 
that there is undeniable mutual influence which transforms both the environment and the 
specific human person in it. She mentions ―houses, rooms and corners as extensions of 
our bodies; gardens as immediate spaces between home and wilderness or city.‖ She 
concludes, as is the case with Ubuntu that ―place becomes part of the developing self and, 
in the extreme, the self may even become inextricable from its physical place. Place does 
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not determine the self, but it influences and shapes it.‖571 Thus Noddings contends that 
human beings cannot be dissociated from the environment that they interact with. This 
argument is far reaching since it points to the importance of psychological, geographical, 
chronological, emotional and sociological environment in which human action happens. 
Since human being cannot be really extricated from such contexts such contexts must be 
taken seriously in morality because humans have a symbiotic relationship with their 
environment. 
There is a communication between human subjects and their environment. 
Humans learn to respond to their environment. The habit to respond is acquired at home. 
It is ―directed at animals, plants and objects encountered there.‖ The capacity to respond 
that humans develop at home ―develops a basic moral need – the need to care is revealed 
and, with it, there is a move beyond duty to something deeper‖ which ―induces the great 
joy of reciprocity.‖572 Noddings points out that ―the most important entities in early life 
are other selves. Even in intellectual life, it is not so much objects and buildings that 
shape us as it is other intellects.‖573 Human beings learn how to respond to ―the needs of 
the cared-for,‖ such needs ―are captured by the response ‗I am here.‘‖ However, some 
needs, though legitimate, remain unmet due to limitations in resources or conflict.
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Due to the uniqueness of each person and context Noddings argues that there 
cannot be identical or similar moral situations. Ethical encounters being unique, general 
principles are rendered irrelevant. In Noddings words, ―Since so much depends on the 
subjective experience of those involved in ethical encounters, conditions are rarely 
‗sufficiently similar‘ for me to declare that you must do what I must do.‖575 Even though 
Noddings argues that her position does not make morality relative, she actually does 
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argue for moral relativity. She makes ethical principles relative to individuals, their 
experience and their context. This principleless stance towards morality is reflected in 
statements like the following: the goal ―lies in trying to discern the kinds of things I must 
think about‖ in caring for others.576 While one cannot rule out the role of context and 
individual perspective in ethics, one cannot rule out ethical principles. Doing that would 
render ethics and morality devoid of meaning and substance, which situation would lead 
to moral anarchism. Actually, individual positions in any moral situation are, and should 
be based on ontologically, socially or culturally established and accepted principles. 
(iii)  Tronto’s Meaning of Care and Equality of People as an End 
Rather  than a Means 
Tronto explores the meaning of care and its praxis at length. In her view caring is 
both an attitude and a disposition that is oriented to action. The most important 
disposition towards care is to care about caring. Tronto shares in, and cites Blustein in 
explaining caring about caring: 
To care about caring is to care about one‘s ability to care deeply about things and 
people in general, to invest oneself in and devote oneself to something (or 
someone) or other…The person who cares about caring…is emotionally invested in 
being a caring person, that, is, a person who takes an interest in and devotes him or 
herself to things, activities, and people in his or her world.
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Thus, in her view, to be caring involves self-investment and devotion mentally, 
emotionally, and physically. Care is oriented to praxis and difference making, without 
which it is devoid of meaning. Tronto states, ―Care implies reaching out to something 
other than the self…care implicitly suggests that it will lead to some type of action‖578 
Care can be understood in at least four different interrelated phases: ―caring 
about, taking care of, care-giving, and care-receiving.‖579 Caring about is at its basis 
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paying attention to a needy situation, recognizing that the morally needy situation needs 
to be resolved. Caring about must involve ―noting the existence of a need and making an 
assessment that this need should be met.‖580 Taking care of implies taking initiative. It 
―involves assuming some responsibility for the identified need and determining how to 
respond to it… taking care of involves notions of agency and responsibility in the caring 
process.‖581 Care giving is the sacrificial and the practical phase of care. It ―involves the 
direct meeting of needs for care. It involves physical work, and almost always requires 
that care-givers come in contact with the objects of care.‖582 Care receiving concerns the 
recipient of care. ―Care-receiving…recognizes that the object of care will respond to the 
care it receives.‖ This aspect of care helps care-giver ―know that caring needs have 
actually been met.‖583 This important phase of care demands some kind of reciprocity. 
Tronto assumes that care is natural to people and nature. Tronto shares in the 
Ubuntu worldview about care, when for instance she suggests that ―caring be viewed as a 
species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our 
‗world‘ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, 
ourselves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-
sustaining web.‖584 In other words, for its own survival nature cares for itself; humans 
need to care for themselves and for the biosphere and the cosmos both for humans 
beings‘ own survival and that of the biosphere. Tronto equates morality and moral 
goodness with care. A moral person is one who ―strives to meet the demands of caring 
that present themselves in his or her life.‖ This assertion would mean that a person who 
does not care is at best not moral, if not immoral. Tronto goes on to apply the same 
standard to states and societies. She states, ―For a society to be judged as a morally 
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admirable society, it must, among other things, adequately provide for care of its 
members and its territory.‖585 The standard used by Tronto for a moral person and moral 
society is recognized and applied by Ubuntu ethics. Notably, Tronto‘s perspective on 
morality is shared by Ubuntu perspective in a substantial way as explored in Chapter One 
and Two of the present work. 
Tronto falsifies the assumption of equality of people. She holds it as an ideal to be 
achieved rather than a status quo. She states, ―Rather than assuming the fiction that all 
citizens are equal, a care perspective would have us recognize the achievement of 
equality as a political goal.‖586 The main problem with Tronto‘s objection lies in the use 
of the word ―equality.‖ Human equality is an ontological and ethical fact that should be 
recognized as is. It means that all human beings share the same essence of humanity and 
that at that level they are equal. From the recognition of the equality of essence, human 
rights proceed. It is on this recognition that ethical principles and theories are founded. 
However, it is quite true that the ideal of treating every human being as an equal, with 
equal basic rights with any other human being has never been realized. It remains always 
as a goal that transcends actual practical life. To that extent, therefore, Tronto is right. 
She thus concludes in a way that resonates with Ubuntu that, ―It is a fact of great moral 
significance that, in our society, some must work so that others can achieve their 
autonomy and independence.‖587 
3. Reciprocity of Care 
The third major component of Ethics of Care concerns reciprocity of care. To 
integrate the debate on individual/universal rights and relationships, there needs to be 
reciprocity of care that clarifies the meaning of ethical responsibility. This component has 
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two concepts. First, ethics and context, since according to Virginia Held and Joan Tronto 
each unique moral situation is located in a unique context; second, the problem of 
universalization of care based on the views posited by Virginia Held and Nel Noddings. 
a. Ethics and Context 
The first concept of reciprocity of care concerns ethics and context. Ethics of care 
rejects the dominant moral theories as abstract and ineffective in resolving concrete 
contextualized moral problems. Each moral problem is different and unique to specific 
circumstances.
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 Two of the distinguishing elements of ethics of care are emphasis on 
the concrete and emphasis on the particular. Care ethics takes the concrete needs of 
particular individuals in specific circumstances as the starting point for what must be 
done.
589
 Ethics of care seriously considers persons as relational rather than separate 
independent entities. Consequently ethics of care ―values emotion rather than rejects 
it.‖590 Ethics of care respects and considers the claims and the situation of ―particular 
others with whom we share actual relationships.‖591 The role of context and human 
relationships can hardly be exaggerated in morality. In some sense situational morality is 
inevitable, owing to the fact of the uniqueness of moral contexts. However, the traditional 
general principles are crucial in enlightening each unique moral context. Due to its 
holistic approach to human personhood, moral attitude of mind and importance of human 
relationships, Ubuntu, like ethics of care, considers human emotion, relationship, mental 
attitude and intention very seriously in determining morality of human action. 
(i) Noddings and the Role of History and Context in Moral 
Development 
Noddings argues that ethics is about care. The genesis of ethical caring is, in her 
view, psychological and natural to human beings. She describes ―ethical caring – the 
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relation in which we meet the other morally,‖ as ―that relation in which we respond as 
one-caring out of love or natural inclination.‖ She further elaborates the relationship of 
‗natural caring‘ psychologically as ―a human condition that we, consciously or 
unconsciously, perceive as ‗good.‘‖ Noddings contend that human beings long for the 
condition she describes as ‗natural caring.‘ It is to be in a relation of ‗natural caring‘ that 
―provides the motivation for us to be moral. We want to be moral in order to remain in 
the caring relation and to enhance the ideal of ourselves as one caring.‖592 Thus 
Noddings‘ view of care is that it is a natural ideal that all humans remember and long for. 
According to Noddings ―It is the recognition of and longing for relatedness that form the 
foundation of our ethic, and the joy that accompanies fulfillment of our caring enhances 
our commitment to the ethical ideal that sustains us as one-caring.‖593 In other words, 
Noddings‘s view of ethics is similar to Ubuntu‘s view, at least in as much as relatedness 
is its basis and objective. 
Care is universal to all humans since survival of human life from its tender and 
fragile beginnings depends on care. The universality of care, according to Noddings can 
easily be found in the ―caring attitude, that attitude which expresses our earliest memories 
of being cared for and our growing store of memories of both caring and being cared 
for.‖ Thus, care is ―universally accessible.‖ Just as care requires a minimum of two 
people so is personal goodness. Noddings contends that human beings are dependent on 
each other ―even in the quest for personal goodness.‖ This assertion makes personal 
goodness a joint venture with contingence to an-other. She states ―How good I can be is 
partly a function of how you – the other – receive and respond to me. Whatever virtue I 
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exercise is completed fulfilled, in you. The primary aim of all education must be 
nurturance of the ethical ideal.‖594 
Noddings indicate that caring is more feminine than masculine, thus she laments 
that ―ethics has been discussed largely in the language of the father: in principles and 
propositions, in terms such as justification, fairness and justice.‖ In her view, ―principles 
and propositions‖ or quest for ―justification, fairness and justice‖ are more masculine 
than they are feminine; more fatherly than they are motherly. In her view, ―human caring 
and ―memory of caring and being cared for‖ are feminine than masculine; more motherly 
than they are fatherly. Consequently, she laments ―The mother‘s voice has been silent. 
Human caring and the memory of caring and being cared for, which I shall argue form 
the foundation of ethical response, have not received attention except as outcomes of 
ethical behavior.‖595 Noddings argument implies that ethics based on principles and 
justice lacks an important aspect: empathy. She describes it by saying, ―Apprehending the 
other‘s reality, feeling what he feels as nearly as possible, is the essential part of caring 
from the view of the one-caring.‖596 Noddings position with regards to gendering ethics is 
not popular within Ubuntu culture, which has been described as one which combines both 
justice and care. 
Noddings then rejects the ethics of principle due to its having too many 
exceptions. Contrary to popular belief, she argues that ethics of principle is ―ambiguous 
and unstable…too often principles function to separate us from each other.‖ Since ethics 
of principle relate to universality Noddings rejects universability on the grounds that it 
wrongly overrides ―Uniqueness of human encounters.‖ In her view, in any ethical 
situation, too much depends on the subjective experience of the parties involved to appeal 
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to objectivity and universality. Without enough explanation, however, Noddings declares 
that there is ―a fundamental universality in our ethic, as there must be to escape 
relativism.‖597 The grounds for the fundamental universality that Noddings claims in her 
brand of care ethics have not been established except for the memories of care that enable 
people to crave for it. Noddings, therefore finds herself in a dilemma which forces her to 
admit the importance of principled approach to ethics which she tries to objet. She gets 
out of the trap by admitting the need for some universality. Ubuntu ethic does not have 
the problem of disentanglement and prioritizing of care and justice. 
(ii) Held on Care Ethics against Rational Traditional Ethics Principles 
Held‘s concern is to provide a clear definition of care ethics against traditional 
justice based ethics. One of the features that define ethics of care is the ―compelling 
moral salience of attending to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we 
take responsibility.‖598 Notably, here is Held‘s emphasis on particularity the care 
recipient and the willful assumption of responsibility by the care giver. In her view, care 
cannot be simply universalized or generalized. The second feature of ethics of care 
provided by Held is its holistic approach. Thus, unlike the traditional ethics, ―ethics of 
care values emotion rather than rejects it.‖599 The third distinguishing feature of ethics of 
care is that ―ethics of care rejects the view of the dominant moral theories that the more 
abstract the reasoning about a moral problem the better because the more likely to avoid 
bias and arbitrariness, the more nearly to achieve impartiality.‖600 
According to Held the approach embraced by ethics of care contradicts 
abstraction and embraces concreteness. The fourth distinguishing feature of ethics of care 
is that it seeks to distinguish and respect between that which is private from that which is 
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public. The fifth distinguishing feature of ethics of care is its relational approach to moral 
problems. ―While dominant moral theories tend to interpret moral problems as if they 
were conflicts between egoistic individual interests on the one hand, and universal moral 
principles on the other … ethics of care, in contrast, focuses especially on the area 
between these extremes.‖601 Thus, rather than polarize, ethics of care tend to unify and 
reconcile the parties and their perspectives in resolving moral problems. 
While it works against traditional ethics principles, Impartiality works for the 
ethics of care. The traditional approach tended to avoid bias in service of human equality 
and eliminate emotion and feeling from principle, mainly because they cannot easily be 
objectified and universalized. ―An ethic of care focuses on attentiveness, trust, 
responsiveness to need, narrative nuance, and cultivating caring relations.‖602 Thus ethics 
of care, at least from Held‘s perspective embraces bias and emotion based on each human 
being‘s uniqueness, uniqueness of human relationships, and, above all, uniqueness of 
each ethical situation. While the claim of care ethicists carries with it some truth, it is 
hard to have plausible ethics devoid of objectivity, universality and principled. In an 
attempt to establish superiority of care over justice Held states, ―Ethics of care usually 
works with a conception of persons as relational rather than as the self-sufficient 
independent individuals of the dominant moral theories.‖603 The problem with her 
assertion is the fact that it tends to undermine and override rational though, which is a 
distinguishing feature of humanity. 
In spite of Held‘s arguments against what she calls dominant moral theories she 
does imply, unlike many other care ethicists, that justice may play a complementary role 
to ethics of care. Justice still has some role in ethics. It takes priority in some respective 
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moral situations.
604
 Generally, however care takes irreplaceable precedence over justice 
she posits that care is the deepest fundamental value since ―there can be care without 
justice: there has historically been little justice in the family, but care and life have gone 
on without it. There can be no justice without care, however, for without care no child 
would survive and there would be no persons to respect.‖ Although she establishes 
possible independence of justice from care, Held argues that care may function as the 
parameters within which justice should be sought. She states, ―Care may thus provide the 
wider and deeper ethics within which justice should be sought.‖605 
Even though Held argues that care takes precedence over justice, care remains too 
subjective between the caring and cared-for persons to be objectified or theorized. 
However, caring people in Held‘s view ―are not seeking primarily to further their own 
individual interests; their interests are intertwined with the persons they care for.‖ Held 
holds that ethics of care is really applicable between people who are intimates or 
physically close with each other. She states that caring people ―neither are they acting for 
the sake of all others or humanity in general; they seek instead to preserve or promote an 
actual human relation between themselves and particular others.‖606 Probably because of 
this crippling dilemma Held had to admit that ―the ethics of care may not itself provide 
adequate theoretical resources for dealing with issues of justice.‖607 
In sum Held struggles to assert plausibility of ethics of care but she is realistic 
enough to realize the need for principled ethics, the need for universality and objectivity. 
While such needs have tended to trivialize human emotion, intimacy and care, they are 
nonetheless crucial in ethics. The experience-based approach of Ubuntu to morality is in 
this case more plausible than Held‘s perspective. Crucial for the survival of our human 
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species as care may be, care cannot stand for itself independent of the traditional 
principles as stable, valid and plausible ethics. Ubuntu prioritizes care for both intimates 
and others in different degrees without underrating moral principles such as justice. It 
accepts humans need for care from other humans, interdependence, and the limits of 
subjectivity and objectivity. Such limits indicate the importance of both care and justice 
or principle. 
(iii) Slote on the Role of Empathy in Care Ethics 
Slote argues that ethics of care is not new. In his view, it has been there though 
different in wording, use and objective. Slote states that ethics of care falls within ―the 
ethical tradition known as moral sentimentalism.‖ One of the philosophers of moral 
sentimentalism is David Hume. Notably, Hume never used the name ethics of care but 
used words such as ―benevolence, compassion and sympathy.‖608 Using psychological 
data, Slote argues that ethics of care is based on human ability and need to empathize. As 
such, it is universal to human beings. Slote contends that care ethicists either have not, or 
have failed to provide a robust theory of moral education supporting their kind of ethics. 
Basing his reasoning on Martin Hoffman‘s work, Slote argues that ―empathy is 
central both to moral education and to moral development.‖ Slote, therefore, challenges 
care ethicists to ―pay more attention to the psychological literature on empathy and moral 
development.‖609 Slote‘s argument entails the fact that ethics of care specifically, and all 
ethics generally, is based on human relationship and the ability to empathize. Empathy, 
he contends, ―is relevant to right and wrong.‖ Failure to empathize would, in other words 
render ethics of care meaningless.
610
 Unlike most care ethicists such as Noddings, Slote 
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does not base the foundation of ethics of care on memory but on a human ability to 
empathize. This foundation aligns care ethics with Hume‘s theory of benevolence. 
Like Held and a number of other care ethicists, Slote argues that since care is 
based on empathy, it is generally more relevant to those geographically or otherwise 
closely related to the subject. Moral obligation to care is equally subject to both 
geographical and relational proximity. The difference that sets him apart is his basing his 
theory of care on empathy. However, empathy and care should not be limited to the close 
others, although it is increased by personal relationships and geographical proximity.
611
 
In slote‘s view, empathy cannot be excluded from morality.612 Slote, complies with most 
care ethicists that care is of fundamental importance to morality, even if most care 
ethicists don‘t relate ethics of care with empathy. 
Slote argues in favor of ethics of care as capable of promoting respect to people 
and their self-determination. This is clearly stated in his own words ―I believe a 
sentimentalist ethics of care can, in fact, ground respect, and respect for autonomy, in its 
own terms.‖613 In his view, therefore, ethics of care can complement traditional principle-
based ethics. Slote implies that respect is based on, flow from or motivated by empathy 
when he states, ―respect for individuals can be unpacked in terms of empathy…one 
shows respect for someone if, and only if, one exhibits appropriate empathic concern for 
them in one‘s dealings with them.‖614 Thus, unlike many care ethicists, Slote does not 
argue that there is necessary conflict between what he calls sentimentalist ethics or ethics 
of care and the traditional ethics. The two types of ethics not only complement each 
other, they need each other. People need both types of ethics. 
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Slote raises a valid major problem with ethics of care. That is its tendency to self-
destruct because of its auto-contradiction. Slote observes that some ethicists of care have 
argued that care ethics ―is more appropriate to women than to men,‖ while, at the same 
time some care ethicists and other thinkers have ―claimed that care ethics works against 
the goals of feminism by recommending the very attitudes and activities that have kept 
women subordinate to men throughout the ages.‖ Slote notes that these two schools of 
thought within ethics of care ―are in some tension with one another, but either of them 
could lead one to conclude that care ethics cannot function, or function well, as a 
morality governing both men and women.‖ However, Slote believes that ―a fully 
elaborated ethics of care has the potential to function in a comprehensive and satisfying 
way as a truly human morality.‖615 Thus, ethics of care, though potentially possible 
universally, it bears within itself seeds of its own destruction. 
Slote‘s approach to care ethics has a lot in common with Ubuntu‘s. Care is not 
exclusive of principles, especially principles of justice. Both care or empathy and justice 
or principles are equally needed for a happy society. A comprehensive ethic cannot 
choose between principles and care, or between rationality and emotion. To be credible 
and plausible an ethic needs to be inclusive both of such trends and people, regardless 
their gender. 
b. Care Universalized 
The second concept of reciprocity of care concerns the problem of 
universalization of care. There are two schools of thought among ethicists of care: those 
who argue that real care exists only between loved ones and those immediately related
616
 
and those who contend that care can be, and ought to be, universalized.
617
 Noddings, for 
example, roots care ethics in the ―attitude which expresses our earliest memories of being 
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cared for and our growing store of memories of both caring and being cared for.‖ She 
contends that care is ―universally accessible.‖618 All people have experiences of being 
cared for, and most have experiences of caring for others. Hence they intuitively 
recognize care as good. Everyone implicitly acknowledges the morality of caring 
relations even if only among family or friends. To reject care on principle is to reject the 
basic conditions of human development and sociability.
619
 Some feminist scholars have 
criticized and resisted any attempt to limit care to private relations and contexts but have 
failed to show how care ethics can be translated into applicable consistent and robust 
universal moral theory.
620
 
According to Noddings and Held, in a strict sense, no institution or nation can be 
ethical. Organizations cannot meet one another as one caring or as one trying to care. 
Organizations ―can only capture in general terms what particular one‘s caring would like 
to have done in well-described situations.‖621 A perspective like this would imply that 
general legal rules and policies could do violence to the particular and variable needs of 
individuals. Gilligan established care as a major new perspective in the discourse on 
contemporary ethics. However, she did not establish it as the sole valid approach; rather, 
she indicated that her theory is only supplementary to theories of justice.
622
 
The problematic conflict of universalization of care between the two schools of 
thought generates the question of validity of care ethics as ethics. If care is completely 
bound in particularity and uniqueness of each particular human relationship there cannot 
be a discourse of ethics of care. If care can be generalized it needs to have robust 
principles and rules to be a credible ethic. This problem of ethics of care is shared by 
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Ubuntu ethics. While care in Ubuntu should be the norm, it is both too universal and too 
dependent on context that it is caught in the same dilemma as care ethics. 
(i) Robinson on the Problem of Globalization of Care 
Robinson‘s perspective on ethics of care is radically different from that of 
Gilligan, Held, Tronto and others. According to her, ―Moral reasoning and ethical 
enquiry which take care as its starting point do not seek to construct a moral theory at 
all.‖ She asserts that ethics of care is ―a collection of perceptive, imaginative, 
appreciative and expressive skills and capacities which put and keep us in unimpeded 
contact with the realities of ourselves and specific others.‖ To exemplify her assertion 
Robinson writes, ―A critical ethics of care does not seek to arrive at an account of moral 
philosophy which presents a justification for action dependent on the application of 
principles and rules.‖623 Thus Robinson does agree with majority of care ethicists that 
ethics of care is not meant for evaluation of any single human act using some set 
principles or theories. It does not specifically prescribe what should or should not be done 
in an ethical situation. 
According to Robinson, an ethic of care is relation-specific. Since it is ―neither 
categorical nor universal-prescriptive; it does not demand that we ‗care‘ wholly, and 
equally, about all individuals at all times in all places, nor does it regard a moral response 
as an act of pure will or judgment.‖ Ethics of care is based on, and evaluates actual or 
possible relations and the ―capacity of those agents to learn how to listen and respond to 
the needs of others.‖ Therefore ethics of care is implicitly different from the traditional 
principled ethics in its objectives and methodology. While ethics of principle evaluate 
human action as right or wrong, ethics of care evaluates human dispositions to, and 
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quality of relationships. According to Robinson ethics of care cannot ―provide an answer 
to the question that plagues normative theorists of international relations: how to arrive at 
global or universal norms / values in a world of particular, competing, and often 
incommensurable value systems.‖624 
Viewing ethics of care from Robinson‘s perspective makes it hard to effectively 
explore it, especially because it is so limited to the subjective experience of those locked 
in a personal relationship. However, Robinson posits that ethics of care is credible 
because it instills the sense of oughtness. She writes, for example that ―Those who are 
powerful have a responsibility to approach moral problems by looking carefully at where, 
why, and how the structures of existing social and personal relations have led to 
exclusion and marginalization, as well as at how attachments may have degenerated or 
broken down so as to cause suffering.‖625 The problem, however, lies in the evaluation of 
this obligation since there are really no objective principles to guide such evaluation. 
Robinson further argues that ―Moral response is not a rational act of will, but an ability to 
focus attention on another and to recognize the other as real. Such recognition is neither 
natural nor presocial, but rather something that emerges out of connections and 
attachments.‖626 Her attempt to at least limit or at most eliminate human rationality and 
volition from morality makes it very hard to establish credibility of ethics of care as it 
makes it less of an academic discourse. 
One of the significant contributions of Robinson to ethics of care is her 
recognition and envisioning of its global dimension. While Robinson like Held argues 
that ethics of care is really between intimates and those close to each other physically, she 
contends that it should inspire global care between nations and institutions. In her view, 
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this recognition comprises of, at the very basic stage, recognition of others as real and 
needy.
627
 She challenges ethics of care to be global and to evaluate unethical global 
structures which cause or support exclusion and address such structures. She boldly 
asserts that ―Any approach to ethics which claims to address the moral problems of 
international relations cannot overlook the structural causes of patterns of moral inclusion 
and exclusion on a global scale.‖ In her view, there is need to reflect critically on 
structures which compromise individual person‘s reality and uniqueness. She sees a need 
to address structures which by ―‗community-making‘, and hence exclusion, serve to 
undermine the ability of moral agents to identify and understand others as ‗real‘ 
individuals – with real, special unique lives.‖628 Thus Robinson‘s perspective on global 
ethics of care is basically inclusion. Ethics of care‘s ideal on international level should be 
inclusion of the entire human family and elimination of the problem of human 
marginalization. 
Robinson observes that there is a trend towards, creation of global human family 
with common identity.
629
 However, globalization in Robinson‘s view is structurally 
flawed if it does not address the ―exclusionary social practices and structures in the 
contemporary global system: how boundaries are constructed, how ‗difference‘ is 
assigned, and how moral and social exclusion is legitimized.‖630 In other words the 
process of creation of global community is at the same time excluding and marginalizing 
some members of the community it seeks to create. Robinson wages a war against what 
she termed ―institutionalization of exclusion.‖ She argues that ―Understanding obstacles 
to moral responsiveness among distant strangers simply in terms of ignorance, egoism, or 
individual prejudice obscures the ‗institutionalization of exclusion‘ which occurs not only 
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within political communities but between them.‖631 Robinson believes that critical ethics 
of care may be the solution needed within the international relations theory. She states, 
that ―A critical ethics of care could eclipse the quintessential problem of international 
relations theory: resolving the conflict between our ‗egoistic‘ roles and duties as citizens 
and our ‗altruistic‘ roles and duties as human beings.‖632 
Robinson‘s Ethics of care resembles Ubuntu in many ways, especially in its 
pursuit of human beings‘ common identity, creation of global human community, 
recognition of other people‘s humanness regardless their social, economic or racial 
difference and its emphasis on individual‘s duty to pay attention to the needs of other 
humans. 
(ii) Sevenhuijsen On the Moral Dilemma of Feminism in Ethics of Care 
Sevenhuijsen writing implies that ethics of care is going through an identity crisis. 
One of the problems causing the crisis is feminism. ―The feminist discussion about an 
ethics of care is too heavily weighted towards questions of identity rather than questions 
of agency and morality.‖633 Studies by Gilligan and other feminist ethics of care have 
tended to ground justification of their feminist theories on psychological and cognitive 
developmental theories like Kohlberg‘s. The result of such researches creates and 
exaggerates the chasm between the two genders. A good example is Chodorow. In 
distinguishing a masculine conception of care from a feminine one Chodorow writes, 
Girls come to experience themselves as continuous with others; their experience of 
self contains more flexible or permeable ego boundaries. Boys come to define 
themselves as more separate and distinct, with a greater sense of rigid ego-
boundaries and differentiation. The basic feminine sense of self is connected with 
the world; the basic masculine sense of self is separate.‖634 
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When translated into ethics, Chodorow‘s assertion may demand different 
standards be adopted for the two genders. Even though there may be truth in Chodorow‘s 
assertion, its exaggeration is counterproductive. 
There is an implied tension and conflict between morality and feminism. 
Sevenhuijsen points out the problem. She states that ―The relationship between feminism 
and morality has recently been one of unease and suspicion. Many modern feminists see 
morality as one of the phenomena from which women should be liberated, and they 
easily associate it with paternalism, restrictive regulation of women‘s lives, and 
conservatism.‖635 Although ethics should ideally be contra oppression, exploitation and 
marginalization of any person or any group of persons, there has been a feeling among 
feminists that morality itself has been exploitative, marginalizing, exclusivist or ignoring 
women. In other words, ethics has not treated the female gender as equal to the male 
gender. Thus Sevenhuijsen writes that ―It is neither an easy nor an inviting proposition 
for feminism to relinquish the norm of equality. The idea that men and women do not 
differ systematically in their capacities is an indispensable element in feminism whose 
principle objective is the fair treatment of men and women.‖636 However, feminist 
ethicists like Gilligan, who have either written or implied that ethics of care is feminist, 
do indirectly imply that there is inequality between the two genders, even in its view of 
morality. Ethics of care would, therefore, be self-destructive by demanding gender 
equality while, at the same time, affirming inequality as a given. 
Sevenhuijsen argues for the importance of difference. She states that ―it is 
because people are treated differently that they depart from their natural sameness.‖637 
Sevenhuijsen observes that ―the public debate about gender issues repeatedly ends up in a 
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vicious circle;‖638 often times such debates do not consider their own relevance. They are 
often counterproductive even as they escalate in intensity. Sevenhuijsen argues that ―a 
universalist ethics implies that women should conceive of themselves as little as possible 
in terms of sexual difference.‖ They should immerse themselves in the world community. 
Equality in outcome is not always ethical. Sevenhuijsen states that ―the principle that 
equality in results should be the touchstone for politics and policy has the effect of 
marginalizing other moral questions, such as the question of how oppression, violence, 
vulnerability and plurality should be dealt with, or how quality of life can be 
improved.‖639 The plausibility of Sevenhuijsen‘s argument consists in its realistic 
observation which in many ways conforms to Ubuntu worldview. Difference and 
diversity, even in gender, is constructive and productive for the human global 
community. 
Sevenhuijsen addresses a centuries year old Platonic and Cartesian influence on 
the western culture which shapes not only the culture but also the thinking and human 
treatment of each other. This influence works on difference: 
Under the influence of philosophers such as Plato and Descartes, Western culture 
has been permeated by thinking in terms of oppositions or mutually exclusive 
opposites. The most important of these are the oppositions between culture and 
nature, reason and emotion, spirit and body, rational and material, rational and 
emotional, fatherhood and motherhood, freedom and necessity, self and other, inner 
and outer, universality and particularity, public and private, Western and Eastern, 
civilization and primitiveness, and masculine and feminine, independence and 
dependence… True personhood is defined as the dominant norm and the ‗other‘ 
can have no subjectivity of its own; this process is termed the ‗objectifying of 
otherness.
640
 
Objectifying of otherness is one of the major differences between the Ubuntu 
worldview and the Western worldview. Ubuntu philosophy encourages recognition of the 
subjectivity of the other, even as the other becomes an object of one‘s thought or action. 
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Within Ubuntu culture otherness is exalted because it is necessary for selfhood. It plays 
such an important role that the maxim ―I am because you are‖ is the only one which 
briefly but exhaustively explains it. In the culture of Ubuntu, exclusion whether of self or 
other is equivalent of homicide. Inclusion is the ideal. Western culture remains trapped in 
the ‗subject – object‘ dilemma. 
(iii) Clement Liberating Ethics of Care from Feminism for Virtue 
Ethics and Justice 
The uniqueness of Clement‘s work consists of her careful critique of ethics of 
care as it is perceived by other care ethicists. She rejects the three most popular trends of 
ethics of care: ―the celebration of the ethic of care as a feminine ethic, the assimilation of 
the ethic of care to a justice perspective and the rejection of the ethic of care from a 
feminist perspective.‖ She does support the view that ethics of care should be virtue 
ethics, or at least part of virtue ethics as viewed by Aristotle. She explores ethics of care 
on par with ethics of justice without letting either of them undermine the other.
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Clement explores two features of ethics of care which she considers to be central. The 
first feature is Justice and the second feature is ―ethic of care‘s status as a personal ethic. 
Clement observes that ―feminine advocates of the ethic of care argue that autonomy is an 
individualistic value that the ethic of care rejects in favor of relational virtues. However, 
its feminist critics argue that because the ethic of care compromises a care giver‘s 
autonomy, it fails by feminist standards.‖ With regards to the second feature of ethics of 
care which is equally controversial, ―the ethic of care‘s status as a personal ethic, it is 
appropriate for our relations with family, friends or those otherwise close to us, such as 
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students.‖ Thus ethics of care would seem to complement ethics of principle / justice 
rather than rival it. 
Grim explains the relationship between autonomy and relation to underline their 
interdependence. He argues that women‘s experience of connectedness may as well work 
against the very ethic of care which assumes and emphasizes empathy and 
connectedness. Grimshaw explains, ―If I see myself as ‗indistinct‘ from you, or you as 
not having your own being that is not merged with mine, then I cannot preserve a real 
sense of your well-being as opposed to mine.‖ There is need to respect boundaries which 
leave room for personal autonomy. Moreover, as Grimshaw observes, ―Care and 
understanding require the sort of distance that is needed in order not to see the other as a 
projection of the self, or self as a continuation of the other.‖642 Complementarity and a 
sense of balance between autonomy and relationship are essential. For feminist care 
ethicists ethics of care ―gives personal relations the moral attention they deserve, 
correcting the ethic of justice‘s view of personal relations as morally insignificant in 
comparison to public relations. Conversely, its critics argue that a feminist ethic must not 
be limited to personal relations, and must include a concern for social justice.‖643 
The reconciliatory role of Clement‘s writing gives both ethics of care and ethics 
of justice recognition of its neediness of the other. The two ethics are not mutually 
exclusive but mutually complementary. Clement argues that ―the conflicts between care 
and justice orientations need not lead us to accept one at the expense of the other; indeed, 
these conflicts can help us distinguish between better and worse versions of each 
ethic.‖644 Care and justice have been viewed as mutually exclusive alternatives to each 
other since ―they are understood as conflicting ethics, each with its own ontology, 
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method, and priorities, committed to mutually exclusive values and best suited to 
different kinds of situations.‖ The two ethics are generally distinguished in three ways: 
(1) the ethic of justice takes an abstract approach, while the ethic of care takes a 
contextual approach; (2) the ethic of justice begins with an assumption of human 
separateness, while the ethic of care begins with an assumption of human 
connectedness; and (3) the ethic of justice has some form of equality as a priority, 
while the ethic of care has the maintenance of relationships as a priority. These 
features in turn are generally taken to result in conflicting evaluations of autonomy 
and a division of labor between the two ethics along public/private lines.
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The rivalry between ethics of care and ethics of justice escalates as one seeks to 
embrace one while attempting to disqualify and reject the other. This extremist tendency 
is unfortunate because there is a genuine and necessary relationship between care and 
autonomy. She posits that ―feminist ethic of care must allow for its adherents‘ 
autonomy.‖646 Since autonomy is a ―moral competence that has both personal and social 
dimensions,‖ argues clement, ―the commonly held view that care and autonomy are 
mutually exclusive arises because of the excessively individualistic and excessively 
social conceptions of the self that accompany the ideal types of justice and care.‖ Ideally 
care and autonomy should be interdependent.
647
 Equally misconceived and misjudged is 
the relationship between abstract and concrete and between reason and emotion. Clement 
states observes that ―From the justice perspective, feelings are seen as threatening the 
universality demanded of moral judgment, and thus we should seek to abstract from our 
particular feelings and focus on universal principles to be properly moral.‖648 Abstracting 
from particular individual feelings in order to focus on universal principles does injustice 
to the validity and relevance of the principles. Similarly, ignoring the principles for the 
sake of the particular concrete emotions within a particular ethical situation renders that 
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very situation impossible to evaluate ethically, for lack of criteria. Knowing the better or 
worse versions of each of the two ethics would enrich bioethics and ethics tremendously. 
Although Clement‘s perspective is similar to Ubuntu worldview, the striking 
similarity is in her view and role of context. Clement warns that ―just as it is a mistake to 
ignore care‘s social context, it is also a mistake to reduce the ethic of care to the distorted 
ways it is often practiced.‖649 While ethics of care cannot be reduced to mere context of 
an ethical situation, ethics cannot be independent of context. To disentangle context from 
ethics is equivalent to rendering ethics devoid of substance. Similarly, the role of human 
equality and attachment in ethics of care should not be taken for granted. Clement 
contends that ―All human relationships, public and private, can be characterized both in 
terms of equality and in terms of attachment, and … both inequality and detachment 
constitute grounds for moral concern.‖ In themselves the concepts of equality and 
attachment may demonstrate the interdependence between ethics of care and ethics of 
justice. Clement states, ―Since everyone is vulnerable both to oppression and to 
abandonment, two moral visions – one of justice and one of care – recur in human 
experience. The moral injunctions, not to act unfairly toward others, and not to turn away 
from someone in need, capture these different concerns.‖650 In sum, the attempt to 
separate care from justice and to prioritize one type of ethics over the other is not only 
wrong and unfair, it is counterproductive to both ethics of care and ethics of justice. 
Conclusion 
Ubuntu worldview recognizes human cognitive and moral development and 
proactively facilitates it by continuous initiation rites from instinctive self-centered 
struggle for survival mode of an infant to a mature autonomous but also social and moral 
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person. Although not in the same manner as elaborated by Kohlberg and Gilligan, 
Ubuntu has the basic understanding of human moral development. One of the differences 
between Ubuntu and modern theoretical theories is that Ubuntu‘s method is based on 
centuries of observation, has been passed on verbally, and is always praxis based. By 
progressive staged initiation a child is helped to grow into the stage where a child can say 
―I am because you are‖ and the society knows then that the child is really mature person 
who can be left to act all the time for self and the society. 
Without creating conflict between personal autonomy and human need for 
relationships (interdependence), Ubuntu recognizes the role and boundaries of self-
determination (autonomy) relative to relationships and societal boundaries into personal 
autonomy. The society helps every individual grow into his unique actualization as 
person while not letting him slip into the dangerous distance that disconnects him from 
the rest of the society. There is no conflict between human need for both care and justice 
in Ubuntu. There is not even a separation between the two. Justice and care are 
concomitant and concurrent. They are perceived as two sides of the same coin. Hence the 
conflict between them is not even perceived. Human emotion and feelings are accepted as 
real and addressed accordingly by the society for the good of the individual involved and 
for the good of all other members of the society since there is the necessary 
interconnection between members of the society which allows all to empathize, and 
therefore, act on behalf of, and for each other. Physical, psychological, emotional and 
moral difference between male and female genders is accepted as a blessing since 
complementarity is the order of life. While basic human dignity equality is sine qua non, 
uniqueness and difference is embraced as richness for all. 
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Having enlightened Ubuntu‘s human and societal perspective by ethics of care, 
the following section will explore Ubuntu‘s perspective on global human society and its 
relationship with the biosphere and the inorganic part of the cosmos as the necessary 
context of human life and society. The next section will rely heavily on the UNESCO 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights as it relied on ethics of care in this 
section. 
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 Chapter Four
UNESCO Declaration:  
Enlightening the Cosmic Context of Global Bioethics. 
One of the most important components of the culture of Ubuntu is its respect for 
the essential cosmic/global context. The meaning of this context can be enlightened by 
considering the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. One of 
the major components of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights concerns justice. The ethical debate on human rights respects the universal 
primacy of the human person within the parameters of the principle of justice. Another 
major component of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human rights 
is based on diversity. The debate on ethical responsibility must respect cultural and racial 
diversity within a global context. Another important component of the UNESCO 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is respect for the biosphere. 
Respecting diversity includes respect for the biosphere as the cosmic context for 
discourse on ethical responsibility. This chapter explores all three components of 
UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights to enlighten Ubuntu‘s aspect of 
universal/global context. 
1. Justice 
One of the major components of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights concerns justice. John Rawls explores the concept of justice 
as a complex theory.
651
 Cunneen relates restorative justice and reparations in establishing 
truth and resolving conflict between both victim and offender while reintegrating them in 
the society.
652
 Hans Kelsen demonstrates the difficulty of defining absolute justice, 
especially because justice is subordinate to, and defined by social order. Justice is, in his 
 197  
perspective, relative.
653
 In his work ―Religion without God, Social Justice without 
Christian Charity, and Other Dimensions of the Culture of Wars,‖ Cherry argues that all 
secular bioethics is empty if devoid of religious objectives.
654
 He perceives ethics as a 
means to a religious end. However, the ethical debate on human rights respects the 
universal primacy of the human person within the parameters of the principles of justice. 
This component is based on two major concepts. The first concept concerns dignity and 
freedom within the matrix of the principles of justice and solidarity. The second concept 
concerns equality of human beings as a fundamental premise and both a requirement and 
objective of ethical discourse. 
a. Dignity and Freedom 
The first concept of justice is that all human beings are naturally entitled to human 
dignity and fundamental freedoms. Denying them such entitlements violates their 
humanity.
655
 Human dignity ―has a key role in international bioethics‖ because all ethics 
is based on, and revolves around it.
656
 The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics 
and Human Rights emphasizes that respect for human dignity and avoiding any abusive 
decision that would compromise human dignity for the sake of society ―is of paramount 
importance.‖ The declaration noted, however, that in many cultures and traditions, family 
and the community are more important. Thus, ―the primacy of the human person finds its 
limits in the principles of justice and solidarity.‖657 The declaration intentionally linked 
bioethics and global problems such as access to quality health care, nutrition, drinking 
water, poverty and illiteracy to emphasize the global primacy of human beings. Since 
human dignity and freedom should be reciprocated between individuals and the 
community and should be honored by both individuals and the community, the 
declaration introduced a new principle called ―Social Responsibility.‖658 Some critics 
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deny UNESCO authority to set such universal standards or to even discuss ethics.
659
 Most 
individual ethicists also face such criticisms.
660
 There is need, however, to have universal 
standards for the sake of the common good of humanity. De Castro, Sy and Chin Leong 
raised the issue of the ‗global poor‘ as an issue of social and distributive justice.661 
Hessler and Buchanan state that due to inequality in national economies and policies, 
distribution of healthcare is problematic.
662
 However, healthcare being a human right, 
such impediment is a mere excuse.
663
 
After exploring and comparing healthcare systems in different national 
economies, Callahan and Wasunna discourage commercialized healthcare in the interest 
of human dignity.
664
 Market forces of supply and demand do not necessarily recognize 
human dignity. Commercialized healthcare often aims at profit maximization at the 
expense of human dignity and freedom of choice. Ubuntu culture, though without formal 
written principles, fully recognizes, respects, and defends human dignity in practice. This 
work explores how Ubuntu assures human dignity and freedom within society as the 
matrix, which discerns and assures justice. Within Ubuntu, human life is invaluable. 
Everybody should do everything possible to protect and safeguard human life and 
dignity. This Ubuntu perspective is an inspiration to modern trends in healthcare. 
(i) Ethical Conflict between Human Dignity and Commoditization of 
Healthcare 
Since market economy operates on the basic principles of supply and demand, 
commoditization of healthcare tends to compromise human dignity. In commercialized 
medicine caregivers tend to specialize in the most marketable fields of medicine and 
patients who can afford to pay for better care or higher quality care receive better 
healthcare than those who cannot afford it. Treating the United States as a case study, in 
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the last century medicine began to depend much more on sophisticated and specialized 
technology.
665
 The advances in medical knowledge and efficiency of technology made 
technology an appealing option in medical care. Gradually, specialization became 
entrenched in the system as doctors focused on particular aspects of health such as 
radiology, neurology, allergy, cardiovascular surgery, oncology and other specialties. 
Such advances contributed to the shift to understand health care as a free-market 
commodity. Soon afterwards fee-for-service became the norm and included the 
opportunity to buy health insurance.
666
 
Once medicine became a commodity to be purchased, ―insurance became 
particularly important in the United States as health care costs rose to cover the expenses 
of medical technology, education, specialization, staffing, and facilities.‖667 Athena du 
Pre articulates the situation as follows: 
The premise of insurance is to pool resources so that expenses are spread over a 
great number of people, saving any subscriber from overwhelming debt. The 
premise assumes that most people will not require more than they contribute and 
that enough people will subscribe to establish an adequate treasury.
668
 
With generous reimbursement of medical costs by third parties, physicians were 
autonomous in clinical decision-making that impacted on the care of their patients and 
did not have to worry about the impact of the cost of medical procedures and treatment 
choices. However, by 1960 health care was becoming increasingly expensive. Health 
insurance rates rose beyond the reach of many Americans.
669
 By 2003, 41 million 
Americans had no health insurance.
670
 At this point the harsh reality of market forces of 
supply and demand sidelining human dignity became more apparent. 
Fiscal scarcity and the rapidly changing health care market resulted in a shift of 
health care organizations from being solely physician dominated, ―guild-like system that 
 200  
depended upon diagnosis and treatment of the patient as an individual,‖ to an 
industrialized model. The industrialized model relies on population-based statistical 
evidence and fiscal resource availability to organize and to provide health care 
predictability. This shift made health care a business. Those who could not purchase 
healthcare had to go without.
671
 Census report indicates that the number of Americans 
without health insurance has been rising.
672
 The National Center for health Statistics 
reports that in 1984, approximately 30% of the population was without coverage. In 1993 
that figure had risen to over 38% and by 1996 it had risen to nearly 40%.
673
 In the year 
1997, there were forty million Americans without health insurance for the whole year.
674
 
This is over 16% of the entire population of the country. Currently approximately forty 
seven million Americans have no health insurance. Among those who have insurance, 
there are many who have heavy health care burdens despite their being insured. Under 
insurance, a scenario whereby only some conditions are covered by insurers is common 
among marginalized portions of the society.
675
 Underinsured people spend a 
disproportionate amount of their income on health care. According to a recent study, 45 
million Americans live in families that spend more than ten percent of after-tax income 
on health care.
676
 Three Institute of Medicine studies reported that the most important 
determinant of access to health care is adequate insurance coverage.
677
 Even geographic 
areas with a robust safety-net care system fail to provide access to health services to the 
same extent as having health insurance.
678
 
Part of the reason for the increasing cost of health insurance is the linkage of 
health insurance and employment. Due to increasing cost some employers abandoned 
provision of health insurance all together.
679
 Another trend is cost sharing between 
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employers and employees, in which case employers would pay a given portion while 
employees would pay a portion by themselves. Often this scenario resulted in some 
employees opting out due to the rising cost of insurance and cost of living.
680
 According 
to Marie Conn, lack of insurance among the economically marginalized portions of the 
American population creates a vicious cycle. The poorer the population, the less 
coverage, since less coverage means paying out of pocket and since the poor tend to take 
more risks with their lives and are open to more risky situations, the poor tend to get sick 
more frequently and in higher numbers. Being sick more often and in higher numbers 
than their wealthier counterparts and having to pay more and more out of pocket results 
in an ever-worsening vicious cycle, which in return compromises human dignity even 
more.
681
 The group of people who most need the coverage become the most likely to be 
denied coverage; the higher their need for insurance coverage, the less the possibility of 
receiving any.
682
 Those with limited coverage end up being denied coverage where they 
most need it since insurance providers are conditioned by market forces geared toward 
profit maximization. Most insurers tend to exclude some occupations, forms of industry, 
geographical areas, people with pre-existing conditions or those prone to some sort of 
illnesses.
683
 
The wealthiest portion of the population gets the best insurance coverage in the 
world since they receive their coverage as a contract with third party insurance 
companies.
684
 Since it is a private contractual right, however, its provision is contingent 
on employment in companies that can afford to provide such access.
685
 The access is 
conditioned by continuing employment. Unfortunately such kind of access is on the 
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decrease due to rising costs of health care and the cut back on financing of health 
insurance by employers.
686
 
Due to the severity of market forces‘ control of healthcare, there has been a lot of 
abuse and neglect, which in turn would compromise human dignity. This situation led to 
creation of EMLATA by congress in 1986. EMLATA is a limited legal right of ―anti-
dumping.‖ Creation of EMLATA is a response to the dumping of so many uninsured sick 
persons, some in life threatening conditions. EMLATA‘s objective is to ascertain that 
uninsured patients will receive at least a minimum standard of emergency care regardless 
their ability to pay out of pocket.
687
 Anti-dumping, however, neither addresses chronic 
conditions nor provides for continuity of care after the emergency treatment. This 
situation indicates a major flaw in the system. It reveals a counterproductive situation in 
which the essence of the problem is not dealt with but the outcome of the problem. The 
problem is lack of healthcare coverage. Instead of proactively preventing the crisis, the 
system provides for a safety-net that only deals with the crisis when it happens. Such a 
scenario is generally inefficient and in the long run uneconomical.
688
 There is an obvious 
issue of injustice in such a system. The following section explores possibilities of true 
justice. 
(ii) Rawls’ Perspective of Justice 
The objective of Rawls theory of justice is to offer a fairer alternative to 
traditional concepts of utilitarianism and perfectionism as foundational theories of justice. 
His starting point is an imaginary hypothetical starting position, which would legitimize 
social contracts. Rawls conceives justice as fairness. His pursuit of fairness led him to the 
development of his two famous principles of justice: the liberty principle and the 
difference principle. Rawls identifies the primary subject of justice as the basic structure 
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of society, or more specifically the way in which major social institutions distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social 
cooperation.
689
 His concept of justice is a provision of a standard, which improvises for 
the possibility of assessing the distributive aspects of the basic structure of the society.
690
 
Rawls‘ original position is imaged as a hypothetical ideal in which no one knows 
his place in society, his class position or social status, his fortune in distribution of natural 
assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength or any other endowment. This state of affairs 
ascertains that the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair, since Rawls‘ meaning of 
justice is fairness. In the original position, all parties involved are equal. All have the 
same rights in the procedure for choosing principles; each can make proposals and submit 
reasons for their acceptance. This hypothetical condition along with the ―Veil of 
Ignorance‖ define the starting point of the principles of justice as those which rational 
persons concerned to advance their interests would consent to as equals when none are 
known to be advantaged or disadvantaged by social and natural contingencies.
691
 Rawls‘ 
imagined ideal of the original position entails what he called ―Veil of Ignorance,‖ that is, 
a virtual committee of rational but not envious persons who would exhibit mutual 
disinterest in a situation of moderate scarcity as they consider the concept of rightness. 
Such concept has to be general in form, universal in application and publicly recognized. 
Rawls claims that rational people will unanimously adopt his principle of justice if their 
reasoning is based on general considerations, without knowing anything about their own 
personal situation. Such personal knowledge might tempt them to select principles of 
justice that gave them unfair advantage.
692
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Rawls identifies two principles that he believes would be chosen by all 
participants under the veil of ignorance in the original position. He further contends that 
the principles must be arranged in a serial order with the first principle prior to the second 
so that they do not permit exchanges between basic liberties and economic and social 
gains.
693
 The two principles require equality in governing the assignment of rights and 
duties and regulating the distribution of social and economic advantage.
694
 The first 
principle is that, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.
695
 The 
second principle is that social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (a) 
they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity; and (b) they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged members of society (the difference principle).
696
 Thus, although the 
distribution of wealth and income need not be equal, it must be to everyone‘s advantage, 
and positions of authority and offices of command must be accessible to all.
697
 
There is striking similarity between Rawls‘ concept of justice as fairness and the 
basic idea of Ubuntu justice. Ubuntu does not condone dangerous inequality that may 
reduce a person from his essential equality with other persons on one hand, while on the 
other hand Ubuntu is not socialism in the sense that it does allow difference and 
entitlement in ownership. The permissible difference, however, is not only to the 
advantage of the privileged but, especially, to the advantage of the marginalized. Rawls‘ 
theory, as is Ubuntu perspective, entails a mechanism which safeguards human dignity 
and essential human equality while allowing some realistic entitlement and liberty. There 
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is imbedded in the system a safety-net which prevents the gap between the richest and the 
poorest from enlarging disproportionally. 
The rationale for regulating the economic gap between the richest and the poorest 
is well explained by Schrecker. He argues that ―Most scarcities that underpin health 
disparities within and among countries are not natural; rather, they result from policy 
choices and the operation of social institutions.‖ Schrecker argues for ―denaturalizing 
scarcity as a strategy for enquiry to inform public-health ethics in an interconnected 
world.‖ In his view, most scarcity is man-made. It results from wrong policy in 
distribution of natural resources or products of human labor between human individuals 
and between populations or geographical regions. Thus ―denaturalizing scarcity 
represents a valuable alternative to mainstream health ethics, directing our attention 
instead to why some settings are ‗resource poor‘ and others are not.‖698 
Rawls‘ theory of justice as fairness is inherently a theory of caring justice in the 
sense that it recognizes and safeguards human equality, dignity, basic rights and the 
principle of subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity appreciates every person‘s 
contributions while, at the same time, encourages participation and protection of those 
who cannot participate. Basically, Ubuntu worldview is similar to Rawls‘ theory of 
justice. UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is in many ways in 
agreement with Rawls‘ theory of justice. Rawls‘ justice is not against ethical liberalism; 
rather it regulates liberalism so that it is not disproportional thus unethical. 
(iii) Nagel on Rawls’ Concept of Liberalism 
Nagel notes that ―Rawls interprets both the protection of pluralism and individual 
rights and the promotion of socioeconomic equality as expressions of a single value – that 
of equality in the relations between people through their common political and social 
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institutions.‖ The foundation of justice rests in the basic structure of society. The kernel 
of such structure is human equality. If the structure ―deviates from this ideal of equality, 
we have societally imposed unfairness, hence the name ‗justice as fairness.‘‖ Thus the 
society is responsible for the structure that either supports fair treatment of all its 
members or supports unfair treatment of some of its members, which ultimately becomes 
unfair treatment of all members of the society. The society as a corporate person is not 
exempt. To underline this structural ethical reality Nagel states that ―a society fails to 
treat some of its members as equals whether it restricts their freedom of expression or 
permits them to grow up in poverty.‖699 
Nagel does not only approve Rawls‘ theory of justice, he states that it is ―the 
fullest realization we have so far of this conception of the justice of a society taken as a 
whole whereby all institutions that form part of the basic structure of society have to be 
assessed by a common standard.‖700 Credibility of Rawls‘ theory of justice as fairness 
consists of the fact that it starts from scratch and at a point of imaginable ideal but also 
real and factual equality which should not be overlooked, even in the sophisticated and 
complicated structures of modern societies. The theory then protects the essential 
common human values that all human beings share. It protects and defines human 
freedom in relation to fairness based on human inviolability. Nagel writes ―The 
protection of certain mutual relations among free and equal persons, giving each of them 
a kind of inviolability, is a condition of a just society that cannot, in Rawls‘ view, be 
explained by its tendency to promote the general welfare. It is a basic, underived 
requirement.‖701 The kernel of Rawls‘ theory therefore is equal human dignity which 
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must be given its due fairness wherever humans are located geographically, socially and 
economically. 
To be ethically justifiable the equality of human dignity which calls for its share 
of fair treatment should not overlook, undermine or suppress diversity, plurality and 
liberty. The first of Rawls‘ principles is thus one of irreducible and undeniable equality 
while the second principle is one that protects ethically reasonable and essential 
inequality. Nagel relates that 
Rawls‘ difference principle is based on the intuitively appealing moral judgment 
that all inequalities in life prospects dealt out to people by the basic structure of 
society and for which they are not responsible are prima facie unfair; these 
inequalities can only be justified if the institutions that make up that structure are 
most effective in achieving an egalitarian purpose – that of making the worst-off 
group in the society as well off as possible.
702
 
In praxis an affluent society bears ethical responsibility of ascertaining that the 
disadvantaged children born to a poor family get all basic needs and the education they 
need to have a fair chance to self-actualize and be free to excel just as children of the 
wealthy members of the society. In other words if the poor keep getting poorer and keep 
being deprived of chances to get out of their poverty even if they would want to; if they 
are not enabled by their wealthier counterparts because the structure does not support it, 
the whole socio-economic structure is unethical.
703
 People ought not be systematically 
rewarded or penalized ―on the basis of their draw in the natural or genetic lottery.‖ The 
only way to justify difference is to ensure that ―the system works to the maximum benefit 
of the worst off‖ because, as Nagel articulates, ―People do not deserve their place in the 
natural lottery any more than they deserve their birthplace in the class structure, and they 
therefore do not automatically deserve what ‗naturally‘ flows from either of those 
differences.‖704 
 208  
Rawls‘ justice neither disregards nor ignores human plurality. Interpreting Rawls, 
Nagel writes ―that pluralism and toleration with regard to ultimate ends are conditions of 
mutual respect between citizens that our sense of justice should lead us to value 
intrinsically and not instrumentally.‖ However, the ―Veil of Ignorance‖ is crucial since it 
protects the basic commonality and equality of human nature without undermining 
accidental differences. Interpreting Rawls Nagel writes, the ―feature of the veil of 
ignorance, like not knowing one‘s race or class background, is required because Rawls 
holds that equal treatment by the social and political systems of those with different 
comprehensive values is an important form of fairness.‖705 Plurality is to the advantage of 
the society. According to Rawls, ―A wide range of views, forming the plurality typical of 
a free society, are reasonable and can support the common institutional framework.‖ 
Rawls calls this ethically justified plurality ―an ‗overlapping consensus‘.‖ Which means 
the uniqueness and the simultaneous compatibility of each of the ―comprehensive views 
with a free-standing political conception that will permit them all to coexist.‖706 
Rawls‘ theory of justice, therefore, cannot be ignored by those who are concerned 
with social justice. The UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, either 
directly or indirectly is inspired by, or has a lot in common with Rawls‘ theory of justice 
as fairness. Trying to justify the objectivity of Rawls‘ theory of justice, Nagel writes 
―Rawls has not only expressed a distinctive position but provided a framework for 
identifying the morally crucial differences among a whole range of views on the main 
questions of social justice.‖707 Needless to say, Rawls‘ theory of justice has a lot in 
common with Ubuntu perspective of justice. The imbedded socio-autonomous 
recognition of human essential equality to be protected; the importance of recognition 
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and use of difference and plurality; especially how difference should be to the advantage 
of the most disadvantaged (by genetic pool or other factors) almost equate Rawls‘ theory 
of justice with the indigenous Ubuntu perspective of justice. 
b. Equality 
The second concept of justice is the acknowledgement of universal human 
equality and equity, which is fundamental in ethics discourse on all that impacts humans 
regardless of their uniqueness and difference.
708
 D‘Empaire notes that the ―principles of 
equity, justice and equality are basic in ethics and they have to be considered as part of 
any ethical system.‖709 This statement is consistent with article ten of the UNESCO 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human rights which states that, ―The 
fundamental equality of all human beings in dignity and rights is to be respected so that 
they are treated justly and equitably.‖710 The Declaration recognizes and emphasizes 
human equality which should lead to treating each human being with equity and justice. 
However, basing their argument on the draft of the declaration, Rawlinson and Donchin 
argue that the formulation of the universal principles of the UNESCO Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights relies solely on shared ethical values while ignoring the 
differences which occur as a result of different cultures and fixed structural economic 
differences. They contend that the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
is too abstract to be applicable.
711
 
Dan Beauchamp makes a case against the commercialization and 
commoditization of healthcare.
712
 From his perspective, commoditization of healthcare 
works against human equality. However, the challenge of translating theoretical 
understanding into real, practical life situations confronts all of human society. Presently, 
many populations are denied basic human rights throughout the globe.
713
 Some 
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marginalized people have been used as a means to an end by other humans. McDonald 
and Preto address this ethical problem in the area of global health research as conflict of 
interest. Daniels explores the global crisis of inequality in healthcare in depth.
714
 
Inequality in healthcare is an issue of justice which results in the denial of human 
equality to the victims.
715
 Ubuntu worldview helps review the importance of assuring 
basic human equality for human common good. 
Inequality in healthcare distribution remains a global problem even if healthcare 
is considered a human right that reflects respect for human dignity. Although some 
governments have ways to regulate healthcare distribution in order to ascertain the decent 
minimum for all, the still problem of unequal distribution remains. Ubuntu recognizes the 
equal dignity of humans in a rather practical way. Every human being has something to 
offer to every other human being, even if it is provision of an opportunity to help. One‘s 
very personhood is based on the recognition of other persons as equals to oneself and as 
participants in the formation of one‘s personhood. In Ubuntu culture it is the 
responsibility of everyone to ascertain the provision of decent minimum of care for all. 
Healthcare in Ubuntu reflects reverence for life as a matter of religion, morality and 
essence of humanity. 
(i) Castro, Sy and Leong on the Global Need to Address 
Dehumanizing Poverty 
According to Castro, Sy and Leong extreme poverty and destitution among 
indigenous peoples is a global responsibility.
716
 Its mere presence indicates unjust global 
socio-economic distributive structures. Morally, rich countries, individuals and 
corporations cannot exempt themselves from the plight of the global poor. Sy and Leong 
contend that ―A corporation‘s responsibility to address the health needs of the poor 
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extends beyond the country in which it directly operates. It has to be concerned with the 
global implications of its operations and not merely be preoccupied with the limited 
impact at the national or community level.‖717 Sy and Leong‘s approach is cosmopolitan 
in the sense that in their view countries, corporations and individuals belong to a global 
community. Cosmopolitanism contends that ―distributive justice applies globally, not 
simply nationally or locally; therefore, there are moral obligations to address the plight of 
the poor of the world as a whole.‖718 
The mere existence of abject poverty facilitates a moral slippery slope whereby 
the poor are forced by their poverty to become poorer to the point of being exploited in 
their very humanity. Having no way out, the poor populations may easily be forced to 
become a means to an end for the rich. Organ transplantation trade is a good example. Sy 
and Leong observe that ―Massive poverty in developing country communities has 
provided the backdrop for debates regarding compensation for organ donors. In some 
communities, organ selling has reached wholesale proportions, making organ trading a 
literal reality.‖ This situation demonstrates how poverty may set humans into a slippery 
slope of moral degradation whereby human dignity is compromised. In this case the poor 
are literally used as a means to the ends of the rich. ―Patients from affluent foreign 
countries have exploited the opportunities that are ably facilitated by clandestine brokers, 
thus setting in motion a practice that has straddled the boundary between transplant 
tourism and organ trafficking.‖719 There is structural injustice when humans are forced to 
become a mere means; or where the situation is that of struggle for survival and survival 
of the fittest or strongest since such situations drain the essence of humanity by 
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compromising its dignity. This degradation of humanity does not merely apply to the 
exploited poor. It applies to the entire human community. 
Organ transplantation trade may lead to a situation morally similar to slave trade 
since people who would otherwise not give up their organs are forced by their poverty to 
do so against their will for sake of survival. According to Sy and Leong ―organs such as 
kidneys and livers must be regarded as sacrosanct and outside the realm of commerce. On 
this basis many hold that organ donation must always be motivated only by altruism,‖ 
especially because of irreducible human dignity. ―Monetary considerations demean 
human donors and transform their bodies into commodities that can be reduced to a 
monetary or material equivalent.‖ It is because of the urgency to avoid the inevitable 
compromise of human dignity through human organ trade that ―the Declaration of 
Istanbul on Transplant Tourism and Organ Trafficking rejects ‗transplant 
commercialism‘ as ‗a practice in which an organ is treated as a commodity.‘‖720 Any 
form of directly or indirectly forced commercialism on human tissue or organ is 
unethical. If poverty makes people sale their own members, poverty is a structural moral 
evil that human community has to eradicate. 
No government should prohibit its marginalized populations from engaging in 
illegal human organ trade if the government cannot provide for their basic need to 
survive. This means the problem of organ transplantation trade is much more complicated 
than it may look. It is a structural problem. Wherever it is happening, the immediate 
society and ultimately the global human society is responsible and culpable. Sy and 
Leong state that ―Society that deliberately and systematically neglects the basic needs of 
the poor is being indifferent to the plight of this population and cannot be justified in 
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prohibiting the means the poor have to address the problems themselves.‖721 
Consequently, prohibiting organ transplantation trade should be preceded by addressing 
the root cause of such dehumanizing trade, which is poverty. Ubuntu maxim that human 
beings are human because of other humans, or put briefly, ―I am because you are‖ means 
that no one is free from the plight of other humans. Claiming such freedom from others 
would mean claiming inhumanity. 
(ii) Beauchamp on the Ethical Need for Basic Human Equality in 
Medicine 
The foundation of Beauchamp‘s argument is human equality within the state. His 
main premise is ―common membership in a republic of equals.‖ It is human equality and 
common membership of citizens in a republic that is the foundation of healthcare 
distributive justice. ―Illness is the relevant reason for distributing medical care and health 
protections.‖ The daunting ethical task is discernment and determination of the most 
ethical ―pattern of organization of equality we ought to employ to make the equal 
distribution of medical care effective.‖722 
According to Beauchamp the distinguishing feature of a central government is its 
duty to protect public health based on citizens‘ equality. In other words, it is unjust for a 
republic‘s government to fail to safeguard both equality and health of its citizens.723 
Beauchamp emphasizes on the objective of a republic as attempting ―to foster a sense of 
common membership and community.‖ In his view ―community like friendship, family, 
kinship, fraternity, and patriotism, refers to shared sentiments and attachments that bind 
people or groups to one another. A republic, with its stress on virtue and a shared 
common life, is a species of political community.‖724 Consequently, the ethical 
government‘s goal is to create, foster, and protect a community of equals. In order to 
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achieve common good and promote harmony and equality the republic has a duty to limit 
individual liberty.
725
 Thus defining and limiting individual liberty belongs to the kernel of 
justice. Beauchamp states that ―Justice, in my account, is based not only on 
considerations of what each citizen needs but also on considerations for what everyone 
needs together.‖726 
In as much as human equality is undeniable, widening gap between the rich and 
the poor that tends to indicate essential human inequality is obviously unethical, 
unjustifiable and intolerable. Such dehumanizing gap is unethical specifically because it 
is unreal and untrue. Beauchamp explains this fact as follows: ―The very obviousness of a 
common and shared equality is the political glue for equality and justice in health, 
making it more difficult to island the poor, commercialize medicine, or allow an 
uncontrolled and expensive medical technology to erode further the society‘s 
commitment to equality in health.‖727 
The greatest single threat to human essential equality in healthcare is the on-going 
commercialization of healthcare. Commercialization of healthcare is commoditization of 
healthcare. Commoditization of healthcare gives market forces of supply and demand 
precedence over human dignity. Beauchamp explains this fact in a more practical way 
when he states that ―As medicine moves deeper into the stronghold of the market, justice 
for the poor and the vulnerable will be increasingly unstable and the politics of a 
democratic majority moving to a common health care system may be permanently 
undermined.‖ In other words, the healthcare system is becoming unethical because it is 
being influenced and motivated by wrong objectives: the market. Beauchamp refers to 
this ethically dangerous phenomenon when he states that ―the health care system, far 
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from serving as a symbol of shared equality, is rapidly becoming a symbol of 
inequality.‖728 One of the most obvious examples is the tendency to tend to deny 
coverage to those most in need due to profit maximization motive that has infiltrated 
healthcare. Beauchamp observes that ―it is the ordinary and rational insurance practice to 
eliminate wherever possible from coverage the highest utilizers of care, that is, ironically, 
those who most need care.‖729 
Beauchamp laments that Americans resist health reform because, ―we wish to 
provide a welfare state without the inconvenience of limiting the market.‖ Unfortunately 
it is not possible to have both scenarios. ―We will have to decide soon, perhaps for all 
time, whether we want a just health care system or market institutions that spread to 
every corner of American life. Our choice will have profound consequences for 
healthcare, for equality, and for the American republic.‖730 Opting to subject humans 
under the mercy of market forces is obviously unjust to human common dignity and 
equality. Human equality, however, ought not to undermine individual pursuit of 
individual good. Beauchamp explains how best to pursue individual interest ethically. His 
explanation is concomitant with Ubuntu perspective. He states that ―In republican 
equality we promote our own good and our shared common good within the same 
democratic scheme.‖731 Since individuals humans are inseparable from society because of 
their social nature and neediness for society, individual pursuit of fulfillment and 
happiness cannot be separate from societal objectives for the common good. 
(iii) Daniels on Ethics of Ignorance and International Harm in 
Healthcare 
According to Daniels, there is an obvious colossal injustice within the global 
healthcare system. This global injustice within healthcare though global responsibility is 
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ignored by individual persons, corporations and states. To explicate global inequality and 
injustice in health care Daniels uses the following data: 
Life expectancy in Swaziland is half that in Japan. A child unfortunate enough to 
be born in Angola has seventy-three times as great a chance of dying before age 
five as a child born in Norway. A mother giving birth in southern sub-Saharan 
Africa has 100 times as great a chance of dying in labor as one birthing in an 
industrialized country. For every mile one travels outward toward the Maryland 
suburbs from downtown Washington, D.C., on its underground rail subsystem, 
life expectancy rises by a year – reflecting the race and class inequalities in 
American health.
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Health inequality between social groups according to Daniels results from ―an 
unjust distribution of socially controllable factors that affect population health and 
distribution.‖ Health inequalities follow different but often times common patterns. Often 
health inequalities are ―by race and ethnicity, by class and caste, and by gender – in many 
countries, both developed and developing.‖733 
Most of the harm to the poor peoples of the world results from ignorance of the 
rest of world‘s population about its obligations to the poor, ignorance of human rights 
and the need to respect them, and insensitivity to the plight of the poor. Daniels argues 
that ―health of citizens of a specific nation is a responsibility of that specific nation. 
However, there are international breaches of human rights in form of omission or 
ignorance from wealthy nations to poor nations.‖ There are other oppressive or 
exploitative practices which are unjust to the poor and which marginalize them even 
more but often go on unnoticed. Some of those injustices are: hazardous waste disposal 
from industrialized countries in poor developing countries, international policies that 
intentionally or unintentionally harm poor countries, and brain drain.
734
 
Brain drain by the global affluent countries from poor countries is worth attention 
since it is not only global ethical challenge, it is growing rapidly. ―Rich countries have 
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harmed health in poorer ones by solving their own labor shortages of trained health care 
personnel by actively and passively attracting immigrants from poorer countries.‖ For 
individual survival or gain, the poor struggle to leave their poor countries to find a better 
life in the developed countries. Unfortunately, those who can even afford to think of that 
migration are the well trained ones. Their leaving their own countries harms the countries 
which have spent their little fortune to educate them. Such poor countries are doubly 
harmed as they are forced by harsh realities of market forces to let go of what they need 
the most. On the other hand countries which already have many health professionals 
benefit by gaining even more supply. ―In developed countries such as New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Canada, 23-24 percent of physicians 
are foreign-trained. In 2002, the National Health Service in the United Kingdom reported 
that 30,000 nurses, some 8.4 percent of all nurses, were foreign trained.‖735 
International brain drain leaves the donor countries in a humanly unethical shape: 
The situation that results in developing countries is dire. Over 60 percent of the 
doctors trained in Ghana in the 1980s emigrated oversees. In Ghana, 47 percent of 
physicians‘ posts and 57 percent of registered nursing positions were unfilled. 
Some 7,000 expatriate South African nurses work in developed countries, while 
there are 32,000 public health nursing vacancies in South Africa. Whereas there 
are 188 physicians per 100,000 population in the United States, there are only 1 or 
2 per 100,000 in large parts of Africa.
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Even though some of the brain drain is not intentional, the harm is obvious as 
seen in the above figures provided by Daniels. Although the intent to harm is rarely 
present, the benefit if often times intended. Some developed countries even give 
incentives to attract professionals into their countries, regardless the harm done to the 
donating countries. The severity of the harm done to the economies and the people of 
donor countries can hardly be accurately measured: 
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In any case, great care must be taken to describe the baseline in measuring harm. 
Such a complex story about motivations, intentions, and effect might seem to 
weaken the straightforward appeal of the minimalist strategy, but the complexity 
does not undermine the view that we have obligations of justice to avoid harming 
health.
737
 
Internationality and grandiosity of the brain or talent drain should not conceal its essential 
injustice. There is need to address this growing international problem. 
Permanent or long term solution of the problem of brain or talent drain lies in 
recognizing human equality and addressing the core causal factors. Daniels explains the 
need to ―move beyond minimalist strategy that justifies only avoiding and correcting 
harms. How far we go toward robust egalitarian considerations is a matter to be worked 
out.‖ However, egalitarian perspective is crucial if at all solution is to be found and 
maintained. There is need to develop national and international institutional structures, 
based on human equality to discourage unethical brain and talents drain.
738
 Just health 
cannot be an exclusive pursuit of an individual person or nation. As Daniels puts it, it is 
individual, societal, national and international pursuit. There is an essential unity of 
human genre which cannot be denied.
739
 Ubuntu warns that no humanity is possible 
independent of human relationships. This inspiration is not limited to unique individuals; 
it applies to the entire global human community. Reducing any human individual or 
nation to a means for another individual or nation harms the essence of human nature and 
its dignity. 
2. Diversity 
The second major component of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics 
and Human Rights is based on diversity. The debate on ethical responsibility must respect 
cultural and racial diversity within a global context. Respect for diversity has two 
important concepts. The first concept concerns cultural pluralism within the limits of 
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human rights. The second concept concerns nondiscrimination based on essential human 
equality. 
a. Cultural Pluralism 
UNESCO advocates for respect for cultural pluralism based on, not at the expense 
of, human dignity.
740
 Article twelve of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics 
and Human rights clearly recognizes the importance of cultural diversity. However, the 
article indicates that cultural values are secondary to human rights. Universal human 
rights ―guarantee the particular expression of individual cultures.‖741 Human rights 
should, on the other hand, limit and provide for boundaries with respects to cultural 
pluralism. The UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is founded on a 
basic assumption of human solidarity. Gunson describes basic solidarity as ―the 
willingness to take the perspective of others seriously, which in turn entails acting in 
ways that support the causes that are worthy of allegiance.‖742 Responding to criticism 
that UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is a form of 
cultural imperialism, Andorno argues that the declaration actually works against cultural 
imperialism.
743
 It provides ―a legal standard of minimum protection necessary for human 
dignity.‖ There is a general trend to global cultural integration which begs for such a 
universal standard. 
Chin and Starosta explore in depth the relationship between modern technology, 
globalization, economy, wide-spread population migrations, cultural integration, 
development of inevitable multi-culturalism in the context of global culture and the role 
of effective communication.
744
 In itself, globalization necessitates better and more 
effective cooperation between nations and peoples in meeting the legal standard of care 
for all people.
745
 The role of the principles of bioethics is crucial in discerning and 
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regulating conflict between freedom of cultural practices and respect for basic human 
rights regardless of specific national laws and boundaries.
746
 The culture of Ubuntu 
flourishes in diversity and pluralism. The ability to go beyond oneself to embrace others 
is an ethical ideal of conduct. Since beings become persons because of others and 
because relationships facilitate recognition and respect for personhood in each other, 
otherness and its plurality is richness. This component of Ubuntu was explored detail in 
chapter two. Ubuntu is thus enlightened by the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights while it simultaneously provides sample praxis of the relevance of 
UNESCO‘s ethical directives. 
(i) Ten Have on Solution of Moral Problems by Negotiation 
Ten Have notes that bioethics is becoming increasingly international even though 
many countries in the developing world do not have ―adequate infrastructure to deal with 
bioethical issues‖ such as ―expertise, ethics committees, ethics teaching programs, and 
ethics-related regulations and legislation.‖ One of the reasons that ten Have points out for 
this awakening internationality of bioethics is the fear of the developing world to be 
―excluded from the benefits of biomedical progress.‖ Ten Have cautions against the 
possibility and possibility ―double, or at least different, moral standards being applied in 
different regions of the world.‖747 Ten Have‘s warning is important, especially because of 
the cultural pluralism. Even though pluralism of perspectives is enrichment to global 
bioethics, there are ethical constants that must remain always universally objective 
regardless cultural perspectives. Double standard in bioethics relativizes it, thus 
compromising its validity. 
Given the globalization of bioethics in the plurality of world cultures, there is 
need for negotiation. Basing his main reference on Beauchamp and Childress, ten Have 
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critically analyses the main trends which should be considered in global bioethical 
negotiation. He explores foundationalism, antifoundationalism, common morality, 
principles and Fallibilism. Since each school has both proponents and opponents, there is 
need for negotiation. Proponents of bioethical foundationalism hold that some bioethical 
principles ―can be based on noninferentially justified beliefs.‖ Such principles can thus 
―be rationally defended and they apply to all human beings.‖ Proponents of 
foundationalism hold that ―bioethical judgments can only be justified on the basis of an 
ethical theory that is rational and universal at the same time.‖748 Foundationalism is 
crucial not only because of its belief in universal principles but also because of its 
unifying perspective which appeals to rationality and human nature. 
The opposite of foundationalism, antifoundationalism, hold that ―there are no 
ethical principles that are certain and universally valid, so that all moral judgment can be 
firmly grounded on them.‖749 Since the this view tends towards concreteness and 
uniqueness of moral situations, it holds that bioethics should be less universalistic, less 
generalizing and more ―appreciative of the actual experiences of practitioners and more 
attentive to the context in which physicians, nurses, patients and others experience their 
moral lives.‖ This perspective defends the unique, historical, cultural, abstract, relational 
and rational nature of bioethical encounters. Antifoundationalism holds that ―persons are 
always persons-in-relation, are always members of communities, are immersed in a 
tradition, and are participants in a particular culture.‖750 Antifoundationalism is 
concomitant to most ethics of care because of its emphasis on concreteness and 
uniqueness as opposed to universality and objectivity. 
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Common morality view tends to defend the innate nature of morality. Ten Have 
refers and elaborates this tendency when he states ―Before acting morally we must 
already know, at least to some extent, what is morally desirable or right. Otherwise, we 
would not recognize what is applicable in moral sense.‖ Hence, human beings are 
naturally moral beings and that ―moral normativity is pre-given and common to all 
human beings.‖ This position tends to bring together foundationalism and 
antifoundationalism since it recognizes both universality and historicity of moral 
precepts. Even though humans have innate knowledge of right and wrong, or good and 
bad ―what we recognize in our experience is typically unclear and in need of further 
elucidation and interpretation.‖751 Unlike foundationalist perspective, common morality 
perspective recognizes both universality of moral principles and the role of history and 
context.
752
 ―Cultures differ but this does not imply that common standards and universal 
principles do not exist.‖753 
Principles and Fallibilism holds that ―ethical principles do not have a stable and 
immutable foundation, but they need justification. Moral principles are justified if they 
contribute to the objectives of morality, such as human flourishing.‖ Thus moral 
principles are rightly a means to an end because, in themselves, moral principles are 
useless. Morality should be at the service of human flourishing. However, principles and 
Fallibilism tend to make moral principles conventional and fluid. One of the advantages 
of this position is its openness and welcoming stance to cultural contribution into 
justification of moral principles for the sake of human flourishing.
754
 This view of 
morality encourages dialogue and development of moral theories since it constantly 
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engages them by its demand of justification. However, it tends to compromise 
universality of moral principles. 
Ten Have observes that there is tendency toward more negotiation with regards to 
ethical principles. He writes, ―Deliberative democratic processes are replacing the search 
for universal solutions that can be applied to all human beings. However, the significance 
of deliberation does not restrict the universality of ethical principles. Solutions to moral 
problems are no longer found and based on fundamental theories but are now 
negotiated.‖755 In order to ethically respond to the demands of globalization of bioethics 
negotiation with indigenous and different cultures is crucial. Ten Have writes that 
―UNESCO strives to respond in particular to the needs of developing countries, 
indigenous communities and vulnerable groups of persons. The declaration reminds the 
international community of its duty of solidarity toward all countries.‖756 This desire of 
UNESCO to respond to the particular needs of developing countries requires common 
mutual understanding which in turn requires effective cultural dialogue, negotiation and 
understanding. The requirement of mutual recognition and engagement belongs to the 
core of Ubuntu world view. 
(ii) Walzer on Pluralism and Distributive Justice 
Pluralism has a lot in common with distributive justice. In fact acceptance of 
pluralism is not possible without, at the same time, an acceptance of validity of 
distributive justice. Walzer validates this perspective when he argues that ―the idea of 
distributive justice has as much to do with being and doing as with having, as much to do 
with production as with consumption, as much to do with identity and status as with land, 
capital or personal possessions.‖757 In other words, Walzer argues for the centrality of the 
importance of distributive justice in social ethics. 
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Walzer sums up this perspective when he states that ―distribution is what social 
justice is about.‖758 Nothing escapes the realm of distributive justice. Even the 
community itself is subject to distributive justice. Walzer argues, ―The community itself 
is a good – conceivably the most important good – that gets distributed. But it is a good 
that can only be distributed by taking people in, where all the senses of that latter phrase 
are relevant: they must be physically admitted and politically received.‖ Thus, there is a 
different kind of distribution when applied to the community because humans become 
members of the community, thus being encompassed by it and becoming part of it, 
―hence membership cannot be handed out by some external agency; its value depends 
upon an internal decision.‖759 Nevertheless human community is an ethical good that is 
unique for its grandiosity and whose distribution is by membership into it. In fact the 
community as a good is a prerequisite and a condition for all other forms of distribution. 
According to Walzer need is the most basic reason for distributive sphere. ―Need 
generates a particular distributive sphere, within which it is itself the appropriate 
distributive principle.‖ Fairness requires that basic needs are mate with fair distribution 
relative to availability of the needed good. Distributive justice does not necessarily 
require uniformity. Just as plurality is complicated so is distribution, and even more is 
distributive justice. Distributive justice is complicated by scarcity of basic needs by 
different people. Walzer refers to this fact when he speaks of ―needed goods distributed 
to needy people in a proportion to their neediness are obviously not dominated by any 
other goods.‖ Distributive justice should always be based on human equality, need, and 
plurality. It should be, as Walzer writes ―different goods to different companies of men 
and women for different reasons and in accordance with different procedures.‖ In 
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Walzer‘s words, this statement contains the basic objective of the principle of distributive 
justice. He states, ―To get all this right, or to get it roughly right, is to map out the entire 
social world.‖760 
Most social conflict arises from unfair or ineffective distribution. Walzer argues 
that social justice is ―intermittent, or it is endemic; at some point, counterclaims are put 
forward.‖ There are three major kinds of counter claims worth noting: 
1. The claim that the dominant good, whatever it is, should be redistributed so that it 
can be equally or at least more widely shared: this amounts to saying that 
monopoly is unjust. 
2. The claim that the way should be opened for the autonomous distribution of all 
social goods: this amounts to saying that dominance is unjust. 
3. The claim that some new good, monopolized by some new group, should replace 
the currently dominant good: this amounts to saying that the existing pattern of 
dominance and monopoly is unjust.
761
 
Due to individual human and cultural uniqueness human society is inevitably 
pluralistic. It is pluralism that calls for just distribution. One of the major challenges 
facing UNESCO is to design an international model of distribution that will be just across 
nations. This ideal may not be easily achievable due to the different individual national 
identities and needs, but the closer the international community is to this ideal objective, 
the more just the world would be. The farther any particular nation or community of 
world nations deviates from the ideal of fair distribution, the more conflicts will multiply 
and the more human dignity is compromised. Ubuntu aims at this ideal by linking 
morality with human ability to empathize and responsibly address the need of another 
human being, thus effecting distribution in a relational and engaging way. The society 
expects every person to actively participate. This kind of responsible participation is 
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considered moral maturity. Actually, personhood is based on this sort of ethical maturity. 
In a very spontaneous physically coercive way Ubuntu ascertains fair distribution without 
encouraging uniformity or discouraging personal initiative and excellence. 
(iii) Amstutz on the Ethics of Global Society and Governance 
Amstutz raises one of the most disabling aspects of ‗international community.‘ 
There is a definition problem with regards to referring to the nations of the world as an 
‗international community,‘ because the bonds that are necessary between nations are too 
weak and sometimes inexistent or hostile to deserve the word ‗community.‘ According to 
Amstutz ―The international community remains a society of states in which ultimate 
decision-making authority rests in member states, not intergovernmental organizations or 
non-governmental organizations.‖ Strictly speaking, therefore, there is no international 
community of nations as such. ―Some officials use the phrase ‗international community‘ 
to refer to actions by the United nations and other intergovernmental organizations, the 
level of solidarity among states and the degree of communal bonds among nations remain 
weak … global society is held together by feeble institutions and slender affinities.‖762 
Due to the lack of real communal solidarity and a central government there is 
really no real authority that oversees issues of justice between or within government with 
ability to intervene. United Nations and its agencies do not have such authority. They can 
only play an advocacy role. Amstutz points out one of the world‘s institutional limitations 
as the ever widening economic gap between rich (North) and poor (South) nations. The 
second example is the obvious world‘s failure to maintain global peace. ―When major 
disputes arise between states, it is states themselves who must resolve conflicts, either 
directly or through intermediaries.‖ Another example is the ―inadequate protection of 
human rights.‖ Yet another piece of evidence is the protection of the environment. 
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Amstutz notes that ―although numerous multilateral efforts have been undertaken to 
protect the environment, the decentralized character of global society impairs effective 
collective action.‖763 
According to Amstutz several factors impede institutionalization of global 
governance. ―One impediment is the lack of democratic legitimacy. Since global 
institutions are not constituted through democratic elections nor do they follow 
democratic decision making, they suffer from a democratic deficit.‖764 Each nation has its 
own style of governance protected by its own sovereignty. Some weaknesses are from 
within specific governments and can hardly be addressed from without those state 
governments. There is often ―fragile ties between decision makers and citizens. Robust 
governance presupposes a high level of social capital – that is, a high level of voluntary 
cooperation based on shared values, interests and trust.‖765 Without what Amstutz calls 
social capital which is voluntariness to cooperate on common values, interest and trust, 
establishment of community is not possible. Thus some national states, to begin with, are 
not themselves a community in strict sense. Creation of international community based 
on their being already community would be logically absurd and counterproductive. 
Centralized government presupposes some sort of community that is governed; otherwise 
the governance is empty of meaning.
766
 Community, in turn, presupposes ―shared values 
and interests. The authority of law depends not only on the coercive power of institutions 
but also on a moral-cultural consensus. Legitimate governmental authority can exist only 
where a strong, consensual political culture exists.‖767 
One of the base factors which enable creation of global community is global 
common good. One of the types of global common good is public goods such as ―ideas, 
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values, practices, resources, and conditions that benefit everyone in a society or 
community. Global public goods are those collective goods that extend across borders. 
Examples of such goods include peace, financial stability, poverty reduction, clean air, 
environmental protection, and conservation of the species.‖768 Being shared by all, global 
public good is like glue that facilitates bonding which is necessary for creation of global 
community. Amstutz observes two important characteristics of public goods: ―first their 
enjoyment is not diluted or compromised as the good‘s usage is extended to others … 
second, no person can be excluded from enjoying a public good.‖769 One of the sources 
of conflict and disagreement between states is the fact that while some states work hard 
to protect and safeguard public goods such as the atmosphere, oceans, and soil, others do 
not care. They recklessly exploit them. Amstutz notes that ―the extent to which states 
implement sustainable development strategies domestically is vitally important because 
domestic practices will profoundly affect transboundary air and water pollution and thus 
impact the quality of the earth‘s atmosphere and oceans as well as the prospect for long 
term economic growth.‖770 Thus, even though there is no international community in a 
strict sense, there is inevitable transnational influence and effect due to the common or 
public goods shared by all. 
There is need to ―balance national interests with global goods, or short-term needs 
with long-term concerns.‖771 This need can only be effectively addressed if there is a real 
relationship between nations. However, ―The international community‘s institutions 
remain politically underdeveloped. The world remains a decentralized community where 
states – not intergovernmental, nongovernmental, religious movements or advocacy 
networks – are the primary actors.‖ Unfortunately, such non-governmental agencies are 
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so limited by states‘ sovereignty that they are often rendered helpless in the face of 
tremendous issues like pollution that endangers all life on our planet. Amstutz states that 
―promoting the global common good ultimately involves cooperative action among 
states, especially the largest, most powerful and economically developed countries.‖772 
Lack of global government leaves citizens of any particular state at the mercy of 
its national government. If the government is oppressive, exploitative or dictatorial, its 
citizens have nowhere to appeal. ―The limitations of global governance are especially 
evident in promoting human dignity. Despite an expansion in humanitarian international 
law, gross human rights abuses persist, especially when ethnic and religious groups 
compete for political power or when regimes pursue political repression.‖773 There is 
need to check on the authority of individual states and how that authority is used over its 
people and how it affects other peoples outside its boundaries. Amstutz warns that ―Until 
states cede more sovereignty and create institutions to make and enforce law, the 
international adjudication of crime will have only a marginal impact on global 
society.‖774 Ubuntu recognizes human species‘ essential unity which is not only 
transnational but also trans-species. Human action has effect over other humans and other 
species and the planet. The community as a whole should see to it that individual or 
community action does not hurt other humans or future generations or the planet. 
b. Discrimination 
The second concept of diversity is that no individual or group should be 
discriminated against or stigmatized on the basis of uniqueness.
775
 Beauchamp and 
Childress address the problem of human fundamental equality and the obvious unequal 
global access to health care as an issue of justice.
776
 Among criticisms represented by 
Shetty is that the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human rights discriminates 
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against underdeveloped countries by assuming and setting the same standard for all 
countries.
777
 Article eleven of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights rules out any form of discrimination based on gender, age, disability or 
physical, mental, social conditions, diseases or genetic characteristics. Article eleven is 
founded on articles one and two of the declaration, that is, all persons are born free and 
equal in dignity and human rights, all persons, therefore, share human basic freedoms.
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Amstutz observes that ―despite the divergent theories, competing ethical and 
philosophical justifications and contested interpretations of human rights, there is 
widespread political acceptance of the idea of human rights in the contemporary 
world.‖779 This global acceptance of human rights is based on implied acceptance of a 
shared common human dignity.
780
 
Sweet and Masciulli state that ―dignity is a characteristic of humanity, and not just 
of this or that human individual, that an offense against one person‘s dignity is an offense 
against human dignity in general.‖781 In an interview Jean states that one of the greatest 
challenges in bioethics is to reach an equilibrium between individual wellbeing and needs 
against that of the society.
782
 Such equilibrium would minimize discrimination. 
Consequently, human dignity cannot be put aside; it has to be recognized and respected 
by all cultures and peoples. Nondiscrimination is based on human common dignity. 
Discrimination is based on a false assumption that certain people, cultures or traits make 
one a better human being than others. UNESCO‘s non-discrimination policy is founded 
on the principle of human equality. In Ubuntu culture discrimination is a serious moral 
evil. Ubuntu utilizes difference positively following the principle of subsidiarity, that is, 
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difference is utilized for the good of all by division of labor based on one‘s ability or 
disability, gender physical strength and skills for the common good. 
(i) Amstutz on Cultural Diversity and Ethics of International Human 
Rights 
One of the greatest assumptions, one on which personal, national and 
international ethics is based, is that of human rights. Based on their inherent dignity all 
humans have basic rights which ought not to be violated. Amstutz notes however, that 
―Because the international community is a society of societies, each with its own social, 
political, and economic institutions and cultural traditions, defining human rights and the 
policies likely to enhance human dignity is a daunting task.‖783 Basic human rights are 
inviolable in the sense that violating them would mean violating humanity itself. 
Occasionally, however, there are some conflicts between human rights and some cultural 
practices. Hence ―the challenge posed by cultural pluralism is how to reconcile universal 
human rights claims with the fact of cultural and moral relativity.‖784 
To some extent cultural diversity is possible between different cultures and the 
demands of human rights. However, Amstutz notes that ―the claim of total cultural 
diversity is simply unattainable … diversity cannot be total because certain moral 
principles are necessary for social life as such, irrespective of its particular form.‖ 
Amstutz observes that ―there is common morality shared by all peoples. This morality 
involves such moral norms as justice, respect for human life, fellowship, freedom from 
arbitrary interference and honorable treatment.‖785 At the level of common morality, 
there are hardly any conflicts between human rights and specific cultures. ―The challenge 
for the international community is to delimit human rights and to emphasize only those 
rights considered essential to human dignity.‖786 The challenge to most indigenous 
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cultures is to discourage cultural elements which conflict with universal human rights. 
UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights respects cultural diversity while, 
at the same time underlines the importance of respecting human rights, based on human 
dignity. 
Although there is an institution responsible for the reconciliation of all global 
cultures with universal human rights, the reconciliation is crucial. Amstutz cautions that 
―in reconciling cultural relativism with the universality of human rights, it is important to 
emphasize that universalism and relativism are not mutually exclusive categories but 
rather different ends of a continuum.‖ For acceptability of the necessary adjustment on 
the side of specific cultures, Amstutz‘s caution is important. It speaks to the approach that 
should be adapted. Both human rights and specific cultures aim at the good of society. 
―The choice is not between the extremes of radical universalism, which holds that culture 
plays no role in defining morality, and radical cultural relativism, which holds that 
culture is the only source of morality.‖ Any approach which involves mutual exclusivity 
between human rights and specific cultures is bound to escalate conflicts and eventually 
fail. Amstutz states that ―the affirmation of human rights in global society will 
necessarily be based on an intermediary position that recognizes both the reality of 
cultural pluralism and the imperative of rights claims rooted in universal morality.‖787 
Thus the appropriate stance is that of ‗both and,‘ rather than that of ‗either or.‘ Ubuntu 
believes deeply in the importance of diversity. Actually according to Ubuntu diversity 
and otherness are necessary for self-identity and realization, humans being human 
because of the otherness of other humans. 
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(ii) Daniels and Social Obligation to Promote Preventive Health for 
All 
Daniels‘ first premise in his defense for promotion of preventive health care for 
all is that health is the basis and condition of most opportunities in life. That being the 
case, ―meeting health needs protects the range of opportunities people can exercise, then 
any social obligations we have to protect opportunity implies obligations to protect and 
promote health for all people.‖788 Hence, in Daniels‘ own words, ―Meeting the health 
needs of all persons, viewed as free and equal citizens, is of comparable and special 
moral importance.‖ Moreover, Daniels consider preventive and curative healthcare to be 
a basic human right. Denial of healthcare, in his view, is an injustice. The community of 
nations and each state has an obligation to promote and protect human health. Daniels 
explains, ―Just health requires that we protect people‘s share of the normal opportunity 
range by treating illness when it occurs, by reducing the risks of disease and disability 
before they occur, and by distributing those risks equitably.‖789 
Daniels underlines the importance of meeting the health needs of all people fairly 
by making ―priority-setting decisions about all these obligations through a fair, 
deliberative process.‖ Daniels goes even further by arguing that ―we owe people when we 
cannot restore their loss of functioning: our obligations take us outside the health 
sector.‖790 This argument is based on his premise that ―the special importance of health 
for protecting opportunity gives us social obligations to promote and protect health. To 
meet these obligations and to secure equity in health, we must design appropriate policies 
both inside and outside the health sector.‖791 Daniels argument raises a lot of questions 
with regards to personal accountability for health. He clarifies this controversy by 
arguing that ―Emphasizing our social obligations to meet the health needs of free and 
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equal citizens, regardless of how those needs arise, does not mean that we cannot hold 
people accountable in reasonable ways for their behaviors.‖ However, he maintains, ―We 
must temper our judgments in light of what we know about the determinants of health 
and of risky behaviors, and where we have reasonable disagreements about what we do, 
we must be accountable for the reasonableness of our decisions.‖792 
Promotion of healthcare for all implies a degree of intrusion into personal 
autonomy and behaviors. Some personal preferences may have to be restricted for the 
sake of the health of others. Efforts to respond to a threat of spread of infectious disease, 
for example, ―raise difficult questions about the appropriateness of restricting individual 
choices to safeguard other people‘s welfare.‖ Examples include the use of isolation and 
quarantine for tuberculosis and pandemic influenza.
793
 Taking responsibility for the 
health of others ought to a reasonable degree limit individual autonomy. The extent to 
which this kind of restriction can be imposed is a philosophically difficulty issue to 
discern. It may go as far as public restrictions on habits such as smoking, poor diet or 
lack of exercise. From the global perspective, ―defining the scope of countries‘ 
obligations to act collectively, and determining how those obligations should be enforced, 
will inevitably raise difficult ethical dilemmas.‖794 However, in line with Ubuntu world 
view, no human person can claim to be completely free from responsibility for other 
humans. A person is a product of many interpersonal relationships; disentangling a 
person from other persons is tantamount to annihilating him. Each human is to an extent 
responsible for the entire human species. 
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(iii) Petrini and Gainotti on Personalist Approach to Public-Health 
Ethics 
Petrini and Gainotti observe that ―The principle of autonomy has tended to 
dominate healthcare ethics especially in North America.‖ In their view the dominance of 
autonomy in healthcare may not always be to the advantage of healthcare since, they 
argue, ―public health is based predominantly on population-level utility, making it more 
attentive to issues such as epidemics, social determinants of health, and cost-effective 
decision making.‖ Petrini and Gainotti admit that ―a pervasive utilitarian component in 
public health is thereby undeniable.‖ Petrini argues against the philosophical idea that 
public health is paternalistic, especially because it involves states‘ intrusion into personal 
liberties for the sake of promotion of health and safety. In their view, ―The main 
challenge lies embedded in the relationship between individual and population health.‖795 
Petrini and Gainotti contend that ―If we want to promote development from a 
health viewpoint, we must move from a solitary, individualistic approach to a Personalist 
approach in an integral sense.‖ Petrini and Gainotti believe that individualistic approach 
to healthcare is an impediment to real progress, hence ―Going forward, we must rethink 
the concept of coexistence in our world, starting from the assumption that we all belong 
to the human species, with consideration of our different identities and, therefore, shift 
from the ‗individual‘ to the ‗person.‘‖796 According to Petrini and Gainotti, ―the founding 
basis of universalism, personalism and solidarity as an anthropological concept is shared, 
today, by representatives of different cultures.‖797 Petrini argues that ―Personalism, which 
suggests building up the common good on the basis of attention to and care for the good 
of each person,‖ is the best way to solve conflicts between individual interests and social 
interests.
798
 In his view personalism is what is what is lacking in modern medicine, 
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absence of which accounts for most ethical social conflicts. In Petrini‘s view 
―personalism is the best approach to face ethical problems not only in clinical bioethics, 
but also in public health ethics.‖799 
Personalism defends public health approach to medicine. Public health is well 
defined by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) as ―what we, as a society, do collectively to 
assure the conditions for people to be.‖800 Total embrace of public health would imply 
that it is unethical to exclude anybody from healthcare, regardless affordability argument. 
Thus ―Public health practice is characterized by global attention to whole populations and 
therefore by an emphasis on collective health conditions, prevention, and social, 
economic, and demographic determinants of health and disease.‖801 Personalism, which 
Petrini advocates, is a form of communitarian ethics since it ―rejects the notion of 
timeless, universal, ethical truths based on reason.‖ Personalism recognizes the role of 
reason in morality but also recognize the significant role of human relationship and 
community. 
Like it is the case with ethics of care communitarian theories consider morality to 
be cultural concrete and relational rather than abstract, rational and indifferent to human 
relationship. ―Communitarians maintain that our moral thinking has its origins in the 
historical traditions of particular communities. Communities are not simply collections of 
individuals: they are groups of individuals who share values, customs, institutions, and 
interests.‖ In other words, abstracting ethical theories from their rightful human 
relationships and interconnectedness is in itself unethical. Petrini posits that what is 
―communitarian seeks to promote the common good in terms of shared values, ideals, 
and goals. In the communitarian perspective, the health of the public is one of those 
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shared values: reducing disease, saving lives, and promoting good health are shared 
values.‖802 The unity of human species evident in personalism is the same unity that the 
ideal of Ubuntu aspires. There is, therefore, a lot in common between the ideal vision of 
Petrini and Gainotti in personalism and the Ubuntu worldview. 
3. Biosphere 
Another important component of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights is respect for the biosphere as the cosmic context for 
discourse on ethical responsibility. This component consists of two important concepts. 
First, all humans have an ethical obligation towards other forms of life and the cosmos; 
second, life sciences have a duty to respect and preserve genetic integrity of both human 
and non-human generations. 
a. Ecological Environment 
The concept of being sensitive to the biosphere implies that every human 
individual and society has an ethical duty to protect other forms of life, the biosphere and 
biodiversity.
803
 Article seventeen is concerned with protection of the environment, 
biosphere and biodiversity as a human ethical responsibility. Allison warns against 
limiting bioethics to a ‗doctor-patient‘ relationship, and argues that human relationship 
with animals and the environment in general is within the subject matter of bioethics.
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In drafting the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human rights the UNESCO 
distributed questionnaires regarding its content. Macpherson notes that sixty percent of 
the respondents to the questionnaires ―wanted the scope of the declaration to encompass 
all life forms, not just human life.‖805 The use of biotechnology should help resolve 
human predicaments and promote prosperity without hurting other forms of life and the 
cosmos. 
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Human activity has not always been sensitive to its negative impact on the 
environment.
806
 Amstutz laments the absence of central global authority to regulate 
national/state impact on the environment. He explores the harm caused by different 
national states as a matter of justice, thereby unveiling the underlying need for protection 
of what he calls the ‗global commons.‘807 
Protection of the biosphere and other forms of life is one of the major concerns of 
UNESCO due to the problem of extinction of some species and environmental pollution 
resulting from human activity. The culture of Ubuntu has always been protective of other 
forms of life and the environment. Ubuntu recognizes interactive and interdependent 
relationship between humans and the biosphere. Killing of animals except for food or in 
self-defense, setting unneeded fires, or cutting trees is considered an ethical evil. Respect 
for other forms of life and the environment is almost a religious devotion. Violence to the 
environment leads to violence against humans. 
(i) Faunce on Technology, Health Care, Environmental Ethics and 
Rights 
Empirical studies show that there is real interaction, cause-effect relationship and 
mutuality between technology, health care, human rights and environmental ethics. 
Faunce relates that the ―intersections between international human rights, health care and 
environmental ethics on the one hand, and international trade law on the other, provide 
one of the great normative challenges for global health policy as we emerge from the era 
of corporate globalization.‖808 After the World War II there was global recognition of 
human of human rights due to its dignity. This move was a reaction to the abuse of the 
war against human dignity. Faunce, however, laments that three things were marginalized 
about the normative content of societal impact of global health care ethics and rights: 
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The first involved how ethics and law could protect the role of the environment in 
human health as well as its intrinsic value to the health of all life forms. The 
second concerned the expanding influence of international trade law in shaping 
influential normative systems largely unresponsive to health care (or 
environmental) ethics and rights. The third concerned how emerging technologies 
should be regulated to help resolve some of the great problems facing humanity 
and its environment.
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Human right to health has ―often been interpreted as a largely symbolic, non-
enforceable individually, progressively realizable concession to normative decency or 
attempt to claim political legitimacy.‖810 There has been an increased awareness of 
―justifiable and enforceable international human rights as part of any functional social 
contract‖ governing how humans treat each other regardless governmental influence and 
control; ―Article 12 of the ICESCR importantly in this context created an international 
right to health, legally binding those parties who have ratified it.‖811 This involves ―core 
obligations to provide the basic preconditions for existence, including food, water, fuel, 
sanitation, housing, reasonable access to essential health services and products as well as 
capacity to live in non-toxic environment.‖812 What is regrettably missing as Faunce 
rightly notes is ―consideration of how human beings should make basic rules governing 
their relationship with the environment including how new technologies should be 
responsive to its sustainability.‖813 
Faunce foresees a great possibility of development in such a way that ―norms of 
international human rights, bioethics, medical and environmental ethics are likely to play 
important roles in developing any new global social contract.‖ All those factors, in 
Faunce‘s view, might combine to ―support the concept of global public goods‖ in such a 
way that ―no individual or ecosystem should be excluded.‖ Some examples of how this 
strategy could be implemented include ―emerging technologies facilitating clean air, 
equitable access to food and energy, peaceful societies, control of communicable disease, 
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transport and law and order infrastructure, as well as sustainable ecosystem. Related 
global public goods will require international cooperation for their production.‖ Faunce 
argues that as global awareness levels increases about the plight of the poor populations 
of the world and as credible and accessible data accumulates, ―it will no longer be 
acceptable in health policy debates to rationalize widespread deaths among increasing 
numbers of poor, uninsured patients and those who cannot obtain access to essential 
medicine or other valuable new health technologies.‖814 
Just as important is the development of global legal system that oversees and 
ascertains just treatment based on human equality and equity between humans but which 
is related to the development and use of new technologies that will not exclude or 
marginalize portions of human population and that will put into consideration 
environmental sustainability: 
When sixty three experts, for example were asked to specify which aspects of 
nanotechnology could most assist the developing world, the nanotechnologies 
cited as likely to be important in this context were nanomembranes for water 
purification, desalination and detoxification, nanosensors for the detection of 
contaminants and pathogens, nanoporous zeolites, polymers and attapulgite clays 
for water purification, magnetic nanoparticles for water treatment and remediation 
and TiO2 nanoparticles for the catalytic degradation of water pollutants.
815
 
Faunce concludes that ―both international human rights and global health care 
ethics carry the promise of enlarging the objects of human sympathy and so the 
applicable range of foundational virtues, principles and rules available to decision 
makers.‖ Faunce‘s optimism is healthy because of its holistic and productive promise that 
tend‘ to address the major global ethical issues simultaneously. To underline the 
importance urgency of his argument Faunce states that ―foundational environmental 
virtues, such as ―sustainability‖ and ―solidarity with endangered species and habitats‖ 
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respecting the earth itself as a self-sustaining entity, must now begin in academic and 
policy discourse to take their place alongside ―justice‖ and ―equality‖ in health care 
debates about the wise use of emerging technologies.‖816 Faunce‘s perspective is 
plausible not only because of its realistic grasp of the holistic integral and interrelational 
nature of cosmic reality and human species but, especially, because of the urgency on the 
part of the human species to play their rightful role of stewardship. 
There are a number of disturbing facts that underline the urgency of Faunce‘s 
perspective. There is even now undeniable evidence of human failure to ascertain good 
stewardship not only for the planet earth but also for fellow members of the human 
species: 
Particular challenges for the global health care ethics and human rights in the era 
of globalization will be the million or so women and girls under 18 trafficked 
annually for prostitution; the 10 million refugees; or five million internally 
displaced persons, the victims of any one of the 35 or so wars currently raging 
across the earth; of state-promoted torture or rape in the guise of ‗ethnic 
cleansing‘; or any of the 250 million children exploited for labor, sexual 
gratification or as soldiers. This is in addition to 1.2 billion people living in severe 
poverty, without adequate obstetric care, food safe water or sanitation.
817
 
Plausibility of Faunce‘s ideas cannot be doubted. The need for holistic and 
realistic approach to the integration of emerging technology, healthcare, environmental 
ethics and human rights has never been more urgent. Ubuntu worldview of 
interdependence of human species, the species‘ interdependence with its environment and 
importance of care for the biosphere is a basic inspiration to the direction Faunce points 
to. Korthals elucidates Faunce‘s argument with regards to the importance of human 
stewardship of their environment. 
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(ii) Korthals’ Ethics of Environmental Health 
There is a direct relationship of interdependence between the biosphere and 
human beings. Human beings‘ environment not only supports human existence, it 
influences it substantially and conditions it. Korthals explores this fact by relating 
environmental health and human health. Korthals lists at least four steps in the criterion 
of establishing unethical environmental influence on human beings. The first is 
―identification of what type of problem is an environmental factor causing unhealthy 
influences and where the problem is located.‖818 Using the example of obesity Korthals 
demonstrates how complex it may be to identify a bad environmental influence and its 
location. Obviously, if a problem is named, identified and located, a search for solution is 
destined to fail. The second step is ―the ethics of doing research into the factors that 
produce environmental hazards.‖ Definitely the research itself has to be ethical if it has to 
lead to ethical results. The third step is assumption of the responsibility to manage and 
increase the environmental health of the people involved, and the fourth step is ethically 
establishing the right to intervene.
819
 For a demonstrative example, Korthals sites a 
suburban town in New York which was constructed on a former chemical waste disposal 
site. He mentions how the demography of its inhabitants suffered from numerous 
problems related with toxicity. Some of such problems are asthma, cancer, and urinary 
tract infection. 
To demonstrate the credibility of his argument and its validity, Korthals laments 
how ―Government scientists made many mistakes in identifying the exact causes of the 
health problems that these citizens had, and resisted the data and findings of citizen 
activists.‖820 Thus some people may be forced to live in unethical environment without 
their knowledge and consent. Some governments and organizations may be a bad 
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influence on the environment of some people, in which case the innocent citizens are 
forcefully victimized. Korthals provides an example to demonstrate how tricky it may be. 
He writes, 
When on-street eateries such as McDonalds, KFC, Fish‘n‘chips and Ben and 
Jerry‘s are tolerated not only in cities, but also in mass media advertising and 
sponsorship, it should not be surprising that the numbers of obese persons are 
greatly increasing, as they still are in Britain, along with increased instances of 
concomitant diseases, such as type-two diabetes, cancer of the intestines and 
cardiovascular diseases.
821
 
Clearly masses of people who are poor or uneducated are forced by their environment to 
eat unhealthy foods and face the consequences. The environment, which disguise as 
friendly; it rather uses them as means to making money regardless their wellbeing. 
Citing World Health Organization (WHO) report published in 2004, Korthals 
explains how our commercialized environment of plenty works against our own good. 
―We live in an obesogenic environment‖ because many people take foods which are so 
rich in calories that the proportion between energy in-take and energy out-put is 
disproportional. Some foods are too rich in energy while human physical activity has 
reduced.
822
 Unfortunately, efforts being made to reduce obesity have been undermined, 
sometimes on purpose, and even used for economic gains, thus reducing the obese into 
means to economic gain. This fact is easily demonstrated by Korthals‘ example. 
The American Obesity Association (AOA) formed in 1995, is nominally ―a lay 
advocacy group representing the interest of the 70 to 80 million obese American women 
and children and adults afflicted with the disease of obesity.‖ However, the Association 
―receives most of its funding – several hundred thousand dollars in all – from 
pharmaceutical industry, including Interneuron, American Home Products, Roche 
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Laboratories, Knoll Pharmaceuticals Ltd., and Servier – all of which market or develop 
diet pills.‖823 
In sum, there is no doubt, therefore, that obesity, like some other diseases, is 
multifactorial in origin. It can be partially genetic, overeating, or eating of unhealthy 
foods, either by choice or by organized or unorganized force. Since obesity is a disease it 
is an ethical issue. To the degree it is caused by human beings, human organizations 
directly or indirectly, it deserves ethical attention and analysis. Citing Minkler‘s 
―Personal Responsibility for Health: Contexts and Controversies,‖ Korthals argues that 
―improving environmental health requires attributing responsibility to people, 
institutions, networks and policy agent, which is often connected with differences in 
power and interests.‖824 The environment a human subject finds himself has a huge 
impact on his life and health, including his self-actualization and happiness. Ubuntu 
world view espouse human environment and emphasize its significance, not without 
reason. 
(iii) Tandon on Protection of the Environment, the Biosphere and 
Biodiversity 
It is undeniable fact that the human species is sustained in existence by in 
interaction of many other member creatures of the planet earth. The human race can by 
no means survive independent of the biospheric environment which is a network of many 
organic and inorganic beings. Article seventeen of the UNESCO Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights states ―Due regard is to be given to the interaction between 
human beings and other forms of life, to the importance of appropriate access and 
utilization of biological and genetic resources, to respect for traditional knowledge and to 
the role of human beings in the protection of the environment, the biosphere and 
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biodiversity.‖825 Superior as it may be to other living and nonliving beings; human 
species is contingent and deeply dependent and sustained by its lower living and 
nonliving part of planet earth. 
Tandon reminds us of an important fact about human beings‘ relationship with the 
planet earth and its ecosystems. He states that, ―The earth system consists of physical and 
biotic components, which have evolved together in continuous interaction towards its 
present state of complexity.‖ In other words, independent of human activity, the earth 
system has been sustaining itself by keeping the healthy balance it needed at any 
particular time in its on-going evolution. Tandon notes that ―Over the past few decades, 
scientific work has established that human activities have caused abrupt and 
unprecedented modifications in the planetary life-support system.‖ It is important to 
carefully discern whether such changes are for the good of the planet and its life forms -- 
therefore for the human species -- or not. This is why bioethics is essential. Any harm 
done to any component of the holistic nature of the planet affects not just that part but 
also all other parts, including humans and future generations. Tandon names the 
component parts as ―the atmosphere, the marine and the terrestrial compartments.‖ All 
three function together in self-sustaining synergy which Tandon calls ―fluxes of matter, 
that is the hydrological and the biogeochemical cycles. The earth system, is in principle 
one and indivisible, because all parts are interconnected by delicate control mechanisms 
operating on various space and time scales.‖826 It is the planet Earth‘s automated and self-
sustaining principle that calls caution to human interaction and its effect over all the 
system. 
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There has been a notable change in the earth life systems due to human 
intervention recently because of the ―advent of the industrial revolution, the development 
of the chemical industry and the introduction of nuclear technology.‖ Atmospheric 
pollution, soil pollution and water bodies pollution, along with human over population of 
some earth parts has already been proven to be hazardous to some species. Consequently 
Tandon warns that ―recent advances in molecular biology, recombinant technology, 
genetics and biotechnology‖ should be vigilantly monitored by public system to ―prevent 
adverse effects on the environment.‖ Just as living and nonliving organisms‘ relationship 
among themselves and between each other is complex and interdependent in many 
complex ways, so is evolution. Tandon states that ―scientific disciplines such as biology, 
sociology and economics show us that our evolution involves not only competition for 
survival of the fittest, but a high degree of collaboration (symbiosis) for the survival of 
the global living system.‖ Needless to mention, human rationality and free will that 
enables him to effect substantial change, even annihilate the planet as we know it, must 
be controlled and carefully utilized. ―The new development of technologies must 
therefore respect local and national social, cultural and environmental constraints, and 
should pose no risk of irreversible damage.‖827 
Since there have already been adverse effects on the planet and its life systems, 
―Environmental security is no longer peripheral to the issues of human health, food and 
nutritional security. It is an integral part of it and neglecting it yesterday has proven 
costly today, and could prove far costlier tomorrow.‖ The most important tool needed for 
the care of the planet is knowledge. Understanding of the many ways human activity 
changes the planet and the life in it is crucial. Tandon observes that ―it has been well 
 247  
recognized that no valid socio-economic or technological paradigm can be built unless 
man‘s relationship with the ecosystem and the universe is properly understood and cared 
for.‖ Due to humans‘ evolving understanding of the ways the planet sustains itself and 
the life it contains there is need for holistic approach. Tandon warns that ―This holistic 
paradigm demands a technology with a human face, used as an instrument to serve both 
humankind and nature. The world needs to manage itself as a system‖ regardless of 
human ability to manage it with his limited understanding.
828
 
Bioethics ―is concerned with the moral relevance of human intervention in 
relation to life. In its broadest sense it is concerned with all life forms: plants, animals 
including humans, and the diverse ecosystems.‖829 The main concern of bioethics is to 
caution and to ascertain healthy relationship not just between humans‘ treatment of each 
other, but especially humans‘ treatment of the other forms of life and the planet earth 
which sustains that life. Thus bioethics cannot ignore its duty towards the cosmos and its 
contents. Doing so may hurt human species irreversibly. ―The inescapable fact is that the 
introduction of new technologies necessary for development brings with it irreversible 
social, ecological, and health consequences, which under certain circumstances can be 
harmful.‖830 It is because of this possibility of harm that bioethics should be concerned 
with the relationship between humans and their environment. The harm humans may 
inflict on the planet and its life forms ―must be anticipated, recognized, prevented and 
mitigated if we are to avoid disaster of the kind most developing and developed countries 
are facing today.‖831 This noble task of bioethics is much more basic than its duty in 
discerning morality of human treatment of one another. Its importance springs from its 
foundational and essential nature. Humans, however, are ―an integral part of the 
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biosphere has responsibilities and obligations towards all other forms of life.‖832 Needless 
to say, humans‘ responsibility towards the biosphere, hydrosphere and the earth generally 
ought to be one of stewardship. Ubuntu worldview which endears, cherish and nurture 
the cosmos and the beings in it almost as fellows is a great inspiration to the attitude that 
is needed in human relationship with the cosmos. 
b. Future Generations 
Humans have an ethical obligation to the biosphere. Life sciences have an ethical 
obligation to safeguard future generations, including their genetic constitution.
833
 Article 
sixteen of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights posits 
that bioethical issues should be considered, not just for the present generations but also 
for the future generations. Present decisions affect future generations.
834
 Because of the 
Declaration‘s position with regards to minority, especially its position against abortion, it 
has won support of religious groups including the Vatican.
835
 Some critics argue that the 
declaration is minimalistic and vague because of its failure to be specific with regards to 
the use of language that is too general or unclear -- phrases like ―impact of life sciences 
on future generations…should be given due regard‖ are harmful to the message of the 
document.
836
 Using the language of Benatar, that kind of statement ―gives guidance 
where none is needed and it fails to give guidance where it is needed.‖837 On the contrary, 
some scholars like Langlois establish the relevance of the declaration while emphasizing 
the role of contextualization of the general principles.
838
 Thus, present generations are 
responsible for their actions that impact future generations. 
Gene therapy and human genome information, for example, may provide accurate 
diagnoses and therapies for individuals but may also involve serious adverse 
consequences for the next generations. Allison argues that the present generation has 
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ethical ―duties‖ to future generations.839 Taylor suggests both national and global 
cooperation in benefiting from genetic research without violating human rights.
840
 
Morisaki suggests involvement of many parties in the decision making process as a way 
of regulating reckless or inconsiderate, harmful steps.
841
 
It has been demonstrated in chapter two how Ubuntu respects and protects 
integrity of both human and non-human lives of the present and future generations. In 
Ubuntu mindset destruction of the integrity of future generations means, at the same time, 
self-destruction. In Ubuntu culture genealogy is important because it is an essential part 
of self-identity and belonging. It also communicates a sense of sacred obligation to 
extend the genealogical line with its integrity. Such a mindset serves as an inspiration to 
counter modern trends and temptations to tamper with human and non-human genetic 
constitutions. 
(i) Ethics of Genetic Manipulation in Relation to Future Generations. 
One of the greatest discoveries of the nineteenth century was Gregor Johann 
Mendel‘s laws of heredity. The discoveries facilitated understanding of the origins, 
significance and mechanisms of genetic diversity. ―The principal phenomena involved 
are segregation, mutation, and recombination of genes. Together these three actions, 
through the opportunities they generate for genetic diversity, have since been used to 
improve plants, animals, and micro-organisms of interest to agriculture, industry and 
medicine.‖842 There has been rapid development in the understanding of human genome 
and how this understanding could be well utilized in in medicine for the good of the 
human species. ―Now that the Human Genome Project (HGP) is an ongoing and rapidly 
progressing reality, and human genetic engineering is expected to become procedure, the 
inevitable question is how these procedures will be applied.‖ There has been a number of 
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ethical concerns with regards to the possible application of the knowledge and 
possibilities that come along with accessibility to human genome. According to Walters 
the use of germ line gene therapy falls into three major categories: ―(1) its potential 
clinical risks, (2) the broader concern of changing the gene pool, the genetic inheritance 
of the human population, and (3) social dangers.‖843 
Eugenics is one of the most feared applications of the Human Genome Project. 
According to Agius and Busuttil this kind of eugenics ―is often looked upon as positive 
eugenics, directed perhaps, towards achieving human beings endowed with optimal 
characteristics of physical strength and beauty, intellectual genius and longevity.‖844 
However, the more basic question is whether our limited knowledge may interfere with 
natural evolution process which has developed for millions of years. Even if there is a 
possibility that the present generation can make an immense contribution to the good of 
future generations by modifying the present genes, the risk is incalculable. Agius and 
Busuttil argue that the present generation has a duty to ―guard the present gene pool and 
ensure, in the most cautious and enlightened way possible, that nothing is done which 
may be detrimental to future generations, and that necessary measures are taken to 
implement any positive measures for its enhancement.‖845 Even with this caution, 
however, it is impossible to be absolutely certain that the germ line gene change that is 
introduced is in both short and long run be beneficial to future generations. 
Agius and Busuttil acknowledge that there is ―fear of the unknown‖ with regards 
to the possible outcome of the ―powerful technology in the hands of scientists.‖ Although 
they, themselves support positive eugenics, Agius and Busuttil acknowledge that they 
―hear warnings of another impending calamity (due to the misuse of genetic engineering 
 251  
in human germ cells) posing a threat to the human genome of future generations unless 
action is taken to prevent it.‖846 The fear is well founded because as Agius and Busuttil 
themselves acknowledge ―There is of course the immense and probably insoluble 
problem of determining which human characteristics, among nature‘s rich and superb 
diversity, can be improved and what constitutes the hypothetical physical and intellectual 
excellence that one might envisage and enhance.‖847 This being the case, there is need to 
proceed with a lot of caution and certainty or not to proceed at all. Humans are now 
holding in their own hands the fate of their own species. They can easily end it as it 
currently is. Ubuntu respect of the sanctity of human life and its sacredness would not 
easily permit any uncertain manipulation. Since human morality in Ubuntu is determined 
by the presence of ―an-other‖ and the way the ―other‖ is treated, the present generation‘s 
morality is measured by its sense of stewardship for the future generations. 
(ii) Kalfoglou on Reprogenetics 
One of the most controversial topics discussed with regards to future generations 
springs from the advancement in genetic technology. Genetic research and technology 
originally was meant for proactive preventive and therapeutic of genetic diseases. 
However, as Kalfoglou rightly states, ―Genetic testing can now influence reproductive 
decisions prior to conception, prior to the transfer of embryos into a woman‘s uterus and 
during pregnancy.‖ Thus, even though the ―original goal of most of this testing was to 
give couples at risk of passing a serious genetic disease on to their children more 
reproductive choices,‖ clearly in practice the use has ―expanded to include screening for 
risk of adult-onset diseases and the ability to select for socially desirable traits, such as 
sex.‖848 This expansion is potentially the beginning of a moral slippery slope into 
dangerous irredeemable situations. The beginning point lies in the fact that a human 
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being has the ability and possibly the freedom to decide how he would want the another 
human being to be like regardless what is naturally right or the care recipient‘s right of 
self-determination or the long run effect on the process of natural selection. 
In the process of getting the right or desired person several embryos may be 
destroyed or used as mere means for the desired one. Because of this moral dilemma 
some governments such as Italy have passed stringent rules to regulate in vitro 
fertilization due to embryo destruction.
849
 Related to the moral problem of embryo 
destruction is the problem of creation of ‗savior siblings‘ because the savior sibling is a 
replacement or a means used to make present the dying child. Usually savior siblings 
represent parents‘ selfish desire to still have the dying child after death instead of another 
child. A savior child is not loved and accepted for itself but for the dead child.
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Needless to mention, the other controversial issue is that of harm (emotional, 
psychological, spiritual, social, economic and physical) to mothers and children. Harm 
usually results from the technology employed. For instance ―there are short-term risks for 
any woman who undergoes oocyte stimulation and retrieval, including hyperstimulation 
syndrome, which can be a serious complication.‖ Currently, there is not enough 
knowledge about the long-term effects of such procedures, especially when repeated 
several times.
851
 
Reprogenetics may easily compromise human dignity, hence corroding the very 
core of all ethical principles and morality. Children may be reduced to mere 
commodities, humans may be reduced to a work of art designed by other humans, and the 
conflict between those who would like to have the best selection of traits for their siblings 
and those who would rather let nature decide the future of their children. This situation 
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may lead to a great moral scenario where the child designed is denied important human 
functions and qualities. A typical example is provided by Kalfoglou in the case of a 
―lesbian couple who were both deaf and sought out a sperm donor who had five 
generations of deafness in his family in the hope that their child would also be deaf.‖852 
Nobody currently knows the long term consequences of such selections. Many nations 
such as Germany, Norway, Australia, and Switzerland and some U.S.A. states have 
passed ―Laws banning the use of any type of selection based on genetics, including the 
use of PGD to avoid genetic disease.‖853 Genetic testing and selection, potentially good 
as it may seem, it may cause stigma, discrimination and marginalization of those known 
to have a genetic disease or disability or a trait that falls short of preferred trait. Already 
some people have been denied employment positions or insurance coverage.
854
 
Discrimination therefore is a potential problem. 
Attempting to manipulate human nature to improve it may not only be playing 
God but may actually lead to a disaster owing to limited knowledge that humans have 
about their own nature and anything for that matter.
855
 Other ethical concerns include 
unpredictable racial, gender or even trait imbalance. There may be an increase in the rate 
of abortions since some ambitious parents who end up not getting the traits they want in a 
child may opt for abortion.
856
 Human dignity of children is logically being compromised 
in the process. Kalfoglou states ―If these technologies are used to alter the characteristics 
of children, there could be subtle but profound effects on how parents and society view 
children. If children are more a product of our desires rather than a begotten gift from 
God, our expectations for our children may change.‖857 Thus, genetic technologies, 
promising as they may be, especially with regards to proactive preventive medicine, they 
 254  
can lead to serious negative social, psychological, demographic, emotional, economic, 
ethical, religious and dignity consequences. In the respect Ubuntu has for human life and 
how nature brings forth a new member of the society as it finds fit after its experience of 
an unknown time span, we find both a caution and inspiration to proceed with caution in 
the subject of reprogenetics. 
(iii) Morisaki on Protection of Future Generations 
Article sixteen of the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is 
about protection of future generations. It specifically addresses the ―impact of life 
sciences on future generations, including on their genetic constitution.‖858 Morisaki 
reports that ―during the drafting process and the discussions of various draft texts, there 
has been consensus that bioethical issues should be considered not only for the present 
generation but also for future generations.‖859 Human responsibility towards the 
biosphere ―should extend to future generations and the actual decisions taken should keep 
that in mind.‖ Present generation has responsibility for future generations because 
decisions made by the present generation affect lives of future generations. ―This implies 
that the concept of intergenerational justice is now at the fore of today‘s international 
environmental concerns.‖860 Acceptance of the concept of intergenerational justice 
implies responsibility on the part of the present generation. It also implies culpability for 
the wrong decisions made on behalf of the future generations with relation to their 
genetic constitution or their environment. Takayuki states, ―Humanity is not only the 
international community, including all people living today, but it refers to the chain of 
generations who collectively form one community whether living now or in the 
future.‖861 
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The importance of ethical concern for the future generations is heightened by the 
rapid development in technology and the easiness of effecting environmental or genetic 
germ line change. There is need to ethically weigh the pros and cons of decisions made 
for the present generation on future generations. Human genome information, for 
example ―will provide not only accurate, personalized or individual diagnosis, but also 
will provide a better choice of therapeutic procedures. However, such new technology 
may result in undesired outcomes for the next generation … as in the case of gene 
therapy targeting germ line cells.‖862 The excitement of finding a solution for a health 
problem may easily overshadow the implication to the future generations. To avoid this 
threat Takayuki recommends that ―scientists coming from the health arena should not be 
the only ones involved in the decision-making process; social scientists or lay persons 
should also be called upon to make a contribution.‖863 This inclusion implies that 
bioethics committees should not only be representative of demographically, they should 
―play an important role in the decision-making process.‖ Takayuki recommends inclusion 
of ―multidisciplinary discussions and international co-operation, including UNESCO 
activity‖ for the sake of reaching objectively ethical decisions in matters that affect future 
generations.
864
 
Analogically, future generations may be considered as children or embryos 
because of their inability to participate in the process of decision making which affects 
them. ―It goes without saying that all research involving their participation must be 
subject to rigorous evaluation, monitoring and governance‖ as a matter of justice.865 
Unfortunately, children have not always been protected. ―Research shows that children 
have been victims of unethical research practices ... The smallpox vaccine, for example, 
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was first tested on the children of researchers and then on children living in an 
almshouse.‖866 The Belmont Report clearly underlines ―protection of vulnerable persons 
from exploitation in research.‖ For the sake of justice, owing to the fact that children 
cannot make informed consent, the Belmont Report maintains that ―in some 
circumstances it may be fair to give preference to the participation of adults rather than 
conducting research on children.‖867 
Clearly, ethically children are considered ―vulnerable and their inclusion must be 
balanced with the need to protect them from potential harm, making the issues of consent 
of parents or legal representatives, the assent of the child and the assessment of the risks 
and benefits particularly important.‖868 However, there is a delicate balance since some 
research must include children and may be for the benefit of children: ―International 
norms tend to balance the protection of children with the need to include them in 
research.‖869 The Declaration of Helsinki includes children among the vulnerable and 
stipulates that two conditions must be met before involving them in research: ―(1) the 
research must be indispensable to promote the health of the pediatric population; and (2) 
it cannot be conducted on persons incapable of providing consent.‖870 On the part of 
children most consent may be provided by parents. Samuel, Knoppers and Avard state 
that ―Ethical guidelines governing research with children should be clarified to ensure 
that researchers respect the rights of parents and children in the context of research.‖871 
The ethical concern for future generations and the need to act on their behalf as a matter 
of justice belongs to the kernel of Ubuntu worldview. 
Conclusion 
As a worldview and philosophy of life, Ubuntu ascertains human dignity and a 
personal freedom which meets its limits only in the freedom of others within society as 
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necessary conditions for morality. Human life and dignity are the greatest concern. Every 
member of society should do everything possible to safeguard and promote it. In line 
with Rawls‘ theory of justice and the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights, Ubuntu recognizes human equality as a given, a conditio sine qua non of 
morality. It is on this necessary condition that any morality is possible. The principle of 
subsidiarity is based on the essential equality of human dignity, which is non-negotiable. 
Since one‘s personhood is conditioned by, and flourishes on others‘ personhood, society 
is essential for not only socio-cognitive and moral development, it is essential for 
meaningful human life in general. Consequently, it is an obligation of every member of 
society to assure to the best of his ability the survival of the society. Doing so not only 
confirms the individual‘s existence, it facilitates both individual realization and societal 
prosperity. 
In agreement with UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human rights, Ubuntu 
recognizes the important role of plurality. Plurality is richness on which human society 
thrives. Difference is cherished because it is essential for self-recognition, a person being 
a person because of the otherness of other persons. Disentangling a person from all others 
is tantamount to annihilating him as a person. In Ubuntu otherness is as important as 
selfhood. Each person should be responsible not only for the self but also for the entire 
human species. Every person being a product of many previous generations, every person 
is obliged to safeguard future generations as a matter of ethics. Future generations belong 
to the realm of otherness that helps define selfhood. It cannot be left aside. Ubuntu, like 
the UNESCO declaration on Bioethics and human rights, cares about how present human 
activities impact future generations. Though unknown to the present generation, future 
 258  
generations depend greatly on the present generation. It is a grave matter to put at risk 
their genetic constitution. Caution should be taken, especially because of the unknown 
risks, given the limits of human knowledge. 
Since human society is in symbiosis with ecosystems, the biosphere and the 
cosmos, the relationship between human being and the cosmos should be one of 
stewardship and care. Ubuntu cherishes and endears human fellowship with the 
environment which makes possible human life. This is an inspiration that needs to be 
nurtured. UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is deeply concerned 
about ethics of human relationship with the environment. Since there is no international 
government which oversees ethics of personal and national treatment of the cosmos, this 
aspect remains a great challenge to modern society. It is possible for one state, using 
nuclear weapons, to annihilate the human race as we know it. This threat should be at the 
top of global agenda for stewardship of the human race and the planet Earth. Unchecked 
national sovereignty threatens multiple nations‘ safety, especially when reckless or 
hateful regimes have nuclear capabilities. 
Exploring the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights reveals its 
great similarity of ethics, perspective and objectives with Ubuntu world view. They both 
recognize nonnegotiable human dignity to be respected and promoted; they both 
underline the importance of plurality and diversity for human flourishing, to be 
encouraged and engaged for the benefit of the entire human species; they both recognize 
the need for good stewardship for the genetic makeup of the future generations; they both 
recognize and care about good stewardship for the planet earth, especially, with regards 
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to human dependence on it. Chapter Five will explore Catholic socio-ethical teaching in 
relation to Ubuntu worldview. 
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 Chapter Five
Catholic Social Ethics:  
Enlightening the Role of Solidarity in Global Bioethics. 
One of the major concepts of Ubuntu emphasizes the role of solidarity. The 
meaning of this role can be enlightened by considering the Roman Catholic ethical 
tradition. One of the most important components of Catholic socio-ethical tradition is 
common good. The ethical debate on responsibility in global bioethics requires respect 
for common good. One of the essential components of Catholic socio-ethical tradition is 
social cohesion. The meaning of common good requires respect for social cohesion or 
solidarity whereby individuals collaborate within a global social context. An equally 
essential component of Catholic socio-ethical tradition is based on minority 
empowerment. This chapter explores these three essential components of Catholic Social 
ethics to enlighten the role of solidarity in Ubuntu. 
1. Common Good 
One of the most important components of Catholic ethical tradition is common 
good. The ethical debate on responsibility in global bioethics requires respect for the 
common good. Respect for the common good is based on two concepts. First, all humans 
are created in God‘s image and likeness. Human dignity demands respect for human 
rights. Second, the personal ethical right of self-determination should be defined and 
limited by common good. 
a. God’s Image 
The concept of the common good relates to being created in God‘s image,872 all 
humans have inherent, irreducible shared worth.
873
 They are essentially spiritual and 
social beings.
874
 Respect for human dignity and common good for all humans is based on 
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the premise that all humans are created in God‘s own image and likeness.875 This 
understanding of the radical dignity of human persons has serious implications. It implies 
categorical respect for human rights.
876
 The Church‘s understanding of human rights, 
however, is different from the secular understanding. Human rights are attributes of 
human being as person. They are radical in the sense that they do not depend on being 
granted by society. They should rather be recognized as already naturally given. The 
society should foster and protect the values that promote genuine commitment to the 
growth and flourishing of all people.
877
 The Church, like other institutions, is not exempt 
from issues pertaining to, and affecting human beings whether those issues are material 
or spiritual. The Church has to involve itself with the real world, which is the context and 
habitat of human beings who are inseparably and at once physical, social and spiritual.
878
 
The culture of Ubuntu has deep respect for human dignity. The Church‘s teaching 
emphasizes that human dignity is inherent in each human being. In se human dignity 
commands recognition and respect. Respecting human dignity means observing and 
protecting human rights. Like Catholic tradition, Ubuntu holds that each human being is a 
unique product of many interconnections facilitated both by God and divinities using 
other humans and the cosmos. As such, a human person is a unique beginning and end. 
Each person commands attention, respect and dignity worth his nature as unrepeatable 
unique event. 
(i) Vatican II’s Joy and Hope (Gaudium et Spes) on the Mystery of 
Personhood 
Citing sacred scriptures, Gaudium et Spes ponders the mystery that human beings 
are. Being created as images of their own creator, human beings are capable of knowing, 
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relating with and loving their creator. They have been so elevated that the rest of earthly 
creation entrusted to their care to be used for the glory of God.
879
 Human greatness, 
however, is conditioned by their sociability. Humans are not solitary creatures. They are 
not meant to flourish in independent of their relationship with other human beings. 
Human realization happens in community since they are by nature social beings.
880
 The 
kernel of Christian message is the greatest commandment: unlimited love of God and 
love of neighbor as oneself. True love develops from human ability to relationality and 
sociability. Over and above humans‘ call to a healthy, mutual fulfilling relationship with 
one another, they are called to ―communion with God.‖ Gaudium et Spes observes that 
―from the very circumstance of his origin man is already invited to converse with God.‖ 
There is always an essential relationship between human persons and God. ―For man 
would not exist were he not created by God‘s love and constantly preserved by it; and he 
cannot live fully according to truth unless he freely acknowledges that love and devotes 
himself to His Creator.‖881 
Human beings need to recognize God since they are created both for themselves 
and for God. They are made with the ability to recognize, and tend towards God for their 
fulfillment since they are created ―to commune with God and share His happiness.‖882 
Tendency towards God does not limit human freedom. It enlightens it by giving it 
meaning. True human freedom is not a license to do evil, on the contrary, ―authentic 
freedom is an exceptional sign of the divine image within‖ a human being. Gaudium et 
Spes posits that ―man‘s dignity demands that he act according to a knowing and free 
choice that is personally motivated and prompted from within, not under blind internal 
impulse or by mere external pressure.‖883 Thus, authentic freedom is essential and 
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rightful to all human beings. In other words, any external condition that impedes any 
human being from freely opting for goodness, which is ultimately God, is evil and 
injurious to the very essence of humanity. The very essence of humanity is comprised of 
knowledge and freedom. Ability to understand and freely make an option makes a human 
being a person, hence a moral being in essence. 
The ultimate vocation of all humans is reflected and manifested in Christ. Christ 
is both the inspiration and revelation of God‘s desire for humanity and humanity‘s ideal 
desire for God. Even though humans don‘t share in the divine substance like Christ, in his 
humanity Christ reflects a perfect or ideal human person. Gaudium et Spes teaches that 
―Christ, the final Adam, by the revelation of the mystery of the Father and His love, fully 
reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme calling clear. It is not surprising, 
then, that in Him all the aforementioned truths find their root and attain their crown.‖884 
Christ‘s authentic obedience in freedom and truth to the will of His Father is a model of 
human relationship with God. Such relationship is based on authentic relationship with 
God, founded on truth and practiced in freedom. Basing its teaching on scriptural 
revelation, Vatican II documents state that Christ is ―the perfect man. To the sons of 
Adam He restores the divine likeness which had been disfigured from the first sin 
onward.‖ However, Christ is not a mere ideal and inspirational model to be imitated. His 
assumption of human body and condition, not only reveals humans to themselves as 
children of God, but ―by His incarnation the Son of God has united Himself in some 
fashion with every man. He worked with human hands, He thought with a human mind, 
acted by human choice and loved with a human heart. Born of the Virgin Mary, He has 
truly been made one of us, like us in all things except sin.‖885 Since Christ‘s incarnation 
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transcends human ability to comprehend, it remains a mystery. Humans‘ relationship 
with God is both imminent and transcendental. It cannot be exhausted and should always 
be respected. It reveals human transcendental nature and dignity thereby demanding for 
its recognition and respect. 
Vatican II documents state that the teaching about the mystery of human dignity 
applies to all humans regardless their culture, religion, and all accidents. It is essential to 
the human essence. In the words of Vatican II, ―All this holds true not only for 
Christians, but for all men of good will in whose hearts grace works in an unseen way.‖ 
Christ‘s revelation of humanity to itself and his teaching which culminated in the paschal 
mystery cannot be limited. It is meant for all humans. Gaudium et Spes explains, ―since 
Christ died for all men, and since the ultimate vocation of man is in fact one, and divine, 
we ought to believe that the Holy Spirit in a manner known only to God offers to every 
man the possibility of being associated with this paschal mystery.‖886 Through the 
mystery of Christ and the help of the Holy Spirit every human being can cry out Abba, 
Father.
887
 Ubuntu like Vatican II‘s Gaudium et Spes recognizes universal human 
neediness for God, God‘s love and elevation of human persons, and humans need for 
other humans for the sake of realization their dignity and the dignity of other humans. 
Both Ubuntu and Gaudium et Spes recognize human irreducible and non-negotiable 
dignity. Consequently, Vatican II would consider a person who has not yet received the 
Christian message but faithful to the Ubuntu worldview an anonymous Christian. 
(ii) John Paul II’s Ethical Personalism in (Redemptor Hominis) 
John Paul II‘s teaching is deeply rooted in Vatican II documents‘ philosophy 
which prioritizes the interests of human race in general without ignoring or undermining 
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human individual interest. Consequently, his teaching is ecumenical, appealing to natural 
law and geared towards reunification of all churches and peoples. The reason given in the 
documents themselves is that ―Christ wills it, and Christ is the head of all humankind.‖888 
Christ‘s incarnation is for the entire human race. Assuming human nature, Christ‘s will is 
to redeem it all, not just a section of it. Christ is the revelation of God and his love and 
mercy to all human beings.
889
 Being created in God‘s own image and likeness, all human 
beings are invited, challenged and enabled to love God in return and to love fellow 
humans as God loves them and as they love themselves. John Paul II states that ―Man 
needs to love in return to be fully human. Man cannot live without love. Only in 
relationship to others, and to Christ, can each man discover what it means to be 
human.‖890 To be human, according to John Paul II is to love truly. The church should 
preach by deeds and words this truth about humans‘ need to love and be loved to all 
peoples of the world. The main justification of the love is the undeniable fact of human 
dignity, revealed not only in creation, but especially in the paschal mystery.
891
 
Although the church is an institution, it transcends other institutions. Citing 
Gaudium et Spes, John Paul II explains that church cannot be ―identified with any 
political or ideological system – the Church is, rather, a sign and a safeguard of the 
transcendence of the human person.‖ The church represents a dimension of humanity that 
the temporal political and organizational systems do not represent. The Church represents 
spiritual and eschatological aspects of humanity, without underrating its spacio-temporal 
and sociological dimensions.
892
 The Church is a permanent sign and revelation of human 
dignity as children of God, images of God, Co-creators and co-governors of the universe 
with God. In a very special way, this partnership of humanity and divinity is at its peak in 
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the Eucharist. In the Eucharist God becomes one with human kind. The Eucharist is thus 
the ―most important source and sign of our human dignity.‖ Liturgy, therefore 
communicates human dignity. ―It is in respecting the Eucharist, equally a Sacrament of 
Sacrifice, a Sacrament of Communion, and a Sacrament of Presence, that we show honor 
to the One who has valued our dignity by dying on the cross.‖893 
One of the most foundational aspects of human dignity is true human freedom. 
However, freedom has often times been misunderstood as a permission to break natural 
law and God‘s law. When freedom is abused human dignity is compromised. The Pope 
states that, ―Freedom is a great gift only when we know how to use it consciously for 
everything that is our true good. Christ teaches us that the best use of freedom is charity, 
which takes concrete form in self-giving and in service.‖894 There cannot be freedom that 
contradicts human nature to love and be loved. True human freedom should not cause 
intentional harm since freedom is oriented towards God‘s goodness which humans 
naturally desire. The freedom that is found in scientific and technological development 
should make human life more human, more dignified. If technology and science, 
therefore, do not reveal even more deeply human dignity, they cannot be called 
development. John Paul II‘s concern is the fact that some of the modern scientific and 
technological development has been to the detriment of authentic human progress, 
because it has become an impediment to true human freedom, rather than promote it. 
Human life is not only uncompromisingly central; it is a sacred mystery of God‘s 
love. Even though human beings are societal and find themselves within the society 
―Political, ideological, and economic systems must not usurp the essential dominion that 
each individual man has in his own life.‖ The sanctity of human life is transcendental. 
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The pope posits that ―Man cannot relinquish himself or the place in the visible world that 
belongs to him. He cannot become the slave of things, the slave of economic systems, the 
slave of production, the slave of his own products.‖ The pope warns that a purely 
materialistic civilization is self-contradictory and self-defeating. Such civilization is 
doomed to self-destruct. Real civilization should not enslave any human being but rather 
enhance human freedom. Systems that give precedence to profits or ideology, or 
economic classes over human persons are against true human progress. Thus communism 
and pure free-market economy may be impediments to true human progress.
895
 
Development in technology and civilization should be concomitant with 
development in ethics and morals. Any advancement which does not dignify human life 
is false because it results from humans and should be at the service of humanity rather 
than diminish it. One way to know whether scientific or technological development is 
worthy of humanity is to examine its consideration of human moral and spiritual 
progress.
896
 The pope explains the dominion given to humans over nature to consist of 
priority of ethics over technology which should be reflected in the primacy of personhood 
over persons‘ products and the superiority of spirit over matter.897 To clarify the 
contradictions in the modern development, the pope points out the plight of the poor parts 
of the world. He laments, ―We all know well that the areas of misery and hunger on our 
globe could have been made fertile in a short time, if the gigantic investments for 
armaments at the service of war and destruction had been changed into investments for 
food at the service of life.‖898 Theological truths about human personhood should never 
be left aside in any realistic human development. Any attempt to do that leads to 
absurdity.
899
 John Paul II‘s ethical personalism is in agreement with Ubuntu worldview, 
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especially with regards to realistic and holistic human development. There cannot be 
development which does not do justice to its author, human person. Development which 
compromises human dignity in any particular human person, compromises the dignity of 
the entire human genre. 
(iii) John Paul II on Natural Law as Participation in God’s Plan 
(Veritatis Splendor) 
According to John Paul II, the Decalogue and its fulfillment in the great 
commandment of love for God and for fellow humans reveals human dignity, which God 
wants to be recognized and respected by all humans. There is neither measurement nor 
boundaries to the extent human dignity should be respected. Human life can only be 
compared to another human life, thus loving a fellow human as oneself. All 
commandments of the Decalogue serve the great commandment of love. The negative 
commandments such as: ―You shall not murder; You shall not commit adultery; You 
shall not steal; You shall not bear false witness - express with particular force the ever 
urgent need to protect human life.‖900 Thus the commandments reveal the ―the good of 
the person, at the level of the many different goods which characterize his identity as a 
spiritual and bodily being in relationship with God, with his neighbor and with the 
material world.‖901 Human dignity springs not only from humans being images of God 
and children of God, it springs from the fact that being imago Dei and children of God, 
humans have been intended and wanted by God for their own sake. John Paul II used the 
phrase ―the only creature that God has wanted for its own sake‖ to describe this ―singular 
dignity of the human person.‖ 902 God intends human beings for their own sake and 
orients them towards pursuit of perfection from, and in Gods elf. Pursuit of perfection by 
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a human person, though assisted by divine grace, proceeds from human free will. A 
human person is able to, and does make ―decisions about oneself and a setting of one‘s 
own life for or against the Good, for or against the Truth, and ultimately for or against 
God.‖903 
Due to human dignity revealed in the commandments that God gives to safeguard 
it, Sin is not only an offence against God, and it is equally an offence against the sinner 
and the entire human species. Consequently John Paul II writes that ―God is offended by 
us only because we act contrary to our own good.‖ This means that there are some 
actions which are intrinsically evil because, in themselves, they hurt human beings. The 
Pope argues that, just as there are inviolable human rights there are undeniably 
intrinsically evil acts.
904
 According to John Paul II ―Jesus brings the commandments to 
fulfillment … by interiorizing their demands and by bringing out their fullest meaning.‖ 
That is why the commandments are not to be kept for their own sake. They are, as Jesus 
himself explained, for the good of humanity. Even the negative ones are meant for the 
good of humanity. A commandment such as ―‗You shall not murder‘ becomes a call to an 
attentive love which protects and promotes the life of one‘s neighbor. The precept 
prohibiting adultery becomes an invitation to a pure way of looking at others, capable of 
respecting the spousal meaning of the body.‖905 
The ultimate revelation of human dignity is achieved in the Paschal mystery. 
Jesus‘ crucifixion, death and resurrection and the institution of the Eucharist reveal not 
only Christ as son of God and God‘s love for human beings but also the mystery of a 
human person. The Catholic Catechism teaches that the dignity of the human person is 
grounded in the affirmation that persons are created by God and bear the image and 
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likeness of God in a way that is unique to humanity out of all creation; the ―divine image 
is present.‖906 However, John Paul II writes, ―It is Christ, the last Adam, who fully 
discloses man to himself and unfolds his noble calling by revealing the mystery of the 
Father and the Father‘s love.‖907 In Christ‘s obedience to the Father, in Christ‘s teaching 
and ultimately in his crucifixion and resurrection for humanity, human beings learn 
God‘s will for them. Discipleship, therefore, is a journey into rediscovery of true human 
calling to God which is not isolative of others. Such a journey is made present in Jesus 
Christ. Jesus does not only fulfill the law, he fulfills humanity. The ideal and objective of 
moral life is found in the person of Christ. Humans need to conform to Christ by ―holding 
fast to the very person of Jesus.‖908 
In Jesus Christ, humanity and divinity merge into one person who is fully divine 
and fully human. An important aspect of incarnation is the coming together of God‘s law 
and human law as one law from different perspectives. John Paul II interpreted natural 
law as human rational participation in God‘s eternal law. The Pope states that ―the moral 
law has its origin in God and always finds its source in him.‖ However, the same law of 
God is ―by virtue of natural reason, which derives from human wisdom … a properly 
human law.‖909 Thus divine law that is revealed to human beings is discoverable by 
human reason because it is meant for human observance. In observing the divine law, 
humans realize God‘s plan for them. By virtue of their rationality and free will humans 
ought to observe divine law which comes to them as natural law. Since humans are not 
forced to observe the law they can be held responsible and accountable for their voluntary 
choices. ―Right to the exercise of freedom … is an inalienable requirement of the dignity 
of the human person.‖910 At the core of the divine law is the call mystery of the human 
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being, who is called to partnership with God. This partnership makes human life sacred, 
transcendent and dignified ―regardless of his or her beliefs, actions, or choices. By their 
very nature, ―persons are also characterized by reason or intelligence, freedom and 
autonomy, and a spiritual soul.‖911 Over and above all other earthly creatures, human 
beings participate in God‘s own plan in both existential and transcendental way. No 
human being should be taken for granted. In line with Catholic social ethics, Ubuntu 
treasures, and protects the sacredness of human beings regardless their accidental traits. 
b. Individual and Community 
One of the most important concepts of the common good relates to having an 
ethical right to self-determination. However, this right is defined and limited by societal 
pursuit of common good.
912
 John XXIII in his Mater et Magistra states clearly that, 
―Individual human beings are the foundation, the cause and the end of every social 
institution.‖913 Mater et Magistra emphasizes the recognition of human dignity as 
essential for the development of proper human prosperity.
914
 It is the recognition of 
dignity due to every human that will facilitate authentic solidarity. Proper understanding 
and implementation of the common good, that is, the sum total of those conditions of 
social living, which enable each member to fully and readily achieve his or her own 
realization, should be the ideal objective of the society.
915
 Thus distribution of the fruit of 
human labor in such way that the ―common good of all society will be kept inviolate‖ 
should be the modus operandi.
916
 
The Church observes that although social institutions are like matrices which 
encompass and contain their members, such institutions exist because of the persons who 
compose them. Their rightful place is that of a means to an end, which end is an 
individual human person. Common good in practice means that the society has to assure 
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human dignity by ascertaining the decent minimum of living and of care for all. Like 
Catholic Church tradition, Ubuntu advocates maintenance of the decent minimum of 
health for all without violating individual freedoms and right to the fruit of their labor. 
The society provides security and assurance of protection to its members. 
(i) Catechism of the Catholic Church on the Human Communal 
Character 
Catholic ideal of community is found in God himself. God is community per 
excellence and fulfillment of all human desire for community. The Catholic Catechism 
states that ―There is a resemblance between the union of the divine persons and the 
fraternity that men are to establish among themselves in truth and love. Love of neighbor 
is inseparable from love of God.‖917 From the Blessed Trinity, humans learn that they are 
created not only for themselves but also for one another and for the community. 
Community making and maintaining, therefore belongs to the kernel of Christianity. This 
theme is also found in Christ‘s teaching as, for example in the example of the vine and its 
branches in John 15:5 and in the priestly prayer of Jesus in John ―…that they may all be 
one‖ 17:22. Hence the core message of Christianity is reconciliation with oneself; with 
God; and with human community. Christian reconciliation, however, is about formation 
of authentic community. Human beings are called to true fulfillment in community. 
Community involves stronger bonds between persons than society. In most cases 
humans experience themselves as member of society rather than community due to 
weaker bonds between them. A society is described by the Catholic Catechism as, 
A group of persons bound together organically by a principle of unity that goes 
beyond each one of them. As an assembly that is at once visible and spiritual, a society 
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endures through time: it gathers up the past and prepares for the future. By means of 
society, each man is established as an ‗heir‘ and receives certain ‗talents‘ that enrich his 
identity and whose fruits he must develop. He rightly owes loyalty to the communities of 
which he is part and respect to those in authority who have charge of the common 
good.
918
 
Thus, realization of the potential that each human person has is not possible 
independent of the human society. By implication, therefore, there is a symbiotic 
reciprocal relationship between individuals and human race as a society. Just as the 
society needs its members to exist as one so does each member of the society need the 
society to realize his individuality. The catechism categorically states, ―The human 
person needs to live in society. Society is not for him an extraneous addition but a 
requirement of his nature. Through the exchange with others, mutual service and dialogue 
with his brethren, man develops his potential; he thus responds to his vocation.‖919 A 
community is a kind of society whose members are interconnected and interdependent in 
a deeper way than in the society. It is what Christ prayed for in John 17:22, that they may 
all be completely one. 
The importance of human society for individual realization ought not to 
compromise each individual‘s uniqueness and autonomy. Moreover, as the catechist 
elaborates, the human person ―is and ought to be the principle, the subject and the end of 
all social institutions.‖920 This statement implies respect for individuals and their rights, 
especially about their dignity, freedoms and initiative. The catechism discourages and 
warns against excessive intervention into individual‘s life by the society. This teaching is 
best explained in the principle of subsidiarity which states, ―a community of a higher 
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order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving 
the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to co- 
ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the 
common good.‖921 This principle applies from personal or individual level through 
national level to cosmic level. In reality, the Principle of Subsidiarity is ―opposed to all 
forms of collectivism. It sets limits for state intervention. It aims at harmonizing the 
relationships between individuals and societies. It tends toward the establishment of true 
international order.‖922 In sum, the principle of subsidiarity is essential for maintenance 
of peace and harmony, while supporting individual realization within human society. 
The Catholic Catechism encourages creation of ―voluntary associations and 
institutions‖ on all levels of the society ―which relate to the economic and social goals, to 
cultural and recreational activities, to sport, to various professions and to political 
affairs.‖ Creation of such associations explicate and ―express the natural tendency for 
human beings to associate with one another for the sake of attaining objectives that 
exceed individual capacities. It develops the qualities of the person, especially the sense 
of initiative and responsibility, and helps guarantee his rights.
923
 The teaching of the 
importance of human community in the Catholic Catechism is replicated in the Ubuntu 
worldview. The only substantial exception is Catholic‘s religious dimension on which 
human community is founded, that is, the Sacred Trinity and Christ‘s teaching. Even 
though Ubuntu ideal of community and society is religious, it is not explicitly Christian. 
It can be argued, however, that Ubuntu worldview is a kind of anonymous Christianity 
due to Ubuntu worldview‘s substantial resemblance to Christian Ideals in praxis. 
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(ii) Catechism of the Catholic Church on Human Equality in 
Difference 
Christianity teaches that all human beings are substantially equal. Human beings 
are equal because they are all ―created in the image of the one God and equally endowed 
with rational souls.‖ Moreover, they all ―have the same nature and the same origin. 
Redeemed by the sacrifice of Christ, all are called to participate in the same divine 
beatitude: all therefore enjoy an equal dignity.‖924 Thus, human beings are equal in their 
substance, origin and destiny. The Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches, ―Equality 
of men rests essentially on their dignity as persons and the rights that flow from it.‖ 
Unfortunately, notes the Catholic Catechism, ―There exist also sinful inequalities that 
affect millions of men and women. These are an open contradiction of the Gospel.‖ 
Millions of people have been marginalized by a few wealthy in so many countries of the 
world. Since they are essentially equal to the wealthy, it is unethical to deny the poor the 
same essential dignity. The catechism states that, ―Excessive economic and social 
disparity between individuals and peoples of the one human race is a source of scandal 
and militates against social justice, equity, human dignity, as well as social and 
international peace.‖925 
 Due to human essential equality, ―Every form of social or cultural discrimination 
in fundamental personal rights on the grounds of sex, race, color, social conditions, 
language, or religion must be curbed and eradicated as incompatible with God's 
design.‖926 
There are non-essential differences between human beings based on ―age, 
physical abilitits, intellectual or moral aptitudes, the benefits derived from social 
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commerce, and the distribution of wealth.‖ Each individual human has some unique gifts 
that are not distributed equally with other human beings.
927
 The difference in the 
distribution of talents ―belongs to God‘s plan, who wills that each receive what he needs 
from others, and that those endowed with particular ‗talents‘ share the benefits with those 
who need them. These differences encourage and often oblige persons to practice 
generosity, kindness, and sharing of goods; they foster the mutual enrichment of 
cultures.‖ The talents are meant both for the individual endowed with them, and for the 
entire human race. Inequality and diversity of endowment reflect God‘s desire for people 
to be a community, each in need of what others ought to offer. Service, which is one of 
the most basic requirements to inherit eternal life, means readiness and desire to avail 
one‘s talents for others.928 
All Christians, in fact, all human beings have a duty of availing themselves to 
others which duty is reciprocated by all that each human receives from others. The duty 
to avail oneself to others is a moral obligation especially towards handicapped. The 
catechism states, ―The duty of making oneself a neighbor to others and actively serving 
them becomes even more urgent when it involves the disadvantaged, in whatever area 
this may be.‖ Citing the words of Christ himself, the catechism validated its statement. 
Jesus stated in Mathew 25:40, ―As you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you 
did it to me.‖929 The gravity of human obligation to other humans goes great lengths. It 
involves loving those who do not love us, forgiving enemies and praying for them. Citing 
the Word of God, the catechism asserts, ―Liberation in the spirit of the Gospel is 
incompatible with hatred of one's enemy as a person, but not with hatred of the evil that 
he does as an enemy.‖930 
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In sum, the Catechism of the Catholic Church acknowledges both human essential 
equality in their accidental differences. This acknowledgement implies mutual 
responsibility and service to all humans. Special obligational preference is to those who 
are less gifted in the society. This teaching within the Catholic Catechism and rooted in 
the Gospel is shared by the philosophy of Ubuntu. Human dignity cannot be 
compromised. The Catechism states, ―Social justice can be obtained only in respecting 
the transcendent dignity of man. The person represents the ultimate end of society, which 
is ordered to him.‖931 Service to the neighbor should not be mistaken for injustice or 
exploitation. Each person should be able to contribute in accordance with the Principle of 
Subsidiarity. The Society, on its part, should ensure social justice by allowing 
―associations or individuals to obtain what is their due, according to their nature and their 
vocation. Social justice is linked to the common good and the exercise of authority.‖932 
(iii) United States Catholic Bishops on Economic Justice for all 
The central thesis of the United States Catholic Bishops on economic justice for 
all is the worth and sacredness of human beings. The bishops explicitly teach that ―The 
dignity of the human person, realized in community with others, is the criterion against 
which all aspects of economic life must be measured.‖ Thus, ―All human beings, 
therefore, are ends to be served by the institutions that make up the economy, not means 
to be exploited for more narrowly defined goals.‖933 However, the bishops note that by 
Government‘s own official definition of poverty, one in every seven people in the United 
States of America is poor, which means at least 33 million Americans live below what is 
recognized as official line of poverty. Given this situation, the bishops choose the path of 
preferential option for the poor as an alternative to safeguard the sacredness and dignity 
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of human life. They state, ―The norms of human dignity and the preferential option for 
the poor compel us to confront this issue with a sense of urgency. Dealing with poverty is 
not a luxury to which our nation can attend when it finds the time and resources. Rather, 
it is a moral imperative of the highest priority.‖934 
According to the United States bishops, and in line with Vatican II Documents, 
―fulfillment of the basic needs of the poor is of the highest priority.‖ It is a yard stick 
which measures the morality of an economy. It is of crucial importance for any 
organization or person to have a right scale of priority concerning the poor. The bishops 
state, ―meeting fundamental human needs must come before the fulfillment of desires for 
luxury consumer goods, for profits not conducive to the common good, and for 
unnecessary military hardware.‖935 Likewise, the United States bishops prioritize 
inclusion, because they hold and teach that ―Increasing active participation in economic 
life by those who are presently excluded or vulnerable is a high social priority.‖ Being 
subjects, human beings are not satisfied by being merely given some basic needs to 
sustain their lives. They do have social needs as well. Humans also need to participate in 
the process of productivity, not just for material gain, but even more importantly, for self-
fulfillment. This is why justice demands much more than mere providing of food, some 
clothing and housing. Justice ―points to the need to the present situation of those unjustly 
discriminated against in the past. Distribution of power is an important dimension of 
economic distribution since it influences the very process of distribution of wealth and 
labor. Power and access to it should be shared by all following the principle of 
subsidiarity.
936
 Investment in production of basic needs such as food and education 
should precede investment in luxurious articles of ostentation. 937 
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American bishops remind the United States of the unity of both the human species 
and the entire planet with its biosphere and ecosystems. They argue that American 
Catholics belong to the universal (or Catholic) Church. By the very virtue of being 
Catholic or universal, they cannot dissociate themselves from the problems of other 
people, wherever they may be on the planet earth. They should concern themselves with 
―the well-being of everyone in the world.‖ Consequently, global problems such as third 
world countries‘ debt, starvation in some Asian, South American, Sub-Saharan and 
Indian countries become Americans‘ concern. Global environmental crisis affects all 
members of the human genre. There is real global economic interdependence that cannot 
be ignored. The bishops write, ―now is the moment when all of us must confront the 
reality of such economic bonding and its consequences, and see it as a moment of 
grace—a kairos—that can unite all of us in a common community of the human family. 
We commit ourselves to this global vision.‖ American bishops urge for global 
collaboration since common good can no longer be limited to national or regional 
boundaries.
938
 ―The unfinished business of the American experiment includes the 
formation of new international partnerships, especially with the developing countries, 
based on mutual respect, cooperation, and a dedication to fundamental justice.‖939 There 
is need to collaborate with, and strengthen ―effectiveness of international agencies in 
addressing global problems.‖ Unity is increasingly becoming a necessity for global 
justice and common good that cannot be left aside.
940
 Clearly, the objective ideal of 
Ubuntu worldview is global unity of the human species within its necessary context, the 
cosmos for the good both of the human genre and other species within the biosphere. The 
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interdependence between human beings cannot ignore its need for other forms of life and 
the environment. 
2. Social Cohesion 
An equally essential component of Catholic ethical tradition is social cohesion. 
The meaning of common good requires respect for social cohesion whereby individuals 
collaborate within a global social context. Social cohesion is based on two necessary 
concepts. The first concept concerns solidarity as necessary for existence of human 
community. The second concept concerns the realization that human action should be 
characterized by mutuality of concern for oneself and for others. 
a. Solidarity 
Crucial to the concept of social cohesion is solidarity. Solidarity is necessary for 
existence of human society, which, in itself, is a system of social organizations.
941
 Human 
society is hierarchical, beginning with the natural human family and ultimately 
encompassing the whole human race.
942
 John Finnis defines common good as ―a set of 
conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for themselves 
reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the value(s) for the sake of 
which they have reason to collaborate with each other in community.‖943 The Church‘s 
teaching on solidarity is based on the anthropological understanding that humans are 
naturally social. Common good tradition aims at promoting conditions and institutions 
which are necessary for human cooperation and achievement of common objectives 
derived from a shared vision of humanity.
944
 John Paul II gives a very comprehensive 
understanding of solidarity from Catholic perspective. In his Sollicitudo Res Socialis, 
John Paul II stresses the need to view human potential and growth in moral terms. He 
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underlines the need for interdependence and a communal sense of sharing.
945
 Human 
solidarity resists objectification of another person as a mere means to self. It is a 
challenge to view the other person as ―a sharer, on a par with ourselves in the banquet of 
life to which all are equally invited by God.‖946 A true sense of solidarity involves a 
willingness to sacrifice self-interest for the sake of the other.
947
 Mater et Magistra clearly 
states that economic prosperity should be based not so much on the sum total of goods 
and wealth possessed as from the distribution of goods according to norms of justice.
948
 
Solidarity is based on mutual recognition of each society member as an end 
irreducible to a means for any other person. True human solidarity eliminates 
marginalization and exploitation of any human being by another. From Ubuntu 
perspective solidarity is a rule of life. A person who separates from the community is 
considered dead. It is solidarity which gives life and security to individuals. 
Consequently, Ubuntu understanding of human solidarity finds endorsement in the 
Catholic traditional teaching. 
(i) Christianity’s Essential Message of Liberation from subhuman 
conditions 
Although liberation is a central theme in Christianity, Christ having died to 
liberate human beings from all sorts of oppression by evil, sin, and subhuman conditions, 
liberation theology as a movement, whose exponents are Leonardo Boff and Juan Luis 
Segundo, has not always been in line with orthodox Catholic theology.
949
 This departure 
from traditional understanding of theology which is based on faith that seeks 
understanding, is evident in the way Gustavo Gutierrez defines theology. In his view, 
theology is ―critical reflection on historical praxis.‖ Hence theology should engage and 
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address human sociopolitical history and contexts. Theology is a ―dynamic, ongoing 
exercise involving contemporary insights into knowledge (epistemology), man 
(anthropology), and history (social analysis).‖950 Liberation theology is based on class 
struggle since it assumes existence of class structure in a society whereby one class is 
exploited and marginalized by the other. Consequently, liberation theology adapted 
Marxist analysis of society, using the language of the bourgeois and proletariat. However, 
the main objective of liberation theology is transformation of society. Like Marxism, 
liberation theology tends to ―condemn religion for supporting the status quo and 
legitimating the power of the oppressor. But unlike Marxism, liberation theology turns to 
the Christian faith as a means for bringing about liberation.‖ Liberationists claim that 
they only use Marxism for socioeconomic analysis of the society but they remain loyal to 
the traditional Christian teaching since ―human liberation may begin with the economic 
infrastructure, but it does not end there.‖951 The main assumption on which Liberation 
Theology is based is Marxist, that is, existence of socio-economic and political strata or 
classes on the society. Like Marxism, liberation theology, though not violently, call for 
both bourgeois and proletariat to eliminate socio-economic and political strata. 
Liberation theology tends to avoid some fundamental facts of spirituality as it 
emphasizes on Christ‘s sacramental presence in the poor and oppressed. The plight of the 
poor and marginalized becomes in a very realistic sense crucifixion of Christ. While 
liberation theologians teach love of all humans, they claim that their struggle is against 
inhuman treatment of humans by fellow humans. Such treatment is not only unchristian; 
it is contradictory to the essence of humanity. ―From biblical perspective liberationists 
argue that the poor represents the totality of the ‗Other,‘ or God. Treatment to the poor is 
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treatment to God since God identifies with the poor and is represented by the poor.‖ 
Liberation theology equates biblical salvation with liberation of human beings from 
oppressive social structures and injustice by other humans. ―Liberation theology for all 
practical purposes equates loving your neighbor with loving God. The two are not only 
inseparable but virtually indistinguishable.‖ God is practically in the neighbor and the 
treatment given to neighbor is given to God. Thus ―The history of salvation becomes the 
salvation of history embracing the entire process of humanization.‖ According to 
Liberation theology, therefore, Biblical liberation of Israelites from Egyptian slavery and 
Jesus‘ teaching, death and resurrection ―stand out as the prototypes for the contemporary 
human struggle for liberation. These biblical events signify the spiritual significance of 
secular struggle for liberation.‖952 Jesus‘ teaching and example make present what 
happens to God when injustice and oppression happens to a human person. 
Liberation theology tends to resist both abstraction and objectification of God 
from creation.
953
 ―Essentialism is replaced with the notion of Jesus‘ relational 
significance.‖ Jesus does not only show us the way to God or the way to become child of 
God, he reveals to us the way to become human. ―The meaning of Jesus‘ incarnation is 
found in his total immersion in a historical situation of conflict and oppression.‖ In his 
immersion into humanity and assumption of human situation, Jesus ―absolutizes the 
values of the kingdom, unconditional love, universal forgiveness, and continual reference 
to the mystery of the Father.
954
 The basic idea of liberation of human beings from 
oppression is good and central to the Christian message and mission. Thus liberation 
theologians and believers have experienced support of some Latin American bishops. 
This support is evident in the 1968 conference in Medellin, Columbia. However, 
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liberation theology has major problems in its methodology. Adoption of Marxist 
communist style of society analysis rather than sin and its alienating character is one of 
the major problems of liberation theology. The second major problem is its implied 
relativism with regards to Christ‘s ontological existence and its significance in itself, 
independent of its analogical and incarnational association with the poor and the 
marginalized. Within Liberation Theology God is almost not independent of creation. 
Liberation theology implies that conception of God is conditioned by history and context. 
Implicitly, ―To argue that our conception of God is determined by the historical situation 
is to agree with radical secularity in absolutizing the temporal process, making it difficult 
to distinguish between theology and ideology.‖955 
Being human, both the rich and the poor deal with sin as estrangement or 
alienation from oneself, from the society and from God. Liberationists, however, 
overemphasize the poor making them ―not only the object of God's concern but the 
salvific and revelatory subject. Only the cry of the oppressed is the voice of God. 
Everything else is projected as a vain attempt to comprehend God by some self-serving 
means.‖ All human beings are children and images of God. God‘s salvation is for all 
God‘s children and God is accessible to all humans who intend to reach and relate with 
Him. God does not overtake the person and autonomy of the poor, so that the poor ceases 
to exist. The poor don‘t become God in the sense that substantially, they remain not any 
more or any less human as the rich. ―Biblical theology reveals that God is for the poor, 
but it does not teach that the poor are the actual embodiment of God in today's world.‖ 
There is an actual danger within brands of liberation theology to humanize God in the 
poor, which tends to relativize God‘s ontological reality. That is heretical.956 Apart from 
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its wrong dogmatic assumptions, liberation theology is pastorally relevant, especially in 
its fight against exploitation and marginalization of the poor and for inclusion of all 
human beings as equal members in the mystical body of Christ, the Church. 
In sum, liberation theology by overemphasizing the significance of Jesus‘ 
incarnation, its sociological, anthropological and economic significance, especially his 
analogical identification with the poor, tends to compromise not only Jesus‘ objective 
reality as God and man, with an ontological real existence. As the second person of the 
Holy Trinity, Jesus transcends human history. As God incarnate he is fully God and fully 
human. No other human being can actually ontologically be the person of Jesus. He 
remains the ideal of humanity which, though incarnate and immanent, transcends 
humanity, and which remains a mystery to humans due to his divine-human nature. Some 
liberation theologians have a problem with the doctrine of the revealed Jesus‘ deity. 
Liberation theology claims that Jesus ―is different from us by degree, not by kind, and 
that his cross is the climax of his vicarious identification with suffering mankind rather 
than a substitutionary death offered on our behalf to turn away the wrath of God and 
triumph over sin, death, and the devil.‖957 
Jesus‘ historical life and the paschal mystery cannot be separated from his nature 
as God-man. Jesus‘ death and resurrection is both for the rich and for the poor. It is for 
all. Paschal mystery is incomprehensible without its linkage with God‘s love for all 
humans and the reality of a sinful humanity in need of redemption. ―A theology of the 
cross which isolates Jesus‘ death from its particular place in God‘s design and shuns the 
disclosure of its revealed meaning is powerless to bring us to God, hence assuring the 
perpetuity of our theological abandonment.‖958 Liberation theology shares with Ubuntu 
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the perspective of human sacred equality before God. Nobody should be marginalized; by 
nature a human person is irreducible to a mere means for another human person. 
Marginalization of a human person depletes the very essence of humanity of meaning. 
Self-realization of humans, whether moral, cognitive or sociological, is never 
independent of other human beings. This essential contingency of humans to fellow 
humans is the core of Ubuntu worldview. Contrary to the Liberation Theology, Ubuntu 
neither assumes nor view human community in terms of classes of the rich and the poor. 
As an ethic, Ubuntu points to the responsibility of the rich towards the poor as a matter of 
commonsense, justice and morality. 
(ii) John XXIII’s Pacem in Terris – Authentic Peace Must Be Based on 
Observance of Human Rights and Justice 
The central point and argument of the encyclical Pacem in Terris of John XXIII is 
that peace remains an empty word if is not based on truth, justice in accordance with the 
requirements of human rights, charity, and human freedom. 
959
 In other words, there is no 
peace if there is no justice charity and freedom. Central to the meaning and content of 
justice is human rights. John XXIII provides a hierarchy of human rights. Basic human 
rights are ―right to life, bodily integrity, food, clothing, shelter, rest, medical care, 
necessary social services … the right to respect for one‘s person, good reputation, 
freedom to search for truth, freedom of speech, freedom of information, the right to share 
in the benefits of culture and education.‖960 Other important human rights include: 
freedom of worship; freedom to choose one‘s state of life and to form a family; freedom 
of initiative in the economic field; right to work; right to safe and humane working 
conditions; fair wage; private property; freedom of assembly; freedom of association; 
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freedom of movement and residence; right to legal protection of human rights; and right 
to participate in human affair; freedom of worship, and the right to act freely and 
responsibly.
961
 These rights ought to be respected and effectively fulfilled by all human 
beings if peace is to be achieved.
962
 
John XXIII praised the United Nations for its Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. In his view, the declaration represents an important step on the path to juridico-
political organization of the world community.
963
 John XXIII explores the meaning and 
implication of rights. Rights are reciprocal and societal in nature, in the sense that, they 
obligate others to acknowledge and respect them. If well observed, therefore, there will 
not only be peace but also a stronger human society. There is, for example, an obvious 
social dimension to the right to respect private property which becomes a duty to those 
who observe it. In sum, rights imply duties and obligations, thus tying humans together 
for the sake of order and peace. Tied to the concept of duty and obligation that rights 
imply is individuals‘ mandate to contribute to the common welfare, which should not be 
left aside. Actively participating in government for both self-interest and common good is 
part of the obligations that human rights imply.
964
 
Just as human individuals have rights, human communities also have rights that 
should be observed and respected by individuals and other communities, John XXIII 
points out that each country has a right to existence, a right to self-development and the 
means to attain it, a right to a good name and due respect. Equal dignity of all people 
implies elimination of personal and racial prejudice and discrimination. Human equality 
means, by implication, racial equality. There should not be any trace of racism in 
international relations.
965
 Inevitably attached to national human rights are the 
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corresponding duties to respect the same rights in other countries. Moreover countries, 
have duties to accept immigrants and integrate them as new members of their society.
966
 
Just as human persons are equal in dignity, nation states are equal in dignity with 
corresponding and reciprocal rights and duties.
967
 Nations‘ relationships ought to be 
harmonized in truth, justice and freedom.
968
 John XXIII warns that for the sake of global 
peace, economically or technologically developed countries should not take advantage of 
their superior position over other nations.
969
 Moreover, like personal development, 
national development should not be based on exploitative or oppressive relationship with 
other nations.
970
 
John XXIII points to the role of public authority of the world community whose 
fundamental objective is to recognize, respect, safeguard and promotion of human rights 
of all persons and nations.
971
 One of the most important element missing in the global 
community of nations is exactly what John XXIII alludes to, that is, ―public authority of 
the world community.‖ United Nations can only declare the rights and possibly condemn 
nations, national leaders and persons who do not comply. It lacks legislative and 
executive authority to oversee implementation of human rights. This situation renders it 
toothless in the face of national or personal refusal to comply. The objectives of John 
XXIII‘s Pacem in Terris are substantially similar to the objectives of Ubuntu. Human 
inevitable interrelationships that should be guided by human rights based on human 
dignity, observed, and implemented by all persons and the government is the ideal of 
Ubuntu. Although Ubuntu does not explicitly mention the adverse effects of refusal to 
respect human rights and observe justice, its strong emphasis on respecting human 
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dignity and basing personhood on individual‘s dealings with other individuals means that 
human rights are the very kernel of Ubuntu. 
(iii) John Paul II on Centrality of Ethics in Development (Sollicitudo 
Rei Socialis) 
In Sollicitudo rei Socialis John Paul II applies the teachings of Vatican II Council 
to specific social problems. Specifically, the document deals with the problems of 
development and underdevelopment at all levels of society but mainly at the level of 
international socio-economic relations.
972
 According to Vatican II council and John Paul 
II‘s Sollicitudo rei Socialis being social is natural to human beings. However, growth in 
sociality and sociability is a vocation of all humans which aims at making each human an 
active player and responsible builder of earthly society.
973
 Sollicitudo rei Socialis 
reiterated, explicated and reinforced Vatican II‘s social question which underlines the 
duty of solidarity between the rich and the poor for the good of both groups.
974
 According 
to John Paul II, there cannot be authentic human societal development if there is no 
peace. There cannot be true peace if there is no justice. The more peaceful any particular 
society is, the more developed it is. In his view, as he explicitly stated, ―development is 
the new name of peace.‖ Hence, arms race is a clear sign of lack of peace, thus lack of 
authentic human development. 
975
 
According to John Paul II one of the greatest global injustices is that of ―poor 
distribution of the goods and services originally intended for all.‖ This is a structural 
societal ethical problem that the pope warns against, especially because it wrongly 
compromises human essential dignity basing human worth on possessions. Ontologically, 
―being‖ is basic and primary while ―having‖ is secondary to ―being.‖ ―Having‖ does not 
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contribute to human perfection unless it contributes to maturing and enriching of 
―being.‖976 Moreover, ―having‖ can detract from ―being.‖ This reversal is unethical. 
Human beings are fundamentally much worth than whatever they possess.
977
 Some of the 
problems which explicate this ethical problem are reflected in the housing crisis partly 
due to urbanization
978
 and growing numbers of unemployment which begs the question 
on the type of development being pursued.
979
 Denying human interdependence is 
unrealistic. Human interdependence cannot be separated from ethical requirements for 
the rich and the poor of any human community and between rich and poor countries.
980
 
John Paul II points out some of the structural problems that account for unethical 
human economic inequality and its escalation. One of the problems mentioned is that of 
omissions on the part of developing countries. This problem is doubled by lack of ethical 
response by affluent world and manipulation of economic, political and social 
mechanisms to benefit the already wealthy at the expense of the poor.
981
 John Paul II 
regrets that the human right of economic initiative in service of individual and common 
good is too often suppressed, which in turn, frustrates people‘s creativity. Such kind of 
totalitarianism reduces people into a mere means for other people, that is, making them 
―objects.‖ Reduction of human persons into objects by, and for other persons is one of the 
greatest immoralities against human nature. There are other forms of immoralities against 
the very nature of humanity such as denial of human right to worship and racial 
discrimination. Such immoralities contradict human social and ethical nature.
982
 
John Paul II warns against international global structural injustice which should 
be addressed. One of such injustice is the intentional ignorance of the developed world to 
the abject poverty in the developing world. John Paul II observes that production and 
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distribution of global goods is not fair. The developing world is falling behind the 
developed world and unity of the human species is compromised by divisions into first, 
second and third world countries.
983
 There is a vicious cycle of poverty on the 
international level in which debtor nations are increasingly forced to export capital. This 
situation aggravates underdevelopment.
984
 Another equally threatening situation is the 
division of the world into liberal capitalism of the west against Marxist collectivism of 
the East.
985
 Exaggeration of concern for national or regional security may be a stumbling 
block to human cooperation, thus undermining human rights.
986
 
International trade system, notes John Paul II, discriminates against the poor 
countries and international division of labor exploits workers in the interest of profit 
maximization. Technology transfer is also unfair to the poor countries. International 
organizations need reform, so that they are free from manipulation by political 
rivalries.
987
 Solidarity among developing countries will call for greater cooperation and 
establishment of effective regional organizations. Regional organizations may help the 
developing countries defend against exploitation by the developed countries. 
988
 
Omission is a great ethical problem among the developing world. Developing countries 
must take up their own responsibilities. They should promote self-affirmation of their 
own citizens through programs of literacy and basic education.
989
 In sum, the Pope warns 
against human succumbing to struggle for survival and survival of the fittest state of 
affairs like animals. Human beings are essentially ethical beings. Their moral nature 
should be reflected in their treatment of one another as individuals, societies or nations. 
In spite of the structural injustices in the contemporary world, the pope notes with 
optimism some signs of hope. Some of the encouraging signs of development include 
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global ecological consciousness and concern; some third world countries have achieved 
some self-sufficiency in basic human needs such as food; there is global growing 
awareness of human rights.
990
 There is an intimate connection between liberation and 
development, overcoming obstacles to a ―more human life.‖991 In sum John Paul II in his 
Sollicitudo rei Socialis systematically articulates the fundamental requirements of ethical 
societal living based on the assumption and premise of human essentially social nature. In 
his analysis he points out major global deficiencies which contradict human nature while 
pointing the way forward in line with Vatican II‘s recommendations. John Paul II‘s 
concern is in agreement with, and verbalizes Ubuntu perspective of moral human societal 
living. All in all both John Paul II and Ubuntu agree on the need to cherish human 
solidarity which is unachievable without justice and peace. Justice and peace should give 
special preference to the incapacitated members of the human race and the poor, based on 
their undeniable essential dignity as humans. 
b. Mutuality 
Another equally essential concept of social cohesion is that individual and 
common societal realization requires human mutuality.
992
 Human fulfillment can only 
happen in society since only in society is a ―firm and persevering determination to 
commit oneself to the common good‖ possible.993 Thus, human actions should be 
characterized by a mutuality of concern for oneself and others.
994
 A genuine sense of 
development interprets the individual within a mutual framework of cooperation in which 
―self-fulfillment is not juxtaposed with the fulfillment of others.‖ The inevitable 
interdependence of humans necessitates commitment to collaboration.
995
 Mutuality does 
not overlook individual needs, rather it places individual needs within an essential 
relational context that views ―fulfillment of self in and through the flourishing of other.‖ 
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Authentic personal fulfillment happens in collaboration and cooperation with others. 
Personal fulfillment contributes to the good of the society as a whole.
996
 Leo XIII, in his 
encyclical Rerum Novarum, explicates what genuine mutuality means. It means 
acknowledgement of equality and equity, assurance of just returns from human labor, 
decent minimum for all and assurance of government security and protection for the less 
privileged. He argues that it is in the interest of the wealthy, the poor and the government 
to ascertain such mutuality.
997
 Chapter two of this work shows why mutuality is within 
the kernel of Ubuntu. Church‘s tradition on mutuality is inspired by the great 
commandment, loving one‘s neighbor as oneself. Mutuality is recognizing equality and 
overcoming our natural inclination to egocentricism. In both Catholic tradition and 
Ubuntu culture human action has dual characteristics. It is at once for self and for the 
society. Catholic tradition is inspired by Christ‘s giving of himself for human 
community; Ubuntu is inspired by the fact that all that a human person claims to be his he 
has received. Giving back is a matter of justice. Human life is about constant giving and 
receiving. 
(i) Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace on mutuality as human 
nature and responsibility 
The Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace underlines communication as an 
important aspect of global solidarity. The council condemns exclusion of some parts of 
human populations from some important communication noting that ―communication 
structures and policies, and the distribution of technology are factors that help to make 
some people ‗information rich‘ and others ‗information poor‘ at a time when prosperity, 
and even survival depends on information.‖ There should not be intentional 
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discrimination in the supply and consumption of useful information. All peoples do not 
only need to be informed but also need to be trained in using modern communication 
technologies.
998
 Information, participation and inclusion of all people should be the 
objective of communication. Human beings being by nature societal, mutuality, which is 
enhanced by effective communication, is an ethical duty of the media. Media‘s audiences 
should also play their part in the use of the information communicated both for personal 
and for common good. 
The pontifical council for justice and peace urges political leaders and economists 
to rethink the urgency of addressing the fact that the ―present economic, social and 
cultural structures are ill-equipped to meet the demands of genuine development.‖ 
Political participation and social justice are necessary for lasting peace. Solidarity ―must 
be made an integral part of the networks of economic, political and social 
interdependence that the current process of globalization tends to consolidate.‖999 There 
is no alternative to creating harmonious, peaceful and functional society without elements 
that facilitate solidarity. On the level of individuals, each persons need to participate by 
pursuit of both individual good and common good. Christians who have been elected and 
trusted with public offices should appreciate and promote democracy, that is, assuring 
―participation of citizens in making political choices.‖ Ascertaining assumption of, and 
removal from, office in accordance to the will of the people who are free in conscience 
and responsible for their government is an important sign of political maturity and 
solidarity. 
1000
 
According to the Pontifical Council for justice and peace morality is an ―absolute 
necessity‖ for political or public service. Ignoring the moral dimension of public service 
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―leads to dehumanization of life in society and of social and political institutions.‖ Every 
person needs to live and act in accordance with his conscience. If one fails to follow the 
dictates of his conscience or contradicts his conscience, he can achieve neither happiness 
nor authentic fulfillment.
1001
 However, morality is not only a matter of personal 
conscience, it is also social. Actually, every society has some sort of moral principles. 
Complete absence of moral principles annihilates society. The most important question is 
whether the principles in place or imagined by a people or their leaders is objectively 
ethical. The Catechism teaches that humanity is inherently social and that the individual 
person by nature requires a community of other persons to fulfill his or her 
personhood.
1002
 
The best way to understand the message of the Pontifical Council for Justice and 
peace is provided by the Catechism of the Catholic Church. The catechism teaches that 
natural nuclear human family is the foundation and extension of the larger family of the 
entire race.
1003
 Thus, all human beings, the members of the larger human family should 
be perceived as ―neighbors‖ who have ―inherent rights and mutual responsibilities for the 
wellbeing of the society.‖1004 Any human being is at once personal and social. Persons 
are simultaneously individual and social, that is unique beings created within a social 
context.
1005
 Like Ubuntu, the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace acknowledges the 
relationality of all humans, interdependence of all humans, mutual need of all humans for 
the cosmos, necessity of morality for social life, and the need to respect individual 
conscience in the context of societal responsibility. 
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(ii) Benedict XVI’s Caritas Veritate - on Mutuality 
The general theme of Benedict XVI‘s Caritas Veritate is the undeniable fact of 
the centrality of truth in Christian faith. Even though the main message of Christianity is 
charity, charity has to be founded on truth. God is love and God is truth. God‘s Love is 
the truth without which nothing makes sense. Benedict XVI analogically equates ―A 
Christianity of charity without truth would be more or less interchangeable with a pool of 
good sentiments, helpful for social cohesion, but of little relevance.‖1006 A genuine sense 
of truth is necessary for authentic development. Without truth ―the social action ends up 
serving private interests and the logic of power, resulting in social fragmentation.‖1007 
Even though the church ―does not have technical solutions to offer,‖ she does have ―a 
mission of truth to accomplish‖ for, and about human society which ―is attuned to man, 
to his dignity, to his vocation.‖1008 
Benedict XVI then turns his attention to the modern world‘s tendency to 
misinterpret true human development, especially by equating it with mere material 
wellbeing, usually at the expense of other human beings‘ subsistence. As such, writes 
Benedict XVI development ―has many overlapping layers.‖ Genuine development has to 
be holistic and integrative of the entire human family. This is not often the factual 
situation. In fact, in the words of Benedict XVI, ―the world‘s wealth is growing in 
absolute terms, but inequalities are on the increase.‖ There are new forms of poverty and 
marginalization of majority of human beings by what is interpreted as development of a 
minority of the human race. The Pope laments that there is an increase in corruption both 
in rich and poor countries. There is still the almost chronic problem of disrespect for the 
rights of workers. Benedict notes that even international aid ―has often been diverted 
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from its proper ends, through irresponsible actions.‖ There is an increasing problem of 
monopoly of knowledge, an ―is excessive zeal for protecting knowledge on the part of 
rich countries, through an unduly rigid assertion of the right to intellectual property, 
especially in the field of health care.‖1009 There is a growing problem of ―unregulated 
exploitation of the earth‘s resources‖ without enough consideration of its effect on both 
current and future generations. This crisis calls for what Benedict XVI calls ―humanistic 
synthesis.‖ The crisis glaring at our present generation, using the words of Benedict XVI, 
―obliges us to re-plan our journey.‖1010 
Addressing the scandal of hunger in the world, Benedict XVI calls for a ―network 
of economic institutions‖ to work together for resolution of this problem which is a 
scandal. He believes that the solution lies in ―employment of relevant and effective 
techniques of agriculture and land reform in the third world countries.‖1011 Human 
dignity should always be protected from the shame of hunger and starvation. Benedict 
reminds the world that economics is not free from principles of ethics and morality. If 
development ―is to be authentically human,‖ it has ―to make room for the principle of 
gratuitousness,‖ especially with regards to market principles of supply, demand and profit 
maximization.
1012
 Divorcing morality and principles of ethics from economics leads to 
suppression of human life. However, ―When a society moves towards the denial or 
suppression of life, it ends up no longer finding the necessary motivation and energy to 
strive for man's true good.‖1013 Realistic human development ―depends above all on a 
recognition that the human race is a single family.‖1014 The market, civil society, and the 
state should work together to ascertain human solidarity and dignity.
1015
 Government 
should respect labor unions, especially because they safeguard human dignity. Benedict 
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XVI contends, ―The primary capital to be safeguarded and valued is man, the human 
person in his or her integrity.‖1016 Dealing with human persons directly demands utmost 
care. Benedict urges nations to work together in addressing the problem of migration 
because of the human dignity of the immigrants. Immigrants, like other citizens possess 
―fundamental, inalienable rights that must be respected by everyone and in every 
circumstance.‖1017 
Benedict XVI mentions the importance of bioethics in safeguarding human 
dignity. In his view, bioethics is of crucial importance as it functions as a battleground 
between the ―supremacy of technology and human moral responsibility.‖ However, 
bioethics has to be inspired and motivated by faith since ―Reason without faith is doomed 
to flounder in an illusion of its own omnipotence.‖ The Pope then exhorts the human race 
to have ―new heart‖ in order to rise ―above a materialistic vision of human events.‖1018 
Once again, Benedict XVI‘s views explored in Caritas in Veritate reflect the shared 
perspective between Ubuntu and Catholic Social Teaching concerning human dignity; 
necessity of safeguarding the truth about human dignity; ethical precedence of ethics and 
morals over materialism and a worldview of connectedness of the human species as one 
family whose familial bonds have to be preserved and protected as a matter of truth and 
ethics. 
(iii) United States Bishops on Cooperation and Partnership for the 
Public Good 
The Catholic bishops of the United States of America, in their pastoral letter on 
economic justice remind their nation that economic prosperity is a product of human 
beings. It results from ―the labor of human hands and minds.‖ Economy being a product 
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of human beings, it cannot be divorced from ethical principles that characterize and guide 
human activity. The economy ―is not a machine that operates according to its own 
inexorable laws, and persons are not mere objects tossed about by economic forces.‖ 
There is special relationship between human persons and the work they do. While the 
product of the work they do may help to sustain and improve human life, human beings 
achieve self-realization through their work. ―All work has a threefold moral significance. 
First, it is a principal way that people exercise the distinctive human capacity for self-
expression and self-realization. Second, it is the ordinary way for human beings to fulfill 
their material needs. Finally, work enables people to contribute to the well-being of the 
larger community.‖ Human labor is social in the sense that it is not merely for oneself. It 
has a social dimension that benefits others.
1019
 Human beings ought to work since they 
need to participate and contribute into the common good and social justice. Human labor 
though, should be justly rewarded.
1020
 
The United States‘ bishops interpreted and applied the teaching of the Second 
Vatican Council for the people of their country about value and role of work to 
individuals and society. In Gaudium et Spes, for example, work is explained as a matter, 
not only of free choice but as a matter of justice. The document states, ―The best way to 
fulfill one‘s obligations of justice and love is to contribute to the common good according 
to one‘s means and the needs of others.‖1021 Work, therefore is an obligation to all that 
can work. Those who have the ability to work should support those who cannot work 
because of some physical or mental impediment. The United States bishops applied the 
ethical Principle of Subsidiarity to explain both the necessity of work for all human 
beings and the ideal of fairness to the concept and substance of humanity that all humans 
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share. Recognition, acknowledgment and participation is of utmost importance. It 
communicates meaning of human life and care. However, people must participate in 
contributing to the common good according to their ability. 
In their pastoral letter, the United States bishops re-presented the principle of 
subsidiarity with the intention of explaining justice in participation to the common good. 
The principle of subsidiarity as formulated by the bishops states, ―Just as it is gravely 
wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and 
industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a 
grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association 
what lesser and subordinate organizations can do.‖1022 The implication of the principle is 
that social activity ought to help (subsidium) both its subject and all members of society 
rather than absorb or marginalize any of them. If the principle of subsidiarity is applied 
well there will be harmony in the society for a number of reasons. The principle 
ascertains freedom and recognition of societal members by minimizing class struggle; it 
favors institutional and societal pluralism, encourages initiative and creativity and 
increases solidarity. 
The principle of subsidiarity recognizes everybody and every institution as a 
significant part of the functioning of the society. In and of itself, recognizing the worth of 
each person or institution helps promote peace and justice, leave alone enhancing the 
economy and social living.
1023
 The ideal of a good society that the Principle of 
Subsidiarity targets is that envisioned by Vatican II Council‘s Gaudium et Spes, ―the 
entire human family seen in its total environment … the world as the theatre of human 
history.‖ Whoever is human is a unique member of the human family to be recognized 
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and cherished.
1024
 Ubuntu worldview, is an application of the principle of subsidiarity, 
not only because of its societal division of labor but, especially, in the recognition of the 
contribution of human otherness to every human person. According to the ideal of 
Ubuntu no one has nothing to offer; everybody should be keen to recognize what 
everybody else offers. 
3. Minority Empowerment 
Another significant component of Catholic ethical tradition is based on minority 
empowerment. This component flows right from the central teaching of Jesus Christ who 
identified with the minority and emphasized equality of people and the importance of 
service to the minority. He paradoxically stated that ―the last shall be first and the first 
shall be last‖ Mt. 20:16.This component consists of two important concepts. First, the 
principle of subsidiarity, that each member of society has a right to be helped to 
participate in the common good according to his potential and ability; second, protection 
of the vulnerable and recognition of right to healthcare for all. 
a. Subsidiarity 
The first concept of minority empowerment is the principle of subsidiarity. As has 
it has been demonstrated in the previous section the Catholic Church advocates for 
creation of an environment whereby each member of society is helped to participate in 
the common good according to his potential and ability.
1025
 The Church condemns 
―possessive individualism and freedom of indifference‖.1026 Respect for the common 
good and human dignity requires the practice of the principle of subsidiarity. The 
principle of subsidiarity received its classic formulation from Pope Pius XI in his 1931 
encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno. The principle aims at the recognition and utilization of 
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the potential of each component of society. The principle of subsidiarity protects self-
realization of individuals and subordinate organizations.
1027
 In Centesimus Annus, John 
Paul II explained the social teaching of the church in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity as stated in Rerum Novarum. The pope explained that the social nature of the 
human person is not completely fulfilled in the state, but is realized in various 
intermediary groups, beginning with the family and including economic, social, political 
and cultural groups which stem from human nature itself and have their own autonomy, 
always with a view to the common good.
1028
 
In their 1986 pastoral letter on the economy and poverty, the United States 
Catholic Bishops articulated the principle of subsidiarity in their terms. The government 
should help smaller organizations and individuals ―contribute more effectively to social 
well-being and supplement their activity when the demands of justice exceed their 
capabilities.
1029
 The United States bishops emphasized that the government should be 
proactive and take an enabling initiative. This aspect of the principle makes an active 
rather than passive principle.
1030
 Consequently, common good cannot be fully realized 
without implementing the principle of subsidiarity. The culture of Ubuntu is founded on 
subsidiarity, not only between human beings and human organizations, but also within 
nature itself. Each potential should be helped into realization. The principle of 
subsidiarity protects the poor and lower class populations in a very special way by 
enabling them to realize their potential. It gives every organization and person a chance 
to participate in the common good. Consequently it is important for solidarity and 
fostering of human dignity. The principle of subsidiarity is at the core of Ubuntu. It is 
reflected in the Sub-Saharan common division of labor according to age, gender, talent, 
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physical strength and disability. In Ubuntu the principle aims at affirming and 
empowering everybody so that each person is recognized for his contribution and 
participation in the flourishing of the society. 
(i) Pius XI’s Quadragesimo Anno – Extreme Forms of Both Socialism 
and Capitalism are Auto-destructive 
One of the dangers of exaggerated capitalism is its tendency to be auto-destructive 
so that the whole economic and social system crushes and collapses. Pius XI in his 
Quadragesimo Anno warns that capital had, and still were appropriating too much to 
itself. Economic institutions were moving in the direction of giving all the wealth to the 
rich.
1031
 Unhealthy disparity between the very few extremely rich and the big majority 
extremely poor was increasing in such a way that economic life was becoming rapidly 
inhuman and unethical. Monopolies and economic dictatorship had taken over the 
market. Power was becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands of the few rich 
minorities.
1032
 According to the Pope, this state of affairs is a fertile ground for conflict, 
protest and riots on the local, national and international levels.
1033
 The system is in itself 
violent. The majority poor already experience the violence even if it had not erupted into 
action in most cases. The cause of the violence is the injustice inherent in the division of 
the society into two opposing classes.
1034
 
Equally self-destructive is extreme forms of socialism. Pius XI argues that one 
section of socialism had already degenerated into communism. Communism is especially 
dangerous because of its inhumanity. Due to its extermination of private ownership, 
which is not natural to the human race, communism bears within itself seeds of self-
destruction. One symptom of this self-destructive tendency of communism is the obvious 
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class struggle always going on within it. The Church condemns all forms of communism 
as incompatible with the Gospel.
1035
 Although Pius XI does not condemn capitalism as 
incompatible with the Gospel as he did communism, especially because it is not in itself 
vicious, its extreme forms can be dangerous to the human race.
1036
 The system can 
condone and enable cruel and inhuman structures.
1037
 Capitalistic economy is thus not 
immune to exploitation and marginalization of human beings. 
Capitalism becomes dangerous when it is completely, or largely, under the control 
of capital and market forces, which operate on the maxim of struggle for survival and 
survival of the fittest. Profit maximization motive tends to undermine human demands of 
morality.
1038
 Unchecked capitalism can take over politics and governments so that the 
government comes under the control and greed of the few wealthy individuals. This 
situation can extend itself into a form of governmental international imperialism.
1039
 On 
the local governmental level, extreme forms of capitalism that has been taken over by 
capital become ruthless in exploiting, marginalizing and ostracizing the poor. Social life 
of the rich, which had once been highly developed through many different associations, 
collapse into a regrettable situation in which there is only the government relating to a 
few individuals.
1040
 Social order on which right reason is partly based tends to decline 
and eventually be exterminated when the society gives in completely to market forces. 
This extermination of social order is fatal to society as such. The negative force behind 
this disastrous situation is human greed and selfishness.
1041
 
Morally rightful approach to ownership of property ought to avoid two equally 
harmful extremes, namely, individualism, which implies minimization or eradication of 
social character of the right to own property; and collectivism, which means complete 
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rejection or minimization of the right to private ownership of property.
1042
 Both extremes 
harm social life by causing harm both to individuals and to the society. Just as private 
ownership should not be at the expense of the human naturally social characteristic, so is 
socializing all individual ownership of property is hazardous both to the individual and to 
the society. While commutative justice demands respect for the property of other 
individuals, owners of property are obliged in their human conscience, though not by 
justice, to use their property in a right way.
1043
 It is unethical, for example, for a 
businessperson to completely disregard the conditions of his workers by acting purely on 
self-interest and profit maximization. Profit maximization and self-interest should not be 
at the expense of human dignity of any person. Moreover, the overall good of the society 
ought to be respected.
1044
 In brief, Christian social principles regarding capital and labor 
must be put into practice.
1045
 
One of the most important points that Pius XI makes concerns the value of human 
labor. Without exertion of human labor capital cannot appropriate and grow. Being 
essential to the production process, human labor should be fairly rewarded. In other 
words when one person provides the capital and another person provides labor; the fruit 
of that labor belongs to both the owner of capital and the laborer. Ethically, they should 
both share the benefits without either of them exploiting the other.
1046
 The wealthy should 
invest in such a way that they provide for employment, thus increasing the chances for 
many to participate in the common good in line with the principle of subsidiarity.
1047
 
Intentional omission of positions within production process that could be occupied by 
masses of the poor in the society is immoral. Eliminating or replacing human labor with 
machines intentionally to deny employment to laborers rather than increase efficiency 
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and inclusion is equally immoral.
1048
 To avoid immorality due to exploitation, wages paid 
to workers must be sufficient to support the workers and their families. It must consider 
the conditions of work, it must not be so exhausting that it is detrimental to the health of 
the worker, provide for a some surplus which will allow the worker to raise his quality of 
living, rather than increase dependence, poverty and human misery.
1049
 
Pius XI does not discourage free competition in the process of production, rather 
he warns of the dangers of letting free competition determine the fate of human 
participation in the production process. He brings to attention the social nature of 
production and the necessity of human participation, not only in his rationality and 
creativity, but also in his moral and social nature. To ascertain fairness in free 
competition, especially, in order to protect the weak poor, the Government needs to 
control and regulate competition in a way that protects the poor.
1050
 Moreover, protecting 
the rights of the weak and poor laborers, the government should not take away the right 
to ownership. It must balance it fairly, determining what can be privately owned and to 
what extent, and what should not be owned privately.
1051
 In sum, Pius XI systematically, 
though without knowing it elaborates the ideals of Ubuntu worldview especially with 
regards to justice in production and distribution of property, human dignity that should 
not be compromised, protection of the poor, common good and moral social cohesion of 
all persons for the good of all. 
(ii) Paul VI on the Development of Peoples (Populorum Progressio) 
Paul VI‘s Major Concern in his encyclical Populorum Progressio is the ever 
widening gap between the rich and the poor. The encyclical notices and thus is concerned 
that the wider the gap between the rich and the poor the greater exploitation of the poor 
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and the more structural injustice in the system as a whole. Economic inequalities are 
infectious in the sense that they cause political inequality so that the richer are also the 
more politically powerful. In the process the poor are constantly being reduced into a 
position of insignificance by being overly ostracized and depleted of their worth.
1052
 The 
harsh modern economics favors the rich by helping to widen the difference in the sense 
that their favored economic position makes it easier for the rich to enjoy easier and more 
rapid growth while the poor have to struggle and develop slowly.
1053
 The gap between the 
rich and the poor tends to have opposite effects on the rich and the poor respectively. 
While it continually empowers the rich to become even more powerful, it escalates the 
misery of the poor, class tension and conflicts, thus setting grounds for revolts and 
riots.
1054
 Promotion of development should guard against widening of the gap between 
the rich and the poor because doing so is the opposite of true human progress that 
development should seek.
1055
 Since human beings are socially related by their very 
essence and nature, marginalization of either an individual or a group of human beings 
has adverse effects on the worth of the race as a whole. 
Paul VI explains the meaning of real authentic development as holistic by nature. 
It has to be integral promoting the good of every person as a member of the human 
family. In other words, development of some which happens at the expense of others 
contradicts the very meaning of development, due to the connectedness of the human 
family, the neediness of community, common good and humans‘ moral nature. No one 
can be completely free from the plight of another.
1056
 Realistic authentic development is 
always a transitional movement from less human to more human conditions. If the 
transition is not leading to more human conditions for an individual and for the society at 
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large, it is not development.
1057
 Thus, economic development, which is not human 
development, is not authentic. In fact it is not development at all.
1058
 The church should, 
by its teaching and deeds, give priority to the hungry, the miserable, the diseased and the 
ignorant, that is, all those who are marginalized and ostracized so that they can share in 
the benefits of civilization for their individual good and the good of the human genre.
1059
 
On the level of international economic relations, Paul VI notes an unhealthy 
situation in which rich nations decide the terms which favor them so that rich nations 
remain rich and poor nations are condemned to perpetual poverty. This condition is 
evident in international trade.
1060
 The Pope warns against neo-colonialism. He observes 
that even though colonialism should have been abolished, there is a worse kind of 
colonialism which takes advantage of poor nations by making them more dependent thus 
exploiting them. The Pope states that this kind of neo-colonialism is in the form of 
political and economic pressures whose ultimate aim is complete control.
1061
 Paul VI 
calls for creation of a more human world, that is, a world in which everyone can live a 
fully human life. Such development demands human solidarity which in turn demands for 
ethical maturity. Real moral maturity implies human responsibility and obligation 
towards everyone, even future generations.
1062
 Paul VII worldview in the Populorum 
Progressio, shares the same perspective, insight and objective with Ubuntu. One becomes 
human in solidarity with other humans; hence one needs other human beings to realize 
his humanity. One needs to care about other humans because that is a distinguishing 
human characteristic that cannot be put aside. Empathizing with, relating with, and caring 
about other humans defines one‘s personhood. 
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(iii) U.S. Catholic Bishops’ Catholic Framework for Economic Life 
Main thesis of the United States Catholic bishops‘ framework for economic life is 
curbing the growing economic injustice, poverty and growing income gaps in their 
country and by extension in the entire world. The bishops note that the economic 
injustice crisis is not limited to the United States of America. It is a global issue. The 
bishops provided an ―ethical framework for economic life as principles for reflection, 
criteria for judgment and directions for action.‖1063 The first directive for all Catholics is 
one of persons‘ precedence over the economy rather than the other way round. ―The 
economy exists for the person, not the person for the economy.‖ In other words the 
economy should always be understood as a means to personhood so it should not take 
over and enslave any person. The importance of this directive is explicated in Vatican II‘s 
Gaudium et Spes. To underline the precedence of personhood over the economy 
Gaudium et Spes like Ubuntu states, ―persons in extreme necessity are entitled to take 
what they need from the riches of others.‖1064 Traditionally, in Sub-Saharan Africa, a 
starving person, and a stranger has an ethical right to enter into anybody‘s property and 
eat. However, he was not allowed to carry spare food from such property. This underlies 
the precedence of human life over personal or community property. Social justice 
requires some sort of redistribution to safeguard human dignity of the disabled or 
marginalized humans. There is inevitable need to guarantee ―the sum total of all those 
conditions of social life which enable individuals, families, and organizations to achieve 
complete and effective fulfillment.‖1065 The second directive is an explanation for the 
first one. It reads, ―All economic life should be shaped by moral principles. Economic 
choices and institutions must be judged by how they protect or undermine the life and 
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dignity of the human person, support the family and serve the common good.‖1066 Once 
again, this second directive clearly provides ethical scale of priority between personhood 
and property. 
The third directive directly relates economy with morality. It reads, ―A 
fundamental moral measure of any economy is how the poor and vulnerable are faring.‖ 
This directive results from the increasing marginalization of many poor people due to 
economic competition which tends to disregard human dignity and morality. In other 
words, the U.S. bishops are concerned that by ostracizing other human persons from the 
economy the economy becomes immoral and fails to serve its end, which is human being. 
This directive is inspired by Vatican II document Gaudium et Spes which addresses the 
―excessive economic and social differences‖ among local, national, and global 
populations as a ―scandal‖ which tends to undermine ―social justice, equity, the dignity of 
the human person, as well as social and international peace.‖1067 The fourth directive 
brings to attention the basic human rights. ―All people have a right to life and to secure 
the basic necessities of life (e.g., food, clothing, shelter, education, health care, safe 
environment, economic security.)
1068
 Obviously, those rights imply obligation and 
necessity for redistribution, people being differently endowed. 
The fifth directive of the United States Bishops addresses the right and freedom of 
active participation that all human beings have. It reads, ―All people have the right to 
economic initiative, to productive work, to just wages and benefits, to decent working 
conditions as well as to organize and join unions or other associations.‖ The sixth 
directive logically flows from the fifth. It states, ―All people, to the extent they are able, 
have a corresponding duty to work, a responsibility to provide the needs of their families 
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and an obligation to contribute to the broader society.‖ This directive cautions against the 
danger of laxity on the side of the poor. It calls for justice from the poor. The poor do not 
only need to be protected and be given opportunities to provide for themselves and their 
families, they need to actively participate in the economic life. In other words, the poor 
should not take advantage of their situation and fail to make use of their right and 
responsibility to function as human persons in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity. 
The seventh directive calls for governmental active engagement in the economic 
life. It states, that ―In economic life, free markets have both clear advantages and limits; 
government has essential responsibilities and limitations; voluntary groups have 
irreplaceable roles, but cannot substitute for the proper working of the market and the just 
policies of the state.‖ Closely related to the seventh directive is the eighth directive, 
which reads, ―Society has a moral obligation, including governmental action where 
necessary, to assure opportunity, meet basic human needs, and pursue justice in economic 
life.‖1069 This directive relates to and addresses the situation that John Paul II grieves 
over: The ―innumerable multitude of people—children, adults and the elderly, in other 
words, real and unique human persons — who are suffering under the intolerable burden 
of poverty.‖ John Paul II‘s intention was to draw attention to the alarming 
marginalization of multitudes of poor people clearly seen in the homelessness, 
unemployment and international debt.
1070
 
The ninth and tenth directives are a reminder that human beings involved in 
economy should remain moral agents, otherwise there is a conflict between economy and 
personhood. The ninth directive states, ―Workers, owners, managers, stockholders and 
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consumers are moral agents in economic life. By our choices, initiative, creativity and 
investment, we enhance or diminish economic opportunity, community life and social 
justice.‖ The tenth directive points to the global economic moral dimension that tends to 
be forgotten. The directive states, ―The global economy has moral dimensions and human 
consequences. Decisions on investment, trade, aid and development should protect 
human life and promote human rights, especially for those most in need wherever they 
might live on this globe.
1071
 This directive relates with John XXIII‘s Pacem in Terris, 
which addresses discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, refugee status, class, 
and gender. John XXIII brings to attention wide discrepancies in economic and social 
development among global community of states and among individuals. Common good is 
not limited to one nation; it is a global issue.
1072
 The directives of the United States 
Bishops on economic justice for all are based on the primacy of personhood over 
products of human activity/labor. They are not only in line with St. Thomas‘ philosophy 
of the precedence of the first act -- that of being, over the second act -- that which 
proceeds from being, they share the worldview of Ubuntu. Human life ought to be always 
precedent to products of human labor. 
b. The Vulnerable 
The second concept of minority empowerment is based on the vulnerable and 
their right to healthcare. The Catholic Church‘s tradition of fundamental option for the 
poor recognizes and affirms the universal right to healthcare.
1073
 The Church is against 
abandoning the poor to the vagaries of economic market forces in health care in which 
only the fittest survive.
1074
 In and of itself, human dignity justifies healthcare as a basic 
human right. Health care, therefore, should not be commoditized. According to United 
States Conference of Catholic Bishops, reliance on market forces has failed to provide a 
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solution to ensuring that the right to care is guaranteed to all by virtue of their common 
shared humanity.
1075
 The bishops argue that those with greater resources should 
contribute to the health care of others in proportion to their ability to contribute to the 
financing of a national health system.
1076
 Their recommendation interprets and applies 
Pius XI‘s encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, that the role of the government includes 
protecting private individuals and their rights and giving precedence to the poor.
1077
 The 
bishops‘ argument is equally supported by John Paul II‘s Sollicitudo Rei Socialis in 
which he states that individual claims on the protection of existing resources are not 
absolute in the face of the more basic needs of others. The pope states categorically that a 
society dedicated to the pursuit of private property ―fails to honor the truth that private 
property is under a social mortgage.‖1078 This papal statement, however, does not deny 
legitimate control and use of property. It emphasizes that ownership and use of resources 
must be conditioned by an expansive concern for human wellbeing that views material 
goods within their ordination to the common good.
1079
 Human rights of the weak and 
poor ought to be protected by the government.
1080
 Workers ought to be protected from 
being used as tools rather than be treated as ends in themselves.
1081
 
The society which is based on the biological principles of struggle for survival 
and survival of the fittest is not humane. The Church‘s mission in its social teaching is to 
challenge the society to transcend the principle of survival of the fittest. The Church‘s 
teaching on the right to healthcare for the less privileged is contained in the culture of 
Ubuntu as explicated in chapter two. The Church‘s organized teaching helps enlighten 
Ubuntu‘s fundamental worldview on the rights of the poor and under privileged. 
According to Ubuntu culture no individual survival is possible independent of the support 
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of the community. Consequently, everybody is vulnerable. An individual is always a part 
of the whole and needs the whole to be fully realized. Enabling and empowering the 
vulnerable is an obligation of the fortunate, a right to the vulnerable and a duty of the 
society to ascertain. 
(i) Leo XIII on Rights and Duties of Capital and Labor (Rerum 
Novarum) 
Although Catholic Church has always delivered social teaching from the time of 
Christ, the encyclical Rerum Novarum of Leo XIII is considered as the summary of the 
church‘s position on issues pertaining to justice and social ethics with regards to capital 
and human labor. Leo XIII was compelled to write his encyclical Rerum Novarum by the 
inhumane condition the working poor were pushed into by their rich employers. The 
working poor were in need of rescue from their misery. They were as well not protected 
from any injustice or violence by their employers.
1082
 The most important requirement on 
the side of the rich few is to pay justly for the work done by the poor. Since the poor 
work to keep their lives, live decently and to procure property and better conditions of 
living, their pay should enable them to do that. Just pay should not be only that which is 
enough for subsistence. As human beings, not any less than their employers, workers 
deserve to prosper and enjoy progress and better living as a reward of the work they 
do.
1083
 
One of the most important arguments on which Leo XIII bases his argument is the 
irrefutable fact that in essence as human beings the poor are not any less than the rich. 
The poor are equal to the rich also in their human rights and dignity. The poor are as well 
equal in citizenship with the rich. Moreover, their work is the source of the nation‘s 
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wealth. It is immoral and ethically unjustifiable, therefore, to belittle or look down on the 
poor, or judge their human worth based on their lack of property. Religion should not be 
used to justify the evil of oppression, exploitation and marginalization of the poor. 
Moreover, according to Leo XIII, the favor of God seems to incline more towards the 
poor. Thus, those who consider the poor and minister to them in attitude and deed are 
God-like.
1084
 People have an obligation to, as much as they can, liberate the poor from the 
savagery of greedy people. There are three types of institutions that can help in this noble 
task. One of the three is working with associations that provide material aid; the second is 
establishing, enabling and working with privately funded agencies that help workers. The 
third type of institution is foundations that care for defendants.
1085
 
Material wellbeing of the poor is not only beneficial for the rich who employ 
them and the common good of the nation; it is a matter of justice and morality. Being 
human just like their employers, poor workers deserve enough to enable them to afford a 
decent shelter, clothes, security and food. Unjust treatment of workers should not be 
accepted as though it were inevitable. While he encouraged them to stand up for their 
rights, the Pope discouraged demonstrations and encouraged order. One should protect 
one‘s own rights and interests while refraining from riots and violence. Formation of 
unions that stand for, and with the poor is a good idea.
1086
 A worker should neither 
intentionally destroy the property of his employer nor forcibly take other persons‘ 
properties since the right to personal property must be kept inviolate.
1087
 Leo XIII urged 
employers never to treat their employees as means to an end. Being human, they cannot 
be reduced to a means for other human beings‘ ends. They are an end themselves. They 
should neither be treated as slaves nor be used as things for some gain. Since the 
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employer needs his poor worker it is only wise to have a harmonious humane relationship 
with him. Mistreating workers is counterproductive as it haphazardly affects ownership 
and business.
1088
 In sum, workers‘ human dignity should always be honored. They are 
persons with physical, spiritual, psychological, moral and familial needs.
1089
 
The encyclical Rerum Novarum is balanced and fair as it seeks justice for all. It 
urges the poor, for instance, to do the work they are paid for diligently, knowing that it is 
not only just, they are actually contributing to the common good as a members of human 
community.
1090
 The government should oversee that workers are justly treated and fairly 
paid. The criterion for discerning fair pay should not be the employers‘ desires. There 
must be objective ways to evaluate human labor and reward it. Wages should minimally 
be enough to provide for the workers‘ and their families‘ basic needs. If a worker accepts 
wages which are less than this he submits to force and violence. Needless to say, work 
should be reasonable, proportionate and considerate of the workers wellbeing. It should 
not wear him out or put him into unnecessary risk.
1091
 The government should oversee 
employers‘ treatment of their workers so that workers are not entirely at the mercy of 
their employers.
1092
 Rerum Novarum is not only substantially in agreement with Ubuntu, 
it systematically and analytically explains objectives of Ubuntu without intending it. The 
validity of the philosophy of Ubuntu is vivified by Leo XIII‘s Rerum Novarum. The 
employer needs the worker as a human being just as the worker needs the employer for 
the good of both the employer and employee, and for the common good. 
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(ii) John Paul II on the Hundredth Year of Rerum Novarum 
(Centesimus Annus) 
John Paul II wrote Centesimus Annus on the hundredth anniversary of Rerum 
Novarum to assess development based on the challenges and objectives of Rerum 
Novarum. John Paul II not only explores and exposes positive development with regards 
to respect for human dignity, equality and rights, he discovers new challenges 
confronting the global human community and needing to be reckoned with. One of such 
problems is Socialism and its tendency to degrade human personhood into a mere 
element, insignificant relative to national populations. This error is a serious moral 
concern since denying any human being his due dignity and rights starts a slippery slope 
in which human rights cannot be defended.
1093
 Due to its systematic suppression and 
undermining of human dignity, rights and freedoms Socialism is bound to fail and has 
already been defeated. However, its defeat should not leave Capitalism as the only model 
of economic organization.
1094
 In fact, the fall of Marxism highlights human 
interdependence and mutual neediness.
1095
 
Human need for other humans is also suppressed, overlooked, or ignored by 
capitalistic economic systems. There is still marginalization, exploitation and alienation 
of people, especially in the Third World Countries.
1096
 On one hand John Paul two 
cautions the world against exaggerated and uncontrolled capitalistic tendency to let 
capital dictate the fate of human dignity; on the other hand John Paul II rejoices at the 
fact that there is growth in the awareness of human rights with United Nations as focal 
point since 1945.
1097
 However, the United Nations has not been successful in establishing 
a development policy or effective system of international conflict resolution which would 
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be a better alternative to war.
1098
 Although decolonization has already happened, the 
political liberation has not been true holistic human liberation. There is neo-colonialism, 
economic manipulation and control of the poor nations by the rich ones. Lack of a 
competent professional class in the newly independent countries is one of the major 
factors that perpetuate other forms of colonization via unnecessary dependence.
1099
 
Foreign debt should not be used as a means of undermining, marginalizing and exploiting 
poor nations; it should be handled in a way that respects human rights to subsistence and 
progress.
1100
 
John Paul II notes that there has been a situation of non-war in Europe since the 
end of the Second World War. One of the observable signs of progress is the collapse of 
oppressive Eastern Europe regimes in 1989 and the transitioning of some Third World 
Countries to a more just and participatory structure within themselves and in the global 
community.
1101
 However, he observes that non-war is not equivalent to peace. He 
laments that many people lost, and still don‘t possess their ability to control their own 
destiny as arms race and violent extremist groups some with atomic capabilities silently 
oppress the world.
1102
 Majority of world populations are structurally denied the basic 
means to acquire the knowledge they need to enter and participate in the world of 
technology and intercommunication.
1103
 They are systematically marginalized. Hence, 
capitalism still stands in need of addressing its flaws. Free market economy has failed to 
satisfy many human needs. There is need for ethics and respect for human rights within 
economic systems.
1104
 
John Paul II warns that atheism and contempt for the human person causes class 
struggle and militarism since peace and human prosperity are natural goods that belong to 
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all members of the human race.
1105
 Promoting human development of the poor is an 
opportunity for moral, cultural and economic growth of the entire human race.
1106
 
Observing the principle of subsidiarity is helpful in determining the juridical framework 
of economic affairs, especially because subsidiarity renders each people an opportunity to 
participate and achieve self-realization.
1107
 Development must be holistic by addressing 
all aspects of humanity, not merely the economic one.
1108
 The present generation should 
always be conscious of their responsibility for the planet for their sake and that of future 
generations,
1109
 while, at the same time, creating a lifestyle in which there is quest for 
truth, beauty, goodness and common good that illumine and help determine choices 
made.
1110
 Totalitarianism is an enemy of human progress and it is found in the denial of 
the transcendental dignity of the human person.
1111
 Humans need to promote a culture of 
peace that provide all with realistic opportunities to progress, self-realization and 
happiness.
1112
 
Like Ubuntu, John Paul II‘s Centesimus Annus underlines the importance of, not 
only respecting human dignity, but working together as human family to promote 
solidarity for the sake of self-realization of all, peaceful community, happiness and 
meaningful life. Both worldviews guard against exploitation of any human by any other 
human being due to its effect of depleting the very essence of humanity of meaning. Both 
views caution against any form of violence against human beings, nature and future 
generations as contradictory to the meaningful human life and human nature as free and 
rational beings. Centesimus Annus is classically, scientifically and systematically written 
but its perspective is shared by Ubuntu which has been passed on as a philosophy of life 
based on experience and praxis for many centuries and which has systematically 
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developed while being enriched by the new challenges that the indigenous Sub-Sahara 
African communities experienced at any particular time in their history. Thus Ubuntu can 
be said to validate the practicality and relevance of both Rerum Novarum and Centecimus 
Annus. The following section will explore application of the perspective of Centecimus 
Annus on preferential option for the poor from South American liberation theology. 
Assuming human essential equality which should transcend their accidental endowments. 
(iii) Gutiérrez on Poverty and Catholic Preferential Option for the 
Poor 
Gustavo Gutiérrez is one of the most known liberation theologians especially 
following his work, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation.
1113
 In 
order to capture an overview of his perspective of liberation theology this section is based 
on an interview found in America: The National Catholic Weekly Titled ―Remembering 
the Poor: An Interview with Gustavo Gutiérrez‖ of February 3, 2003. According to 
Gutiérrez poverty is sub-human condition in which majority of humanity lives today. By 
describing it as sub-human Gutiérrez implies that it is unfair and unethical and that the 
minority who are not poor bear some responsibility for the sub-human condition of the 
majority of their poor counterparts. Consequently Gutiérrez describes poverty as ―more 
than social issue.‖ It is an ethical issue, a religious issue and a theological issue. Thus 
―poverty poses a major challenge to every Christian conscience and therefore to theology 
as well.‖1114 It cannot be brushed away because it stares at the entire human society, 
especially those who claim to be Disciples of Christ by trying to follow Christ‘s 
footsteps. Gutiérrez confronts the situation of the poor of the world with the Christian 
message of loving neighbor as oneself. Caring for the neighbor as for oneself is the ideal 
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of Ubuntu. Liberation theology, therefore, is similar to Ubuntu, at least in its ideals. 
Ubuntu, however, is not Christianity as it is not based on Christian revealed truth. Ubuntu 
holds that each human being is a unique product of many interconnections facilitated 
both by God and divinities using other humans and the cosmos. Thus caring for the poor 
in Ubuntu is a matter of justice, not charity. Care for the poor, the sick and any needy 
member of the human family defines the meaning of being human. Thus it is essential to 
humanity. Gutiérrez‘s argument for the care of the poor is based on the core teaching of 
Christ who identified with the poor. Thus, caring for the poor is within the essential 
substance of Christianity. On the other side, Ubuntu holds that each human being is a 
unique product of many interconnections facilitated both by God and divinities using 
other humans and the cosmos. Ubuntu morality can neither ignore interpersonal human 
relationships nor the necessary existential relationships between human beings and their 
environment.  
Just as humans find themselves in a context, theology is always contextual. 
Gutiérrez corrects the use of the phrase ―contextual theologies‖ exclusively for liberation 
theology by stating that theology has always been contextual. ―Some theologies, it is true, 
may be more conscious of and explicit about their contextuality, but all theological 
investigation is necessarily carried out within a specific historical context.‖1115 His 
approach is obviously existential and praxis oriented. Although traditional understanding 
of theology is that of faith seeking understanding, Gutiérrez focuses on the application of 
both faith and understanding to human situation rooted in its specific socio-historical and 
geographical context. Gutiérrez describes our present context as one that is ―characterized 
by a glaring disparity between the rich and the poor.‖ It is this disparity which is at the 
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base of liberation theology movement, since it has to be addressed.
1116
 In other words, 
Gutiérrez posits that a theology that abstracts from reality while ignoring the factual, 
spacio-temporal reality is unrealistic. 
Gutiérrez observes that ―Poverty has a visibility today that it did not have in the 
past. The faces of the poor must now be confronted.‖ Christians and the entire human 
society cannot and ought not to ignore the reality of poverty that confronts them, 
demanding action and solution. There is simply no escape. ―No serious Christian can 
quietly ignore this situation.‖ Ignorance of the plight of the poor is not invincible. 
Fortunately, nowadays there are means to resolve the problem of poverty. In the distant 
past ―poverty was considered to be an unavoidable fate, but such a view is no longer 
possible or responsible‖ because now human society has the ability to ascertain provision 
of the decent minimum of human needs for dignified life. More importantly ―we also 
understand the causes of poverty and the conditions that perpetuate it. Now we know that 
poverty is not simply a misfortune; it is an injustice.‖1117 Even though Gutiérrez does not 
qualify or define his use of the word ‗injustice‘ in this case, there certainly is some 
injustice in the denial of dignity and means to sustain that dignity to every poor human 
being. Nobody is exempt from this kind of omission. 
Gutiérrez describes material poverty as ―premature and unjust death‖ since the 
poor are forced by their situation to succumb to the consequences of their poverty. They 
are thus denied of their human dignity, either actively or passively by their fellow 
humans. In reality a poor person is thus being reduced or treated ―as a non-person, 
someone who is considered insignificant from an economic, political and cultural point of 
view.‖ In other words, in the judgment of other human beings ―the poor count as 
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statistics; they are the nameless.‖ However, in the sight of God, the poor are ―never 
insignificant.‖ As humans they are equal to the rich.1118 According to Gutiérrez, 
therefore, ―the option for the poor is not optional, but is incumbent upon every Christian. 
It is not something that a Christian can either take or leave. As understood by Medellín, 
the option for the poor is twofold: it involves standing in solidarity with the poor, but it 
also entails a stance against inhumane poverty.‖1119 Hence option for the poor is a task, a 
duty and responsibility that is shared by all human beings, especially Christians. 
Gutiérrez boldly states that ―option for the poor has become part of the Catholic 
social teaching. The phrase comes from the experience of the Latin American church. 
The precise term was born sometime between the Latin American bishops‘ conferences 
in Medellín (1968) and in Puebla (1979).‖ However, as a theology, it is universal. ―The 
content, the underlying intuition, is entirely biblical. Liberation theology tries to deepen 
our understanding of this core biblical conviction.‖1120 Although always rooted in the 
actual situation on a specific ground ―a good contextual theology, though, will also deal 
with global issues, because Christian responsibility does not stop at the border. The 
ministry of solidarity has international dimensions.‖1121 In other words, being human is 
not exclusive of other humans regardless their location. There is a basic connection 
between all human beings that hold all responsible for all others. 
Preferential option for the poor is part and parcel of Catholic socio-ethical 
teaching. It started with Christ himself. It runs through most encyclicals and Vatican II 
Documents. In his Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Nuntiandi, Pope Paul the VI states 
that it is the duty of the church ―to proclaim the liberation of millions of human beings … 
struggle to overcome everything which condemns them to remain on the margin of life: 
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famine, chronic disease, illiteracy, poverty, injustices in international relations and 
especially in commercial exchanges, situations of economic and cultural neo-colonialism 
sometimes as cruel as the old political colonialism.‖1122 John Paul II has been on the 
forefront in defense of preferential option for the poor. In his encyclical Sollicitudo rei 
Socialis he states ―the option or love of preference for the poor … a special form of 
primacy in the exercise of Christian charity, to which the whole tradition of the Church 
bears witness.‖1123 In his Centesimus Annus, John Paul II categorically states, ―love for 
others, and in the first place love for the poor, in whom the Church sees Christ himself, is 
made concrete in the promotion of justice.‖1124 In Sollicitudo rei Socialis, Pope John Paul 
II says that solidarity is ―not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the 
misfortunes‖ of the poor but ―a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to 
the common good.‖1125 
In sum, Catholic socio-ethical tradition has always been in defense of the poor; 
and for their liberation and protection. In many ways Ubuntu identifies both with 
Catholic socio-ethical teaching and liberation theology. One of the major ways Ubuntu 
does it practically is its refusal to let any human being fall below what is acceptable by 
the society as decent enough for his dignity as human. There is always an imaginary 
poverty line in the cultures that share Ubuntu worldview. Such line is relative to average 
wealth within the society. Ubuntu‘s worldview is praxis oriented. For the sake of the 
human essence that every member of the society shares every person is actively 
responsible and engaged in the plight of the poor. Ubuntu is proactive with regards to this 
issue since its stance is that of prevention. The reason there are excessively rich people is 
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that there are excessively poor people. Ubuntu watches against this unethical extreme as a 
matter of faith and morality. 
Conclusion 
The Church‘s teaching emphasizes that human dignity is inherent in each human 
being. It is the inherent human dignity in itself that commands recognition and respect. 
Respecting human dignity means observing and protecting human rights. Like Catholic 
tradition, the culture of Ubuntu has deep respect for human dignity. In both Catholic 
socio-ethical teaching and Ubuntu world view a human person is a unique beginning and 
end. Each person commands attention, respect and dignity worth his nature as 
unrepeatable unique event. Theological truths about human personhood should never be 
left aside in any realistic human development. Any attempt to do that leads to absurdity. 
Due to human dignity and rights both Catholic teaching and Ubuntu respect Common 
good without violating individual freedoms and rights. Common good in practice means 
that the society has to assure human dignity by ascertaining the decent minimum of care 
for all. The society provides security and assurance of protection to its members. 
The teaching of the importance of human community in the Catholic Catechism is 
replicated in the Ubuntu worldview. The only substantial exception is Catholic‘s religious 
dimension of human community founded on, and inspired by, the Sacred Trinity. Even 
though Ubuntu ideal of community and society is religious, it is not explicitly Christian. 
It can be argued, however, that Ubuntu worldview is a kind of anonymous Christianity 
due to Ubuntu worldview‘s substantial resemblance to Christian Ideals. Ubuntu 
understanding of solidarity finds endorsement in the Catholic traditional social teaching. 
That is, nobody should be marginalized since doing so destroys not just the victim but 
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also the offender and the entire human species. Ostracizing a human person depletes the 
very essence of humanity of meaning. Self-realization of humans, whether moral, 
cognitive or sociological, is never independent of other human beings. This essential 
contingency of humans to fellow humans is the core of Ubuntu worldview. Human 
beings need other human beings, those currently alive, those who have passed on, on 
whose shoulders the present generation stands, and those to come. The present generation 
needs future generations to continue what the present generation has received and started, 
or else it is all absurd and meaningless. 
Nobody can live for oneself alone. Mutuality is characteristic of human beings. 
Human actions have dual characteristics, that is, at once for self and for the society. The 
greatest teacher and inspiration of this fact is Christ who gave of himself for the salvation 
of the human race. On the side of Ubuntu the inspiration comes from the awareness that 
all that a person is, is received and what he is and have, have to be shared or passed on. 
Catholic socio-ethical tradition has always been in defense of the poor; and for their 
liberation and protection. In many ways, though unconsciously, Ubuntu identifies both 
with Catholic socio-ethical teaching and liberation theology. One of the major ways 
Ubuntu does it practically is in its refusal to let any human being fall below poverty line, 
relative to the community‘s economy. The poor in the society become the concern of 
every member of that specific society. The gap between the poor and the rich is the yard 
stick that measures morality of both the society and the individuals‘ in it. Catholic socio-
ethical teaching is normally first documented before it is put to practice; Ubuntu teaching 
is praxis oriented, based on centuries of experience that has been handed over. Ubuntu is 
a communitarian ethic. Every member of the society participates in the struggle against 
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all that is contrary to both individual and communal good; consequently, every person is 
actively responsible and engaged in the plight of the poor both at an individual level and 
at a societal level. Ubuntu is proactive since its stance is that of prevention. Ubuntu 
cautions, not only against dehumanizing poverty but also against disproportional riches. 
Ubuntu recognizes the fact that the reason there are excessively rich people in the society 
is that there are excessively poor people. Ubuntu watches against that as a matter of faith 
and morality. 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation interprets the culture of Ubuntu to explain the contribution of a 
representative indigenous African ethics to global bioethics. Specifically, Ubuntu 
presents a representative communal worldview for ethical decisions whereby individuals, 
community and world are connected together. Ubuntu ethics protects individual rights 
within a cosmic context to enhance solidarity. However, solidarity is essential for 
maximization of quantity and quality of human life. Precisely, Ubuntu worldview 
promotes life-centered ethics. Specifically, the dissertation demonstrates that Ubuntu is a 
representative world view that upholds respect for persons, construed in terms of their 
dignity and rights, in the context of relationality with the cosmos and the subsidiarity 
with the human community. Human relationships are important because they help 
generate, recognize, promote and nurture human life. Human relationships with the 
biosphere and the cosmos ought to be life nurturing, life maximizing and life promoting 
mainly because human life is dependent on its immediate environment and the cosmos.  
Ubuntu holds that maintenance of optimal equilibrium, integrity and sanctity of 
the cosmos is a sacred and moral obligation. Humans have a duty and obligation to 
provide good stewardship, treasure, and safeguard their environment both for the current 
and for future generations as a matter of ethics. Future generations belong to the realm of 
―the other‖ without whom ―the self‖ cannot be defined. Cognition and its development 
does not happen independent of acknowledgement of otherness. Equally, moral 
development is other – centered. Thus Ubuntu worldview contrasts Cartesian‘s Cogito 
Ergo Sum. Every member of the human genre has an ultimate personal obligation to 
grow, that is, to become fully human. To become fully human means to maximize both 
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personal and communal life by increasingly entering into community with other persons 
and the cosmos without losing or compromising one‘s individuality. 
Healthcare in Ubuntu is a concern of all members of society. From the perspective 
of Ubuntu, the poor and the underprivileged have a just claim to the labor, talent and time 
of the community in whose life they share. It is a moral duty, not optional charity, to 
provide for those who cannot provide for themselves while recognizing and appreciating 
their contribution, according to the principle of subsidiarity. No human life is in vain. 
When human life is at stake, no individual rights holds. Human life overrides all 
individual rights, except when such life is a threat to more lives or the life of the 
community. Caring is a proof of both personal and community moral maturity. Ubuntu 
assumes that the welfare of individuals is dependent on the welfare of the community as a 
whole, just as it assumes that ‗being an individual is being with others and that the self 
stands in constant need of an-other. Hence the individual does not take precedence over 
the community. Initiations are geared toward acknowledgement that ethically, individual 
rights meet their limit in the rights of other individuals represented in sum by the 
community. It is the continual process of initiation into and through the community 
which enables sub-Sahara Africans to think in ‗both/and rather than either/or‘ categories. 
Personal maturity is realized in the process of synthesizing and reconciling of personal 
autonomy with other persons‘ autonomy. One of the basic functions of the society is to 
ascertain and protect human relationships so that they promote and nourish life. 
Consequently, Ubuntu synthesizes the tension between the ethical principles of 
autonomy, justice and beneficence.  
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Ubuntu understands human disease comprehensively, essentially as a breach or 
breakage of human integrity. Ubuntu healthcare addresses not only the visible symptoms, 
but the possible underlying physiogenic, psychological, social and ontological causes. 
Healing, therefore, is a process of reconciliation. Healing reconciles and restores the lost 
unity within the self; between the self and the society; between the self and the diseased; 
between the self and the cosmos; and between the self and God. Thus, Ubuntu 
perspective on human disease and healing is comprehensive and holistic. Essentially, 
Ubuntu is undeniably an ethic of care that conforms to the ideals and objectives of the 
UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. Even though Ubuntu is not 
explicitly Christian, its substance makes it an anonymous Christian worldview, especially 
due to its shared perspective with Christian social ethics. 
The first part (chapters one and two) explains the meaning of Ubuntu, as a 
representative indigenous ethics, and its three constituent components. This part 
demonstrates that Ubuntu represents indigenous ethics that focus on the centrality of 
respecting rights based on human dignity, recognizing the cosmic context of ethics, to 
enhance the role of solidarity. The second part (chapters three, four, and five) interprets 
the culture of Ubuntu as providing a representative African ethics that contributes to 
global bioethics. To explore this contribution to global bioethics, the three components of 
Ubuntu ethics are analyzed in light of major approaches to contemporary bioethics 
discourse. In chapter three, the component of rights in Ubuntu ethics is explored as being 
consistent with and enhancing bioethics discourse in the ethics of care. In chapter four the 
component of cosmic context is explored as being consistent with and enhancing 
bioethics discourse related to the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. 
 343  
In chapter five the component of solidarity in Ubuntu ethics is explored as being 
consistent with and enhancing bioethics discourse in the global Catholic tradition of 
social ethics.  
In sum Ubuntu makes a valid contribution to global bioethics that ought to be 
seriously considered. The contribution that Ubuntu makes to global bioethics is 
paradoxically facilitated by its openness to systematized and principled enlightenment by 
major global trends in bioethics such as Ethics of Care, UNESCO Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights and the Catholic Traditional Socio-Ethical Teaching. All 
major trends in ethics presume and share in the assertion of Ubuntu that the very essence 
of the human ―self” is annihilated by the sheer absence of the ―other.‖ Selfhood is 
undeniably and helplessly dependent on otherness. Ignorance of otherness is ignorance of 
the selfhood. 
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